The article presents the main threads of the dispute over fact/value dichotomy as discussed by analytic philosophers. The analysis aims to show the implicit assumptions of dichotomization of facts and values (Ayer, Hare), and attempts to undermining the dichotomy (Foot, Searle). Hypothetical results of the discussion are considered with particular reference to MacIntyre’s account of its origins and concentrate on the historical variability of the grammar of moral language. According to the arguments offered by MacIntyre, undichotomic account of facts and values requires unambiguity of rules connecting evaluations and factual criteria of their use. From this point of view the emotivization of moral language should be treated as a result of decomposition of grammar connected with the collapse of traditional communities of rules and values.
Maciej Soin — Prof. dr., Institute of Social Sciences and Management of Technologies, Łódz University of Technology. Main publications: “The Philosophy of S.I. Witkiewicz” (1995), “Grammar and Metaphysics. Wittgenstein’s Problem” (2001), “Th e Question of Truth. Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy” (2008). His current research focuses on applications of linguistic philosophy to sociology and ethics.
The journal founded by Leszek Kołakowski, Bronisław Baczko and Jan Garewicz appears continuously since 1957.