



ADAM DROZDEK

## Scheler: between Striving and Love

**ABSTRACT:** Scheler's main objection against Kant's ethical system was that it was a formal system, not material. Ethics should deal with actual deeds, intentions, values, *etc.*, not with a form, but with a content. Scheler separated values from goods and made them immutable and imperishable ideal objects that become real only when manifesting themselves in goods. The world of values is hierarchical and is founded on the value of God. However, the principal moral values – good and evil – are not included in this hierarchy; they come into play when actualizing other values. Values are accessible to humans through an emotive intuition and are inaccessible to reason, which is a fairly serious weakness of Scheler's system. The person, defined as the unity of actions, is the original carrier of good and evil. Moral goodness of a person becomes a reality when nonmoral positive values are actualized. There is a measure of innateness in Scheler's system. Not only the entire emotive apparatus is built into the human being – strivings, preference, will, and feelings with the dominating character of love and hate – but also general rules or hierarchy of values and the rules or axioms of application of values. The general aspect of such rules means that formal ethics is innate, and this formal aspect of ethics acquires material dimension in life according to a particular social milieu. In this way, Kant's framework of formal ethics is moved to the inborn level of emotive machinery.

**KEY WORDS:** phenomenology • Scheler • ethics • values • God

**M**ax Scheler wanted to base ethics on a firmer foundation than his predecessors, in particular, Kant. Therefore, he built his system based on Husserl's call, "back to the things themselves". Scheler's main objection against Kant's ethical system was that it was a formal system, not material. Kant promoted as the main moral principle the categorical imperative which said that people should act so that their principles of action could become general laws. In this way, the categorical imperative gave little guidance of how to act. It was a principle which referred to particular moral principles, and in this way it was formal. By analogy, the law of excluded middle, which says that the statement "p or not p" is always true, is a formal law, since it says nothing about particular situations or sentences; it only uses a formal variable p which should be substituted with a particular sentence (e.g., "today is Tuesday or not (today is Tuesday)" or, more comprehensibly, "today is Tuesday or today is not Tuesday") to see it work. In Scheler's opinion, ethics should

be not of formal nature, but of material, e.g., it should not deal with variables representing deeds, intentions, values, etc., but with actual deeds, intentions, values, etc., not with a form, but with a content (matter or material).

## Values

The central element of any ethical system is built of values, in particular, ethical values. According to Scheler, Kant was right in rejecting any ethics of goods and purposes, but he erroneously considered values to be abstracted from goods. Goods are things of value – e.g., well-being of culture or state – and they are historically changeable<sup>1</sup>, so, ethics would also be relativistic, based on a shifting ground. A critique of the goods would be impossible, yet, we do criticize cultures and hold in high esteem those opposed to the realm of the goods. It is the same with ethics of purpose – the purpose of the world or mankind<sup>2</sup>. However, purposes can only be justified by the goodness of the will from which these purposes originate; purposes are good only in the light of the value of the action that actualizes them. The point is that, while excluding goods and purposes as foundations of ethics, Kant also excluded values, which would have been justified if values had been abstracted from goods<sup>3</sup>. Although colors manifest themselves in corporeal objects, colors do not depend on them. So it is with values: the value of pleasantness, friendliness, nobleness, *etc.*, are accessible without seeing them as being properties of things<sup>4</sup>. What is good and bad cannot be established through observation and trying to derive them from observed properties using criteria unrelated to values<sup>5</sup>. “It is meaningless to ask about the common property of all red and blue things, since the only possible answer could be: it consists in that they are blue and red, so it is also meaningless to ask about the common properties of good and evil actions, moral dispositions, people, *etc.*”<sup>6</sup>. By separating values from goods which are their carriers, values acquire a separate and significantly more elevated ontological status than goods. Values do not change, whereas things do change; redness remains redness when a red object turns blue<sup>7</sup>; “the value of friendship is not challenged if my friend

<sup>1</sup> M. Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die material Wertethik* [1913–1916], in his *Gesammelte Werke*, v. 2, Bern 1954, p. 32 (Later *Formalismus*); *Idem*, *Formalism in ethics and non-formal ethics of values*, Evanston 1973, p. 9 (Later *Formalism*).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 33; *Formalism*, p. 10.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 34; *Formalism*, p. 11.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 34; *Formalism*, p. 12.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 37; *Formalism*, p. 14.

<sup>6</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 37; *Formalism*, p. 15.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 41; *Formalism*, p. 18.

proves to be false and betrays me”<sup>8</sup>. “Values cannot be created and destroyed. They exist independently of any organization of particular spiritual beings”<sup>9</sup>.

What are values, exactly? They have a curious ontological status. Values (value qualities) are ideal objects<sup>10</sup>. A good is related to a value quality the way a thing is related to a property; goods (value things) must be distinguished from values (thing-values). A good represents “a ‘thinglike’ unity of value qualities” (value complexes) and “values become real in goods”<sup>11</sup>. They are only objective by themselves; it is in goods that they become real, when they manifest themselves, frequently in a palpable form accessible to the senses: the value of beauty is actualized in beautiful objects; the value of friendship presents itself through the friendliness of a dog, of my old buddy, of a particular social group, or of a state institution.

Values thus appear to be at the same time objective and unreal, and they become real only when manifesting themselves in goods. Therefore, their existence would not be on a par with the existence of the physical world<sup>12</sup>. By itself, such an ontological status is not necessarily unique. What is number 2 and what is number 4? They do not exist in a palpable form; Plato would assume their existence in the world of ideas, but, today, we would say that they are objective entities about which we can speak and prove theorems. However, their nature is independent of any human subject since to their nature belong the fact that  $2+2=4$ . These numbers manifest themselves in two apples, two horses, etc., but the numbers themselves are not real – not as real as physical objects and maybe not even real as spiritual entities. However, for Scheler the presence of values may have more reality than that. He said that “all possible values are ‘founded’ on the value of an infinite personal spirit and ‘the world of values’ standing before it”<sup>13</sup>. This infinite spirit can be only God, who is prominently present in the theologically laden value theory (axiology) of Scheler. God surely exists and so do

<sup>8</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 41; *Formalism*, p. 19.

<sup>9</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 275; *Formalism*, p. 261.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 44; *Formalism*, p. 21.

