The goal of the paper is to show in a rather schematic and concise manner what is the place of Husserl’s phenomenology within the tradition of the post-Kantian transcendental philosophy. Two models were developed in this tradition. First model, subjective, was developed by Baden School. In this model, inspired by Fichte, more emphasis is put on aprioristic transcendental subject. Second model is more objective oriented, where the starting point is not a transcendental subject (which does not exist) but intersubjective world of meanings, constituted within the boundaries of non-egologically conceptualized consciousness. The evaluation of Husserl’s position is ambivalent: transcendental phenomenology understood critically is very close to the objective model but its dogmatic Cartesian trait pulls it at same time relatively close to the Fichtean model. Text attempts to elucidate stages of development of the transcendental philosophy. First stage – Kantian, where transcendental philosophy is a critique that precedes subsequent development of philosophy, second stage – neo-Kantian, which reduces whole philosophy to the theory of cognition and knowledge and the third – connected to Husserl – where transcendental philosophy could constitute itself as ontology. Husserl harks back to the traditional conception of truth and apophantic judgements and this transports transcendental philosophy on a whole new level of reflection.
Pismo założone przez Leszka Kołakowskiego, Bronisława Baczkę i Jana Garewicza ukazuje się nieprzerwanie od 1957 r.