Edmund Husserl’s Polemic over Relativism and Skepticism. Early phase

Janusz Sidorek

Danger of skeptic consequences of relativism was one of the main motives which led Edmund Husserl to taking up polemic with psychologism. This polemic was discussed and analyzed repeatedly, so instead of speculating on validity and importance of each of the arguments used, I rather focus on the structure of argumentation articulated in Prolegomena to pure logic and to consider the role of frequently dismissed thread of the epistemological absolutism’s apology. For Husserl this absolutism is strictly connected with a conception of signifi cances as ideal species, thus in next step I try to show that basic draft of this conception is present already in polemic arguments of Prolegomena. That in turn appears to lead up to the conclusion, which – contrary to the declarations – that in respect of systematic the Husserl’s polemic over relativism is placed before strict phenomenological turning point – it seems to be its ramification. Subsequently I demonstrate how becomingaware of this fact leads Husserl straight to the idea of phenomenological reduction.

Keywords: Husserl · psychologism · relativism · skepticism · phenomenology

Janusz Sidorek – Associated Professor at The Warsaw School of Economics. Research interests: history of philosophy in the 19th and 20th century, phenomenology. Translator and commentator of works of Edmund Husserl and contemporary German philosophers.   »  

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