The paper discusses critically Richard Rorty’s exclusion of the truth category from his conception on philosophy functions as well as from his proposal of a new culture in the post-philosophical world. Especially, the author of the paper considers critically Rorty’s thesis claiming that truth is destructive not only as an epistemological value, but as a regulative ideal in Lebenswelt; in Rorty’s view truth should be eliminated totally from social life, from individual human existence, as well as from religion, politics, and the moral sphere. It is argued that Rorty’s truth exclusion leads necessarily his two main ideas of Lebenswelt organization (that is, solidarity, and tolerance) to serious degeneration.
![]() | 57-czarnocka |
Keywords: truth · tolerance · solidarity · objectivity · anti-individualism
The journal founded by Leszek Kołakowski, Bronisław Baczko and Jan Garewicz appears continuously since 1957.