Ludwig Wittgenstein and “Metaphysics as a Kind of Magic”

Urszula Idziak

In this article we will approach Wittgenstein’s critique of the explanatory attitude whether undertaken towards Sigmund Freud’s interpretation of dreams or Sir James Frazer’s explanation of ritual. However the clue concept will be that of magic, as something that has not been suffi  ciently defi ned in the Wittgensteinian terminology. We seek to off er an understanding of Wittgenstein’s mysterious statement that was to begin the Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough – “What it is that is deep about magic would be kept”. A  preliminary approach to Wittgenstein and magic issue seems to introduce implicitly an affective category, which according to Wittgenstein, should be the axis of any turn to practice when studying language. Th e aff ective component present in many late Wittgenstein writings has inspired many emotivist or expressivist interpretations of his thought. However, we aim to reconsider the emphasis made by Wittgenstein on the lived aspect of religion, and his non-approval for empirical knowledge concerning such issues as a more important shift  of paradigm which further elaboration is to be found in Jean-Luc Nancy’s project of deconstructing Christianity.


Słowa kluczowe: religion · magic · Wittgenstein · affect

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