Revision of Brentanos Cartesianism in Twardowskis Idea and Perception

Wojciech Starzyński

The task of the paper is to determine the influence of Brentano’s thought on Twardowski’s doctoral thesis Idee und Perception. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Untersuc­hung aus Descartes (Wien 1892), and then to establish the consequences of this influence in the form of solutions adopted by Twardowski. The first part reconstructs Brentano’s analysis of the Cartesian theory of judgment, and in particular the question of participation of will in formation of judgments. These considerations lead Brentano to a critique the Cartesian con­ception of perception, which he describes as a hybrid one. In the second part, Twardowski’s thesis is read as a revision of Brentano’s critique of Descartes. Twardowski states, however, contrary to Brentano, that the Cartesian perception is not treated by Descartes as a represen­tation, and, partly in accordance with Brentano, that Descartes, in his theory of perception, is not fully consistent in maintaining the introduced tripartite division of a mental phenom­enon, because perception not treated as a judgment, but only as a condition of judgment, which seems to introduce a separate, fourth class of phenomenon into this division.

DOI: 10.37240/AHFiMS.2022.66.67.6


Keywords: Brentano · Twardowski · Descartes · perception · representatiom · judgment · will

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