<sup>11</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 43; *Formalism*, p. 20.

<sup>12</sup> As Scheler phrased it in his PhD dissertation, “the value and being are coordinated concepts that resist any derivation from one another,” *Beiträge zur Feststellung der Beziehungen zwischen den logischen und ethischen Prinzipien*, Jena 1899, 83; M. Uchiyama, *Das Wertwidrige in der Ethik Max Schelers*, Bonn 1966, 23.

<sup>13</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 116; *Formalism*, p. 96. To phrase it differently, “what can we do when we have to sever the value order itself from changeable human consciousness of the value order, but we also have to add that a value order is meaningless without a loving spirit”? We have to refer to a primally existing spirit, answered M. Scheler, *Philosophische Weltanschauung*, Bern: Francke 1954 [1929], p. 13–14.

values, whose existence is grounded in the existence of God. Since God is certainly real, so are values, whereby the world of values is not entirely unlike the Plato's world of ideas<sup>14</sup>.

The world of values is hierarchical. Scheler listed five criteria of value hierarchy. (1) Values are higher the more enduring they are. An enduring value includes the phenomenon of existence through time<sup>15</sup>. (2) Values are higher the less divisible they are, i.e., the less they have to be divided while there are many participants. A material good has to be divided when many people want to participate in it (e.g., dividing a loaf of bread). A painting does not have to be divided for its beauty to be enjoyed by many viewers<sup>16</sup>. (3) Values are higher the less they are based on other values<sup>17</sup>; that is, a value A that is the basis of another value B is higher than B. The useful is based on the agreeable, which is based on a vital value (health); feeling the agreeable is based on the value of feeling of a living being who understands the value of<sup>18</sup> agreeable through a sensory feeling<sup>19</sup>. (4) The higher a value is the more satisfaction it brings when a person becomes aware of the value<sup>20</sup>. These four criteria do not give the ultimate meaning of the rank of a value. The essential value characteristic is as follows: (5) the higher values are the less relative they are, i.e., the closer they are to the absolute values; the value of pleasure is related to a sensory being, the value of nobleness to a living being<sup>21</sup>, but the absolute values do not depend on the nature of any being. Moral values belong to this category<sup>22</sup>. The values of a person are higher than the values of a thing<sup>23</sup>. Values of oneself and values of the other are of equal rank. The value of actualizing the value of the other is higher than the value of actualizing the value of oneself. The values of acts (acts of cognition, love, hate, will) are higher than the values of functions (hearing, seeing, feeling) and these are higher than the values of responses/reactions (to be glad about something,

<sup>14</sup> The world of values “hangs over things of which it is the essence or the ideal meaning and flies over the time of its proper actualization, [the time] of its contingent concretization; it forms whole that is atemporal (thus, ahistoric) and aspatial (thus, likely to be, in principle, actualized everywhere since nothing ascribes to it a determinate here and now)”, A. Métraux, *Scheler ou la phénoménologie des valeurs*, Paris 1973, p. 70.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 111; *Formalism*, p. 91.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 113; *Formalism*, p. 93.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 110; *Formalism*, p. 90.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 114–15; *Formalism*, p. 94.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 115; *Formalism*, p. 95.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 116; *Formalism*, p. 96.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 117; *Formalism*, p. 97.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 118; *Formalism*, p. 98.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 120; *Formalism*, p. 100.

feeling as others do, revenge). Values of intentional experience are higher than values of states of experience<sup>24</sup>.

Scheler distinguished four categories of values (value modalities), which are presented as “quality systems of material values”<sup>25</sup>, and these categories form a hierarchy. (1) The agreeable and the disagreeable values form the lowest value modality, and they are related to sensory perception and sensory feelings<sup>26</sup>. (2) Vital values correspond to values of vital feelings: the noble and common, the skillful and inferior, the weal and woe (*Wohl und Weh*), courage and anxiety<sup>27</sup>. Then there are (3) spiritual values: beautiful and ugly, right and wrong, truth and falsehood, pleasant and unpleasant, approving and disapproving, respect and disrespect, vengefulness and sympathy<sup>28</sup>. Finally, the highest category includes (4) the holy and unholy that appear in absolute objects. This category is special and elevated over other categories to the extent that “all other values are at the same time given as symbols for these values [in the last category]”, which are apprehended through love and hate and are directed toward persons<sup>29</sup>.

It should be noticed that the principal moral values – good and evil – are not included in this hierarchy. The hierarchy includes all values, some of them tinged with moral coloring, but the good and evil in the moral sense are not among them. This is because they come into play when actualizing other values: moral goodness emerges when values of highest rank pertaining to a particular situation are actualized. Whether it really happens depends on the knowledge of values, which comes through the light of value intuition and through intentional feelings which are the cognitive organs of grasping values<sup>30</sup>.

## Feelings

Although values are independent entities, they are accessible to the human subject through a special type of intuition, not rational, but emotive. It is just an ancient prejudice that there are only two mental spheres, rational and sensory, whereby emotions have been included in the sensory category<sup>31</sup>.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 121; *Formalism*, p. 101.

<sup>25</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 125; *Formalism*, p. 104.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 125; *Formalism*, p. 105.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 126; *Formalism*, p. 106.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 128; *Formalism*, p. 106–7.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 129; *Formalism*, p. 108–9.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 269–70; *Formalism*, p. 255.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 84–5 and 267; *Formalism*, p. 64 and 253. In particular, for Kant, all feelings, except for respect, are of sensory nature and thus irrelevant for ethics Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 255; *Formalism*, p. 241.

However, feelings have their independent cognitive role which is related to values. Scheler mentioned only Augustine and Pascal as those who did not subject themselves to this ancient prejudice. Both of them presented the logic of the heart as being different than and of equal importance to the logic of reason<sup>32</sup>. “The heart has its reasons: ‘i t s’ [reasons], about which the intellect knows nothing and can never know anything; and it has ‘r e a s o n s’, that is, real and obvious intuitions about facts, to which the intellect is totally blind – as blind as the color-blind [person] is [blind] to colors and the deaf is [deaf] to the sound”<sup>33</sup>. With this very strong statement, Scheler severed the domain of the heart from the domain of reason. There is nothing that reason can tell us about values and about ethical matters in particular since it is hopelessly blind to them. A reasoned discussion on ethics is just as fruitful as the discussion of the blind about colors. To stress it even more, he stated that “by essential necessity, i t b e l o n g s to all values a particular type of ‘consciousness of something’, through which they are given – which is ‘feeling’”<sup>34</sup>. Reason is blind to values and this blindness, as it were, is written into the essence of values: reason cannot be healed from its blindness since the nature of values is such that no cure is possible. In this way, feelings acquire a prominent role in Scheler’s ethics<sup>35</sup>.

