Hegel’s logic is an analysis of being in the sense of all possible objects of thought and experience, of essence in the sense of all meaningful theoretical explanations of appearances or phenomena, and of the concept in the sense of our conceptual system of default differentiations and generic inferences. The contrast between general sentences expressing situation- and time-independent dispositions as default inferences and empirical truths with a situational and temporal dependent copula (was/is/will be) replaces Kant’s distinction between a priori and a posteriori judgements in the Critique of Pure Reason. Truth, reality and objectivity are not situated in a transcendent sphere behind the phenomena, but play an internal role in our transsubjective explication and explanation of experience in the generic sense of what can be intersubjectively recognized or reproduced.
Keywords: Hegel · a priori · appearance · being · concept · essence · for itself · form · generic inference · in itself · logic · ontological proof · projection
Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer – Prof. Dr., studies, research and teaching in philosophy, linguistics and mathematics in Konstanz, Berlin, Prague/CZ, Berkeley/CA, Campinas/Sao Paolo and Pitts burgh/PA. Since 1992 Professor for Philosophy at the University of Leipzig, Visiting Professor in Swansea (University of Wales, 1997/98), New York (New School University, 2002), and Pittsburgh (2006/7). Since 2008 President of the Saxonian Academy of Science. Main research interests: philosophical logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, Plato, Kant, Hegel, Wittgenstein.
The journal founded by Leszek Kołakowski, Bronisław Baczko and Jan Garewicz appears continuously since 1957.