ARCHIWUM HISTORII FILOZOFII I MYŚLI SPOŁECZNEJ • ARCHIVE OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL THOUGHT
VOL. 59/2014 • ISSN 0066–6874

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Innatism in Kant

ABSTRACT: Although Kant very seldom mentioned the concept of innateness, it is very important in his epistemological system. The article shows that although the *a priori* and the innate must be distinguished from one another, they are intertwined concepts. Also, taking into account different levels of generality of Kantian cognitive subjects allows us to show that the same thing can be considered innate and acquired at the same time.
KEYWORDS: Immanuel Kant • innatism • epistemology

The total concentration on the self, on the cognitive subject, is Kant's answer to the problem of how we know what we know it. There is no extraneous foundation of immutable knowledge in form of the Platonic world of ideas or in form of God's eternal and perfect mind. Everything is in us. The order of what we call nature comes from us. We would not find it if we, i.e., the nature of our minds, did not put it there first (A125), which surely solves Meno's paradox[1]. But an element of immutability is necessary to assure the certainty of knowledge and this Kant accomplished through the very intricate cognitive structure of the mind and its content. Certainty lies in the *a priori*, before even experience of the world begins, and this *a priori* sphere is the centerpiece of the cognitive subject. Presumably, the *a priori* must be there before any experience begins. Therefore, it would appear that the *a priori* is a terminologically fanciful way of referring to innate elements of the human cognitive mechanism. Kant made some fairly puzzling statement concerning innateness of elements of the cognitive apparatus which do not appear to quite fit his philosophy, particularly in its critical phase.

Kant was apparently opposed to the idea of innate ideas from early on. In his *Inaugural dissertation* (1770), he wrote, "each of the two concepts [time and space] without any doubt has been acquired, not by abstraction from the sensing of objects (for sensation gives the matter, not the form, of

[1] "In what way will you look for it, Socrates, when you do not know at all what it is? How will you set about to search for something you do not know? If you should encounter it, how will you know that this is what you did not know?", Plato, *Meno* 80d.

human cognition), but from the very action of the mind which coordinates its sensations according to perpetual laws; [each concept is] like an immutable image and is known intuitively" (§15.corollary/2.406)[2]. The rejection, however, was not absolute: "objects do not strike the senses with their form or shape; therefore, in order for various [impressions] from the object that affect the sense to coalesce into some representational whole, an inner principle of the mind is needed through which these various [impressions] are wrapped into some shape in accordance with stable and innate laws" (§4/2.393); these laws collectively form "the law of the soul" and the latter "joins in a certain manner its sensations [stemming] from the presence of an object" (§15.corollary/2.406). Generally, metaphysical concepts "should not be looked for in the senses, but in the very nature of the pure intellect, not as innate (*connati*) concepts, but as abstracted from laws implanted in the mind (*legibus menti insitis*) and thus as acquired. Of such kind are [the concepts of] possibility, existence, necessity, substance, cause, etc." (§8/2.395). Concepts are not inborn, but they result from inborn laws of the mind, *leges menti insitae*. This, however, has been stated in the pre-critical period. However, the matter is not consigned only to the pre-critical stage of Kantian epistemology.

In the *Critiques* there are virtually no mentions of innateness. At one point, in the *Critique of pure reason*, Kant stated that there are only two ways of agreement of experience with categories of intellect (B166): either experience enables these categories (an empirical approach) or categories enable experience (Kant's *a priori* approach). The former must be rejected; only the latter can be retained. However, hypothetically, Kant mentioned an intermediate way: categories are neither from experience, nor are they *a priori* principles of the mind, but they were implanted by the Creator along with the ability (*Anlage*) to think (B167). In Kant's view, this idea is inadmissible since such categories would lack necessity if they were "solely based on some subjective necessity implanted in us," the necessity of tying together empirical representations. I could not say, for example, about causality that "the effect is connected (necessarily, that is) with the cause in an object, but: I am so formed that that I cannot think about this representation as being connected in this and in no other way" (B168). The argument is rather unconvincing. It seems to suggest that there is, as it were, a world of *a priori* categories which are instantiated somehow in each individual human mind to be readily used in cognition. Because this world is one, each human subject's cognitive endowment would be fashioned by one cognitive original. However, if God

[2] References are made to Kant's *Gesammelte Schriften* edited by the Prussian Academy of Sciences.

is included in the picture, this cognitive original can be considered part of God's being, whereby it would retain its unity and uniqueness. Also, if God is assumed to be a perfect being, with which Kant would agree, categories could be freshly minted for each human coming to the world, and because of God's perfection, all these categories are equally perfect in each subject; thus, the fact that the subject would rely on the *a priori* categories that are his own, the objective character of necessity could still be retained since God's perfect creation of categories would guarantee that subjectivity in respect to the use of categories would be tantamount to their objectivity.

