Problem treści niepojęciowej w filozofii Immanuela Kanta

Małgorzata Koronkiewicz

The aim of his paper is to discuss application of contemporary idea of nonconceptual content in Kant’s philosophy. In the introduction I try to characterize concepts and intuitions. The purpose of this description is to examine thesis about complementary and independent nature of concepts and intuitions, stating that thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind and conceptualistic thesis saying that, intuitions have no meaning themselves and only concepts can put them in order. Then I employ application of nonconceptual content in two models of transcendental deduction of pure concepts of understanding in edition A and B. The third part of the paper considers “categorical conceptualism” thesis and illusion argument for nonconceptual content. In the last part I present R. Hannah’s application of nonconceptual content in Kant. He argues that, thanks to formal intuitions – representations of time and space, we are able to refer to objects without possessing concepts. At the end I sketch shortly Wittgenstein’s idea of thinking about perception as intellectual and sensual unity.


Słowa kluczowe: nonconceptual content · concepts · intuition · conceptualism · category · Kant

Pismo założone przez Leszka Kołakowskiego, Bronisława Baczkę i Jana Garewicza ukazuje się nieprzerwanie od 1957 r.

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