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Seweryn Blandzi

The author puts forward hermeneutic rethinking of Aristotle’s theory of being, freed from later mediation (Aristotle’s commentators, scholastics, modern ontology), which unwittingly still infl uence the original understanding of his predicative ontology. Th e term ‘being’ (to on) as a nominalized form of ‘being something’ (to einai/ ti/ to on) does not denote existence (or ‘the existent’), Being as object in general or the notion of Being or Being as a notion, but expresses a general truth claim of predication. The form on (‘being’), the participle of einai (‘to be’) belongs to speech, it is a carrier of predication, but not a straight object (res), of which (in later metaphysics) we predicate as of ‘Being’ (to on, ens). Metaphysics shift ed the stress from predicativity on, that is, from the carrier of predication onto what is predicated (subject). As a result in the Latin tradition, the function of on is obscured a limine by the substantive and substantial understanding of what is predicated as ens.  Th is shift  of stress results in a substantivization of on under the infl uence of what is predicated (res). Th e linguistic element undergoes confl ation into one with what is predicated. As a result of this reifi cating substantivization, the predicative Greek on is translated into Latin as the subjective (id) quod est (‘what is’), which later is used interchangeably with ens. We could call it a transformation of the universal predicate of ‘being something’ into the universal name ‘Being’, and the most general concept.  Th e grammatical form (to on] is a linguistic exponent of predicativity, whose real designate is ousia, that is essence or substance. In short, the predicating element is on], the predicated – ou) si/a, the latter as defi nitional essence or individual substance (to ade ti).  Aristotle does not dwell on the sense or meaning of to on, but asks the question ti to on and answers concretely: tou=to/ e)sti ti/v h( ou)si/a, Being (res) is essence or substance. I n this paper the author also takes up the controversial issue of Aristotle’s ‘prime’ philosophy, mostly on the basis of Metaphysics, Book VI, which continues considerations published in the paper Aristotle’s Prote Philosophia: Metaphysics, Ontology, Theology or Methodology?, “Archive of the History and Philosophy of Social Th ought”, vol. 61/2016, pp. 273–286.

62-blandzi

Słowa kluczowe: Aristotle · participle being as exponent of predication · Being as noun · substance · name · meaning · general concept · object in general

Seweryn Blandzi — Redaktor Naczelny „Archiwum”. Kierownik Zespołu Badań nad Filozofią Antyczną i Historią Ontologii w IFiS PAN. Prezes Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozofii Systematycznej, redaktor serii „Hermeneutyka problemów filozofii”  i „Studia z Filozofii Systematycznej”. Zajmuje się historią filozofii, zwłaszcza starożytnej, historią metafizyki i jej nowożytną transformacją w ontologię, a także filozofia niemiecką i hermeneutyką. Autor m.in.: Henologia, meontologia: Platońskie poszukiwanie ontologii idei w 'Parmenidesie' (Warszawa 1992), Platoński projekt filozofii pierwszej (Warszawa 2002), Między aletejologią Parmenidesa a ontoteologią Filona. Rekonstrukcyjne studia historyczno-genetyczne (Warszawa 2013).   »  

Pismo założone przez Leszka Kołakowskiego, Bronisława Baczkę i Jana Garewicza ukazuje się nieprzerwanie od 1957 r.

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