The starting point of accessing values are strivings (*Streben*) which are impulses, drives at the bottom of human subconsciousness. A striving is “the most general foundation of experiences that are different from any possession of objects (representation, sensation, perception) and from any feeling”<sup>36</sup>. The lowest kind of striving, aspiring (*Aufstreben*), is “a pure impulse of movement” with no goal, “something that rises in us”. Then, there

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 84 and 268; *Formalism*, p. 63 and 254; M. Scheler, *Ordo amoris* [1916], in his *Schriften aus dem Nachlass*, v. 1 (= *Gesammelte Werke*, v. 10), Bern 1957, p. 362 (Later *Ordo amoris*). Augustine spoke about the law written in the heart (*Conf.* 2.4.9) and about imprinted concept of goodness (*De trin.* 8.3.4). This law is the order of love (*De civitate Dei* 15.22, *Confessiones* 13.9.10). Pascal spoke about *raison de coeur* and *ordre de coeur*, *Pensées*, fr. 277, 283, which Scheler also rendered as *mathématique du coeur* (cf. *Ordo amoris*, p. 362); Uchiyama, *op. cit.*, 125. “It might not be amiss to re-examine in this light what St. Thomas Aquinas has to say about ‘knowledge by connaturality’. It is questionable whether a purely rational logic can ever come to terms with the existential”, Q. Lauer, *The phenomenological ethics of Max Scheler*, “International Philosophical Quarterly” 1961, v. 1, p. 289, note 54.

<sup>33</sup> *Ordo amoris*, p. 362; cf. *Formalismus*, p. 269; *Formalism*, p. 255.

<sup>34</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 279; *Formalism*, p. 265.

<sup>35</sup> By using feelings as the means of access to values, Scheler followed Franz Brentano who initiated the idea of setting the analysis of values in the framework of human emotions, cf. Ph. Blosser, *Scheler’s Critique of Kant’s Ethics*, Athens (OH) 1995, p. 116.

<sup>36</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 52, note 24; *Formalism*, p. 30, note 24.

is a strivings-away or strivings-towards (*Wegstreben* or *Fortstreben*) that are initially with no goal which is found along the way<sup>37</sup>. Finally, there is a striving (*Erstreben*) that has a direction, but no image content, no representation; the goal of this striving is based on a value which is experienced by the striving and is clear to consciousness<sup>38</sup>. We can experience a sense of uneasiness or anxiety without knowing what caused it and what should be done to end it. However, the way of ending it may be found when contemplating on it and when trying to do something about it. There may be some *Weltschmerz* caused by recent political or social developments that cause uneasiness, but we may not fully realize the reason and the way of alleviating the problem. We can experience the readiness to make a sacrifice or to be benevolent toward people without realizing or picturing for ourselves the content of sacrifice or benevolence and even without knowing their object<sup>39</sup>. Goals of striving are experienced in striving, not before it. The content of striving is determined by a direction (goal), by the value component of its goal, and by image/meaning content stemming from the value content; no representation is used here, no intellectual activity; no thinking is involved here; thus, the image content is secondary and determined by value content; how we picture the value to ourselves is secondary to the value and its presence in a striving (impulse). On the other hand, purposes of the will are represented contents of goals of striving<sup>40</sup>. Thus, the purpose presupposes a goal. A goal becomes a purpose when it is willed, i.e., when its image content is to be realized. Striving can remain on the level of value consciousness of its goal; willing that is conscious of its purpose is given in terms of images (meanings)<sup>41</sup>. “Our willing is ‘good’ when it chooses the higher value given in inclinations [which are experiences of strivings<sup>42</sup>]. Willing does not ‘direct itself’ by a ‘formal law’ immanent to it, but it directs itself by knowledge given in [the act of] preference, [the knowledge] of what is higher in value contents given in inclinations<sup>43</sup>. In a man of high moral standing, strivings that follow an order of preference and that are the content of willing appear involuntarily and automatically. The order of preference becomes here “the inner rule of automatism of striving itself<sup>44</sup>. Strivings are impulses coming from within

<sup>37</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 54; *Formalism*, p. 32.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 56; *Formalism*, p. 33.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 56; *Formalism*, p. 35.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 61; *Formalism*, p. 39.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 62; *Formalism*, p. 40.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 63; *Formalism*, p. 41.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 63; *Formalism*, p. 42.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 64; *Formalism*, p. 43.

someone's being and they have to be visualized to become a subject of the will. You cannot want something if you do not *see* what it is that you want. Subconscious wants are merely strivings, impulses; true wants can only be conscious objects. They are a subject of the will which through the act of preference chooses purposes that are in line with the objective hierarchy of values<sup>45</sup>.

Every striving is based directly on value feeling (love, etc.) and its content, whereby all willing presupposes a value feeling<sup>46</sup>. In any striving for something there is a feeling directed toward some value that is the motivation of the striving. There is also a feeling that is the source of striving, and, finally, a feeling accompanying the execution of striving; thus, there is a feeling at the beginning, in the middle, and at the end, as it were. For instance, there may be a striving aimed at feeding someone, which is motivated by the value of satisfying someone's hunger. This value can become present in the striving only through a feeling. The striving is the result of love, the love of neighbor; thus, the feeling of love is the source of the striving. And there is a feeling of satisfaction that accompanies the actual action of feeding someone<sup>47</sup>. There are strivings that are not motivated, that is, not goal-oriented, but the strivings that count are imbued in feeling. This means that feelings are standalone entities, true starting points of action, since we can feel values in the absence of striving for them<sup>48</sup>. In this way, the emotive structure of the person deciding what to do or what to abstain from ultimately determines the automatism of the way strivings are stirred and thus submit goals of action to the will, which the will translates into purposes, maybe with some help from the rational sphere (weighing options, assessing consequences, estimating the means of executing an action). In this way, the emotive side of the human subject becomes more important than the rational side.

There is a link between the world of values and the human heart since "the order of values is reflected in the hearts of all men, whereby the heart is not a chaos of blind feelings [...] [but] an organized counterpart of cosmos of all possible objects of love, [...] a microcosm of the world of values"<sup>49</sup>. Dif-

<sup>45</sup> To use Scheler's distinctions, we choose between actions, we prefer between goods (empirical preferring) and values (a priori preferring); we choose one action over another; we prefer one good action over another. Choosing needs pictorial representation; preferring, being based on feeling, does not, cf. *Formalismus*, p. 107 and 274; *Formalism*, p. 87 and 260. Importantly, "the hierarchy of values is absolutely invariable, whereas the rules of preference are principally variable in history", *Formalismus*, p. 108; *Formalism*, p. 88.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 153; *Formalism*, p. 133.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 356–7; *Formalism*, p. 344–5.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 58; *Formalism*, p. 36.

<sup>49</sup> *Ordo amoris*, p. 361.



ferent feelings correspond to different values<sup>50</sup>. To the first category belong sensory feelings, for instance, the sensation of sweetness. Sensory feelings are given as extended and localized in the body; they cannot be separated from the content of sensation by attention<sup>51</sup>; they have no relation to the person<sup>52</sup>; the closer a feeling is to the sensory feeling, the more it can be willfully controlled<sup>53</sup>. The second category consists of vital feelings of the organic body and feelings of life; they include the feeling of health, illness, strength, and weakness. Vital feelings are not localized – where would fatigue, health, vigor be localized?<sup>54</sup>. Vital feelings have intentional character; they give value content of the environment (freshness of the forest)<sup>55</sup>. Also, whereas sensory feelings are results of stimuli, vital feelings anticipate the value of stimuli<sup>56</sup>. The third category includes psychic feelings, the feelings of the ego, for instance, pride, shame, sadness, joy; finally, there are spiritual feelings (feelings of the personality)<sup>57</sup>. Spiritual feelings are absolute, not relative to something. We can be sad over something (psychic feeling), but not blissful over something. They either are not experienced at all or encompass the entire person<sup>58</sup>.

In this hierarchy, love is the highest and also ultimate feeling<sup>59</sup>. Love is “the tendency ... or the act which attempts to lead each thing in the direction of perfect value fitting it – and does lead if there are no obstacles”<sup>60</sup>. Love is the force that empowers a human being in all respect: “man is a loving being before he is a cognitive being or a volitional being”<sup>61</sup>. As expressed by Scheler, “the a priori of love and hate is the ultimate foundation of all other apriorisms and thereby the common foundation of the a priori cognition of being and of the a priori willing of contents. [...] The domains of theory and praxis find in it the ultimate phenomenological connection and unity”<sup>62</sup>; “love is always an awakener unto knowledge and willing – even the mother of the spirit and the reason itself”<sup>63</sup>. Love is the

<sup>50</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 343; *Formalism*, p. 330.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 345; *Formalism*, p. 333.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 346; *Formalism*, p. 334.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 348; *Formalism*, p. 336.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 350; *Formalism*, p. 338.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 352; *Formalism*, p. 340.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 353; *Formalism*, p. 341.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 344; *Formalism*, p. 332.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 355; *Formalism*, p. 343.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 274; *Formalism*, p. 260.

<sup>60</sup> *Ordo amoris*, p. 355.

<sup>61</sup> *Ordo amoris*, p. 356.

<sup>62</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 85, note 1; *Formalism*, p. 64, note 20.

<sup>63</sup> *Ordo amoris*, p. 356.

cognitive starting point; the knowledge about the world is acquired though the power of love and, as it were, in the light shed by it onto the world. Love is the foundation of all cognition, so values are known before being<sup>64</sup>, the being in which values can be actualized, and thus the value has a priority over being<sup>65</sup>. Thus, the hierarchy of feelings is the *ordo amoris*, the order or hierarchy of love. This hierarchy reflects the hierarchy of values that is immutable and independent of any cognitive subject, of any person. As such, *ordo amoris* is also immutable, at least in its objective dimension; however, a subjective *ordo amoris*, a subjective order of the heart does not necessarily replicate the objective *ordo amoris* since its makeup is influenced by social milieu, religious environment, and political and cultural traditions.

The subjective *ordo amoris* defines the whole of human personality; therefore, Scheler would agree with the maxim, “show me what a man loves and hates, and I will show you the man!”<sup>66</sup>. Love is the principal feeling and because feelings are at the bottom of striving, love also determines striving. Therefore, “every being strives toward what it loves and strives against what it hates. It does not love what it strives for and does not hate what it strives against”<sup>67</sup>.

The core of humanness is also expressed by the moral disposition (*Gesinnung*). Moral disposition is determined by *ordo amoris*. The moral disposition is the basis of the moral value of an act, and an action can be considered good if the moral disposition is good<sup>68</sup>. Whether an action is good depends on intentions and the will. The moral disposition does not by itself determine intentions; it delineates “a material a priori playing field” for the formation of intentions and deeds<sup>69</sup>; that is, the moral disposition is the ground from which good intentions can grow. Thus, the moral disposition is what we would call someone’s character, if Scheler did not state that character is something else. Character has a somewhat negative ring in Scheler’s view. Character is only a hypothetical assumption assumed by induction

<sup>64</sup> Value is the “first messenger” of being, cf. *Formalismus*, p. 41; *Formalism*, p. 18.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. M. Scheler, *Liebe und Erkenntnis*, Bern 1955, p. 26; W. Hartmann, *Die Philosophie Max Schelers in ihren Beziehung zu Eduard von Hartmann*, Düsseldorf 1956, p. 49; Uchiyama, *op. cit.*, 33.

<sup>66</sup> E. Kelly, *Material ethics of value: Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann*, Dordrecht 2011, p. 46; Scheler himself said, “who has/knows the *ordo amoris* of a man has/knows the man. He has for him as a moral subject what the crystal formula is for the crystal”, *Ordo amoris*, p. 348.

<sup>67</sup> M. Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, in his *Gesammelte Schriften*, v. 7, Bern 1973, p. 185–186.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 133; *Formalism*, p. 114.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 135; *Formalism*, p. 115.

to explain someone's actions<sup>70</sup>. We see someone behave nicely and we may conclude that he is a nice person. However, appearances can be deceptive. Mere observation is not sufficient. Faithful to the phenomenological spirit, Scheler advocated intuition, a true insight into someone's action which can go even from one example into the core of someone's moral personality, that is, moral disposition. The latter can thus be called true character. Therefore, when we know someone's moral disposition and we see actions apparently contradicting it, we analyze these actions more carefully to detect good reasons behind them. On the other hand, when the actions contradict someone's character, we change the picture of the person's character<sup>71</sup>. Thus, character is our frequently erroneous image of someone's personhood. This can be caused as much by inadequacy of our perceptive powers as by deliberate attempts to present one's own image in a particular way. True character, that is, moral disposition is what really characterizes a person. Character can change; that is, our characterization of a person can and does change due to superficial observation. True character as determined at or closely after birth is usually a constant in someone's life. However, even the true character can change, but this is a rare event in someone's life and a major transformation, "the moral conversion"<sup>72</sup>.

## Person

The value is the first pillar of any axiology, ethics, and moral conduct in particular. This conduct is performed by someone, and this leads us to the second foundational element of Scheler's ethical system, the person. In Scheler's view, the person is the carrier of values of good and evil; that is, properly speaking, actions of a person should not be called good or evil, but the person himself even in the absence of any action, and thus, by definition, "'good' and 'evil' are values of the person"<sup>73</sup>. Only persons can be morally good or evil; virtues are properties of the person that vary with the goodness of the person. Events, not persons, are agreeable or useful. Aesthetic values are values of objects<sup>74</sup>. Ethical values are values of persons alone<sup>75</sup>. However, Scheler's understanding of what a person is, is rather elusive. He stressed the fact that the person is neither a substance – such as psychic or mental

<sup>70</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 137; *Formalism*, p. 117.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 138; *Formalism*, p. 118.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 136; *Formalism*, p. 116.

<sup>73</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 50; *Formalism*, p. 28.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 105–6; *Formalism*, p. 85.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 106; *Formalism*, p. 86.

substance, nor an object – such as the soul. The person “exists only in the execution of his actions”<sup>76</sup>. A person is “the subject of all acts of the essence of inner intuition” and exists “only as the concrete unity of acts executed by him and only in their execution”<sup>77</sup>. Also, acts are not objects and they “are experienced only in the execution itself and are given in reflection”<sup>78</sup>. A person’s experience of acts is not limited to the acts which have been executed or are executed. The person’s existence lies in “in the experience of its possible experiences”<sup>79</sup> and such an experience involves the entire ethical setup as defined by moral disposition since the moral disposition “determines the world of values of the personhood”<sup>80</sup>. Consequently, any action can be considered morally good or evil not because of the nature of the action, but because of the person who executed it. Such an action does not have to be even executed to be considered good or evil; it can be the person’s possible or contemplated action, and through this contemplation the action is positively or negatively colored with a moral value. The moral disposition is, what it is, a disposition, a frozen moral essence. The moral disposition acquires a dynamic value through the personhood of a person. The active aspect is what makes a person a person and it is only to be desired that this person has a morally positive disposition for the actions of the person to have an individually and socially desirable outcome.

An animal is not a person. Only a human being is a person and only on a specific level of human existence, although “seeds of personhood” are already in children and the weak-minded<sup>81</sup>. One condition for personhood is (1) the possession of a wholly sound mind that manifests itself in “immediate understanding of life expressions of a man”<sup>82</sup>. Such understanding takes place when “out of the spiritual center of the other [person] given in intuition we immediately experience and re-execute his acts (speech, expressions, deeds) concerning us and the environment as intentionally directed toward something [...] and that we immediately attribute to all

<sup>76</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 51; *Formalism*, p. 29.

<sup>77</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 488; *Formalism*, p. 482.

<sup>78</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 385; *Formalism*, p. 374.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 396; *Formalism*, p. 386.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 177; *Formalism*, p. 159.

<sup>81</sup> “Any mother will tell you that at least some tentative signs of a distinct personality are present from birth, if not before”, P.H. Spader, *Scheler’s ethical personalism*, New York 2002, p. 282. This is an important point for Spader, since pressing too much the point of lack of personhood in children can be used to justify infanticide; cf. Scheler’s remarks, *Formalismus*, p. 328–9; *Formalism*, p. 315.

<sup>82</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 482; *Formalism*, p. 476.

of this the unity of some ‘meaning’<sup>83</sup>. That is, the intuition must be fully functioning to feel as someone else feels, to comprehend the meaning of someone else’s words and actions, to be able to grasp hidden intentions of other people. Therefore, (2) a child must reach a certain maturity level for the personhood to be developed. A child possesses the selfhood, the soul, and self-consciousness, but this does not make the child a full person in the moral sense. Personhood comes with the ability of experiencing the difference between one’s own and someone else’s acts, willing, etc. and this insight comes without a reference to another’s body<sup>84</sup>. Finally, (3) human beings are persons when they dominate over their body<sup>85</sup>.

“The value ‘good’ – in the absolute sense – is the value that by an essential regularity appears in the act of actualizing the value [...] that is the highest, the value ‘evil’ – in the absolute sense – is the one which appears on the act of realizing the lowest [value] ... A value actualizing act is morally good when its intended value matter agrees with the value that is ‘preferred’ and is opposite to what is disfavored”<sup>86</sup>. A good act realizes a positive value (positive and negative values are on every level of values); thus, there is a connection between moral good and evil and other values<sup>87</sup>: when positive values are actualized according to their hierarchy, then moral goodness is also actualized. One consequence of such understanding of morality is the religious coloring of morality: since always the highest value should be actualized for moral goodness to emerge, and the holy is the highest value, morality is intertwined with theology and its understanding of the nature of God<sup>88</sup>.

Moreover, an action does aim at moral goodness, at least indirectly; it aims at actualizing nobleness or beauty and, as a side-effect, it also actualized moral goodness<sup>89</sup>. And hence, the cumbersome expression “on the act”

<sup>83</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 482–3; *Formalism*, p. 477.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 484; *Formalism*, p. 478.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 485; *Formalism*, p. 479.

<sup>86</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 48; *Formalism*, p. 25.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 48; *Formalism*, p. 26.

<sup>88</sup> The ascription of the highest status to the holy and its relation to moral investigation is called theonomy of morality by M. Dupuy, *La philosophie de la religion chez Max Scheler*, Paris 1959, p. 30, who also stated that the moral act “implies a religious act since it could not be accomplished without taking God into consideration”, *ibidem*, p. 30 note 2.

<sup>89</sup> “Right actions always *do* in fact ‘realize’ moral value as a byproduct of *attempting* to realize nonmoral value, whether or not they actually succeed in bringing a bearer of value into existence”, Blosser, *op. cit.*, p. 66–67. It is thus justified to say that “Scheler’s principle does not define the goodness or evil of moral actions, it only defines the conditions of emergence of goodness or evil as a particular class of values, [the emergence] in the content of emotive and cognitive experiences. It is thus a principle that defines only the

in the quote above: the value good “appears on the act of willing”; thus, “it can never be the matter [i.e., the content] of an act of willing; it appears ‘on the back’ of this act” i.e., it cannot be intended in this act since this content is a non-moral value<sup>90</sup>. Only in such a derived sense can actions be considered good or evil. When someone feeds the hungry, then thereby the action actualizes the value of satiation, whereby the action becomes good. However, if the action is aimed at doing good, at actualizing moral goodness, then the action, in fact, thwarts moral goodness, since it aims at appearance, at hypocrisy. The same goes for the person who, after all, is the unity of actions. The person, in fact, is the original carrier of good and evil<sup>91</sup>. The person should “never willfully intend its own moral value”<sup>92</sup>. The person should aim at being a decent computer programmer, but not at being good. Values pertaining to persons (salvation, self-perfection) are actualized when they are not intended by the will<sup>93</sup>. Moral goodness is an emerging value; moral goodness becomes a reality when nonmoral positive values are actualized. Concentration on one’s own goodness leads eventually to hypocrisy, to concentration on appearances, to the undertaking actions which make one look good. Sure, someone may be benefitted by such actions, but they are not beneficial for the person carrying them.

The idea of not aiming at one’s own goodness may not be readily acceptable, but it is justified in the context of Scheler’s ethical theory. Values can be perceived solely through feelings and, therefore, when planning on being good and preferring one’s own goodness, the feelings would be concentrated on this very goodness of oneself, in particular, love, whereby the love which should be other-directed becomes self-directed and thus leads to sanctimonious egocentrism<sup>94</sup>. This may happen not only in the context of Scheler’s phenomenology, but in very ordinary life of every person, too. Moral self-perfection, says Scheler, can be accomplished by

correctness of intentional experience of material values, but in no way does it reach the objective moral values themselves, [it does not reach] what is good and evil”, K. Wojtyła, *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maksa Schelera*, Lublin 1959, p. 54.

<sup>90</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 49; *Formalism*, p. 27.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 50; *Formalism*, p. 28.

<sup>92</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 511; *Formalism*, p. 506.

<sup>93</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 512; *Formalism*, p. 508.

<sup>94</sup> “Scheler’s assumptions are phenomenological, ‘good’ as well as ‘evil’ are given and analyzed as phenomena, i.e., as appearing in intentional feeling of a particular personal subject. Should they constitute objects of the will or striving, then this should be understood in such a way that a particular person wants to feel his own goodness, to feel that ‘he is good’ or that he ‘acts well’”, Wojtyła, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

concentrating on the realization of nonmoral values, whereby one's own goodness ensues.

Actions should thus be directed by the hierarchy of values, the a priori hierarchy independent of the wishes of a particular person. However, there are only four levels in this hierarchy and the number of values is potentially unlimited. Which value should be actualized here and now? Scheler gave no guidance about determining a choice when they are in the same category. Is beauty more important than truth? Is courage to be valued more than nobleness? And is this hierarchy of value always to be followed? When a programmer works on his C++ project, he certainly enriches himself intellectually; should he then interrupt his work only because his child cut herself and cries for help? Isn't intellectual enrichment of higher value than feeling agreeable or disagreeable because of mere physical pain? In life, such decisions have to be made and it is somewhat unsatisfactory if a particular ethical system is unhelpful in that respect. After all, as Scheler himself quite colorfully expressed it, "ultimately, ethics is a damned 'bloody business,' and when it cannot give me any directives how 'should' 'I' live now in this social and historical setting – then, eh, what is it?"<sup>95</sup>.

A major problem with making informed decisions concerning value choice fitting a particular situation is Scheler's strict division between provinces of the heart and of reason. He gave priority to the heart, but rather verbally, since, on the surface, reason does not seem to play any role in making moral choices. The absolute reliance on feeling would actually lead to an artificial split of the human person into two rather disconnected spheres: the rational side and the emotive side, which, to put it bluntly, makes the human being suffer from multiple personality disorder<sup>96</sup>. Scheler's concept of person focuses on the emotive side to ensure unity of actions with an apparent exclusion of the rational side. We can agree with Scheler that the heart has an upper hand in the human being, but this also means that rationality does have a role to play even in the moral decisions not just, say, in scientific research or in gambling. Rationality is a tool of the moral dimension of man

<sup>95</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 611; *Formalism*, p. xxxi, note 14. Admittedly, the remark was not in the published version; it is to be found only in the manuscript.

<sup>96</sup> In respect to Scheler's devaluation of rational cognition consider the opinion that "the intuition does not constitute the real essence of philosophical thinking, but is only a subordinate moment in it. Not a mere intuition, but the thoughtful processing of the intuitive knowledge leads to philosophical results", M. Wittmann, *Max Scheler als Ethiker: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der modernen Ethik*, Düsseldorf 1923, p. 17. "The man who in his attitude to values would rely solely on the way his feelings develop is confined to the orbit of what only happens in him and becomes incapable of self-determination", K. Wojtyła, *The acting person*, Dordrecht 1979 [1969], p. 233.

and is utilized to accomplish its goals. There is thus a very strong connection between the moral dimension and rational dimension, whereby the human person is whole, unified, and able to act more effectively in all situations<sup>97</sup>.

In fact, this is also what Scheler was doing. The very expression “the logic of the heart” points in the direction of reason. The value related intuition does reach values, it sees their objective hierarchy, but the application of this emotive knowledge is done in a very rational fashion. Scheler provided axioms of the logic of the heart<sup>98</sup> and only in that respect logic of the heart is different from rational logic, since, apparently for Scheler, the latter was limited to the classical propositional and predicate logic. Deontic logics as separate logical systems came in the twentieth century as areas of nonclassical logic, but still as logical systems with their own sets of axioms and rules of inference. Scheler did not specify any special rules of inference for his logic of the heart, and he took for granted that, say, the law of noncontradiction and the law of excluded middle would be applicable in it. Therefore, the foundations of the logic of the heart lie in emotive intuition and they allow Scheler to form axioms of this logic, but the application of this logic, by deriving consequences from these axioms, is of purely rational nature. After all, Scheler himself admitted that “there are no specific rules of aesthetic and ethical ‘assessment’, of aesthetic and ethical inference, *etc.*, that are different from logical rules [...] but there are [specific] laws of aesthetic and ethical value assessment (*Werthalten*) of any value configuration (*Wertverhalte*)”<sup>99</sup>. Therefore, notwithstanding Scheler’s attempts, reason does have a function in Scheler’s axiology and moral reasoning, after

<sup>97</sup> The view of priority of moral dimension over rational dimension is advocated in A. Drozdek, *Moral dimension of man in the age of computers*, Lanham 1995. “Rational and non-rational moments in no way stand in a relation of irreconcilable opposition; that which distinguishes them does not divide them. ... Just the opposite: knowledge that is of full value normally occurs through bringing together rational and non-rational moments into a unified world-picture”, S. Strasser, *Phenomenology of feeling*, Pittsburgh 1977, p. 133–134, although Strasser gave rationality the upper hand: “In short, rational knowing grows out of the non-rational as its highest necessary totalization, spiritual illumination and completion”, *ibidem*, p. 143.

<sup>98</sup> See the nine axioms of material ethics, for instance, the existence of a positive value has a positive value; or, good is the value accompanying the actualization of a positive value (Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 48–9; *Formalism*, p. 26–7); see also the two axioms concerning obligation: “everything positively valuable should exist and everything of negative value should not exist” (Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 221; *Formalism*, p. 206).

<sup>99</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 204; *Formalism*, p. 188. “Even a phenomenological ethics is bound by the laws of logic,” Lauer, *op. cit.*, p. 284, note 46. It is true that “even if moral intuition contains an element of logical distinguishing, this does not mean that it is reducible to logical analysis,” Blosser, *op. cit.*, p. 117. It is that moral intuition enlists logical analysis in its service.



all: reason is subcontracted by moral dimension to perform reasoning tasks based on the axiological axioms and on value-related data submitted by moral dimension.

The problem of breaking ties in respect of making choices of values that are on the same hierarchy level is addressed by an introduction of new criteria. One such attempt was made by Nicolai Hartmann. In addition to the value height criterion used by Scheler, he introduced a value strength benchmark: the elementary values, which are of lower status, have greater strength than other values, since “the higher value is always the more conditioned, the more dependent and in this sense the weaker; its fulfillment is conceivable only in so far as it is raised upon the fulfillment of the lower values”<sup>100</sup>. Therefore, we can truly enjoy music and smell roses after thirst is quenched and when there is no physical pain in the body. Husserl’s pupil, Hans Reiner, introduced 11 criteria of value preference. In addition to Scheler’s and Hartmann’s criteria, they include (3) temporal urgency criterion (console a crying child; music enjoyment – a higher value – can wait); (4) quantity of value realization (actualize more values rather than fewer<sup>101</sup>); (5) choosing a value whose actualization is most promising, and (6) satisfying the most pressing need; (7) protection of existing values from violation should take precedence over creation of new values; (8) if a task requires many people for completion, work on a task for which the highest percentage of required participants is available; (9) when many people are available for the task, a person’s abilities and possession of requisite means to accomplish the task should be considered; (10) when one person is available to perform different tasks, the task should be chosen for which the person has best abilities and means; finally, (11) the principle of the *daimonion*: an inner voice calling someone to do something<sup>102</sup>.

The *daimonion* principle is actually included by Scheler, and quite prominently so as the voice of conscience. For Scheler, conscience represents “1. only the individual form of the economization of moral insight and 2. this insight only in these boundaries insofar as it is the good in itself ‘for me’”. Conscience works when moral norms end and when acting and willing already satisfy these norms. It tells each person something

<sup>100</sup> N. Hartmann, *Ethics*, London 1932 [1926], v. 2, ch. 63d, p. 446, 451; A. Deeken, *Process and permanence in ethics: Max Scheler’s moral philosophy*, New York 1974, p. 57–58. Somewhat tepidly, Scheler acknowledged the importance of Hartmann’s criterion, cf. *Formalismus*, p. 19, note 2; *Formalism*, p. xxviii, note 20.

<sup>101</sup> Scheler alluded to such a criterion, cf. *Formalismus*, p. 107, note 1; *Formalism*, p. 87, note 57.

<sup>102</sup> H. Reiner, *Die Grundlagen der Sittlichkeit*, Meisenheim/G. 1974 [1951], p. 168–174; Deeken, *op. cit.*, p. 59–60.

different in the same situation<sup>103</sup>. Conscience is a carrier of moral values but not their source. It functions in negative fashion. It represents something as bad; it is set against an action. This does not mean that it tells us what is good. It warns and forbids rather than recommends. Its function is only disapproval; it gives no positive insight<sup>104</sup>. This is very much in line with the Socratic voice of *daimonion* which is very personal and practical counsel<sup>105</sup> which primarily restrained Socrates from doing something, although it could also prescribe some action<sup>106</sup>. The negative aspect of conscience is also presented by Hendrik Stoker in his study on conscience, which included Scheler's preface and a laudatory comment in Scheler's *Formalism*<sup>107</sup>. In Stoker's view, "the true conscience does not speak about the good, but only about evil" and it does speak only when "there is a doubt concerning the value of an action". Interestingly, Stoker found in the voice of conscience a firmer principle than Descartes' *cogito ergo sum*: "the objective absolute which Descartes thought he found, is in true conscience much more clearly, more significantly and more adequately given in the evil principle in me than the objective absolute is given in most other noetic-psychic phenomena", where the evil principle is the principal evil present in each person, since no one is free from an ingredient of evil<sup>108</sup>.

The problem of executing actions poses a problem for the disabled. A disabled person would not be able to help a drowning child. Is such a person good? Is the disabled even a person when a person is defined as a unity of actions? Maybe intentions, that is, moral disposition of the person, would count as an action and thus the disabled person would not be altogether denied personhood. However, a disability is a serious moral impediment in Scheler's system. He defined virtue as "an immediately experienced power to do what ought to be done"<sup>109</sup>, "a moral disposition of a certain kind that is ready for and capable of an action"<sup>110</sup>; an ability "to will and do what is given and experienced as ideally mandatory"<sup>111</sup>. This excludes the handicapped from being candidates as virtuous persons. The handicapped can be good only because of his intentions, but he cannot be virtuous, because he is

<sup>103</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 337; *Formalism*, p. 324.

<sup>104</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 335; *Formalism*, p. 322.

<sup>105</sup> Plato, *Apologia* 40a, 41cd; Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.1.4–5.

<sup>106</sup> Plato, *Apologia* 31cd; Xenophon, *Apologia* 12; Idem, *Memorabilia* 1.1.4, 4.3.12, 4.8.1.

<sup>107</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 23; *Formalism*, p. xxxi.

<sup>108</sup> H.G. Stoker, *Das Gewissen: Erscheinungsformen und Theorien*, Bonn 1925, p. 256–257, 263, 261.

<sup>109</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 220; *Formalism*, p. 205.

<sup>110</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 149, note 1; *Formalism*, p. 129, note 14.

<sup>111</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 253; *Formalism*, p. 238.

lacking power to actualize his intentions. Therefore, a capable person must do something, if it is in his power, to bring to fruition positive values. Good intentions are not enough. Just as faith without deeds is dead, so are intentions without actions, and, paradoxically, goodness without virtue.

As it is with moral goodness so it is with happiness since they are both intertwined. All feelings of happiness are based on feelings, that is, intuition, of values. Happiness comes from the consciousness of one's own moral goodness (a person can be conscious of his own goodness, but should not make it a goal of his actions). "Only the good [person] is a happy [person]". This very happiness can also become the reason ("the root and the source") for all willing and action. However, happiness, just as goodness, cannot be a purpose of willing and action. Only the happy person executes morally good actions. Happiness is not a reward of virtue, nor is virtue the means of happiness. However, happiness is the root and source of virtue even though it is the result of the goodness of a person<sup>112</sup>. Only a good person is happy; only a happy person is good. The feeling of moral adequacy is reflected in the feeling of personal happiness, and happiness reinforces a person's moral goodness by directing the will to actions that actualize positive value, that are best suited for a particular situation ("only the happy person can have a good will"<sup>113</sup>).

Happiness depends on goodness and goodness on happiness, but they both depend ultimately on the heart, on personal strength of feelings, primarily the feeling of love, whereby the immutable and independently existing hierarchy of values can be properly applied. In life, however, the moral level of people is frequently not up to mark. Tradition and social milieu have some influence in molding particular *ordo amoris*. Is this all left to the outside influence? Scheler explicitly banned the existence of innate ideas: "we have no somehow inborn, conscious or unconscious ideas of things that we love or hate: neither an inborn idea of, for instance, God, nor an idea of a type of man"<sup>114</sup>. However, the idea of innateness is not altogether alien to his system. Certain instincts are "undoubtedly innate," for example the instinctive fear of darkness or adverse reaction against things considered repulsive. There are, thus, on the physical level certain innate instincts which are directed against some unspecified entities, since the ideas of these entities that are subjects of such instincts are not innate; these ideas are developed from sensory experience and tradition. And so it is with ideas

<sup>112</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 370; *Formalism*, p. 359.

<sup>113</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 360; *Formalism*, p. 348.

<sup>114</sup> *Ordo amoris*, p. 355; cf. *Formalismus*, p. 21; *Formalism*, p. xxx.

of loved and hated objects: they are developed from experience. However, “without any doubt,” we can inherit “certain direction of love and hate”<sup>115</sup> just as in the case of physical love about which Scheler stated that “certain playing field of the choice respective eros is inborn through inheritance”<sup>116</sup>. Not only the ability to love and hate is innate along with the entire emotive apparatus that enables a human being to know values and act according to the recognition of their hierarchy, but so is a particular direction of love and hate. This surely determines one’s life and Scheler did speak about fate as such a determining force<sup>117</sup>. Also, the emotive apparatus can work only if the rules of work are embedded in it. And Scheler himself stated as much: the heart, that is, the *ordo amoris*, has its reasons; that is, its specific rules or laws “are inscribed (*eingeschrieben*) in it, [the laws] which correspond to the level on which the world as the world of values is built”<sup>118</sup>. Not only the entire emotive apparatus is built into the human being – strivings, preference, will, and feelings with the dominating character of love and hate – but also general rules or hierarchy of values and the rules or axioms of application of values. Interestingly, the general aspect of such rules means that what is innate is formal ethics, and this formal aspect of ethics acquires material (content-related) aspect in life according to a particular social milieu. Kant’s framework of formal ethics is thus not overcome by Scheler; it is moved to the inborn level of emotive machinery, to the preparatory stage before the human being springs onto the arena of life in the real world. Inborn rules allow a newborn become a person through the process of sifting the axiological material through the filter of these rules. The emotive makeup is so built that the contact with the objective and immutable world of values is possible. Because of the hierarchical structure of this world, the highest values ought to be preferred and feelings are attuned to it by their hierarchy as well. The human being is thus born for becoming good through execution of actions. And this should be the normal state of all humans. ∞

ADAM DROZDEK – jest pracownikiem Duquesne University w Pittsburghu na stanowisku Associate Professor. Jego zainteresowania koncentrują się wokół historycznego rozwoju rozważań teologicznych.

ADAM DROZDEK – Associate Professor at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh. His current research focuses upon historical development of theological reflection.

<sup>115</sup> *Ordo amoris*, p. 374–5.

<sup>116</sup> *Ordo amoris*, p. 376.

<sup>117</sup> Fate is “the playing field of certain characterologically strongly circumscribed possibilities of experience of the world”, *Ordo amoris*, p. 350.

<sup>118</sup> *Ordo amoris*, p. 362.