It would appear that Kant rejected his views from the *Inaugural dissertation* concerning the innate character of the cognitive machinery; however, in a brief mention and rebuttal of the third way of the categories-objects connection, Kant focused on categories and only fleetingly mentioned the ability to think that would correspond to the *Dissertation*'s laws in the mind. Was the rejection of the innateness of the ability to thing really definite?

In his work, *On a discovery according to which each new critique of pure reason should have been made superfluous by an earlier [critique]* (1790), which is a rebuttal of Johann A. Eberhard's criticism of his views, Kant wrote as follows: "The *Critique* allows for absolutely no created (*anerschaffene*) or innate (*angeborene*) representations; it considers them all, whether they belong to intuition or to concepts of intellect, as acquired. There is, however, also an original/primal acquisition (as the teachers of the natural law say) in result of which what did not at all exist before [is acquired], hence it did not belong to anything before this act. It is the same as the *Critique* states: first, the form of things in space and time, second, the synthetic unity of the multiplicity in concepts, because our cognitive ability takes/derives none of them from objects as given [or: as they are] in themselves in them, but it brings them out from itself *a priori*. However, there must exist a ground for it in the subject, which makes it possible that the aforementioned representations arise/originate in this and in no other way and that they can also refer to objects which are not given yet, and that at least this ground is innate" (8.221–222). Kant also explained that "the ground of the possibility of sensory intuition […] is merely a peculiar receptivity of the mind (*Gemüth*) to receive representations in accordance with its subjective makeup when it is affected by something (in sensation). Only this first formal ground, e.g., of the possibility of space representation, is innate, not the space representation itself. Because impressions are always needed to determine/direct the cognitive ability, first of all, to the representation of an object (which is always its own particular action). Thus, the formal intuition, called space, emerges as an originally acquired representation (the form of outer objects in general) whose ground (as mere

receptivity) is nevertheless innate and whose acquisition comes long before a determinate concept of things that conform to this form; the acquisition of the latter is an *acquisitio derivativa* in that it already presupposes general transcendental concepts of intellect that are not innate, either, but acquired, whose *acquisitio*, however, as that of space, is also *originaria* and presupposes nothing innate except the subjective conditions of the spontaneity of thought (conformity with the unity of apperception)" (222–223/4.44). Briefly, intuition's forms of space and time along with intellect's categories are not innate; on the other hand, the ground for cognitive abilities – that is, intuition and intellect – is innate.

To interpret properly Kant's qualified acceptance of innatism, it has to be observed that, whenever he could, Kant aimed at generality, at casting the net of his philosophy onto the largest area possible. Consider his apparently curious statement that when he wanted to establish for h u m a n s the irrefutable basis of morality, he did not want to take h u m a n nature into account. In the preface to his *Foundations of the metaphysics of morals* he stated that this ground should hold for all rational beings, not just for humans if the moral law should be absolutely necessary (and they have to be rational, since it is "self-evident [that] irrational [beings] have no morality," 28.1113). Thus, a genuine moral philosophy has to be "fully cleansed from all that can be only empirical and what belongs to anthropology." Therefore, "the ground of obligation must be sought not in the nature of man or in the circumstances of the world, in which he is placed, but only *a priori* in concepts of pure reason" (preface/4.389) since the moral law should hold "not only for men, but for all rational beings in general" (ch. 2/4.408, 412, 425). Similar sentiment is expressed in the *Critique of practical reason* where he wrote in the preface that his work should give principles of possibility of duty and its scope "without any special connection to the human nature" (5.8); and again, as stated in ch. 1, §7, the moral principle "is not limited only to humans, but is extended to all finite beings that have reason and will and it even includes the infinite being as the highest intelligence"; for finite beings, the categorical imperative is the moral law (5.32). His system of morality should hold for all rational beings: humans, Martians, angels, *etc*., notwithstanding the fact that his observations could be based only on one kind of rational beings, namely humans. It was no different with his analysis of the system of cognition which should also hold for all rational beings. However, different rational beings could have different cognitive makeup. Yet, Kant assumed that all of them should be characterized by the presence of three cognitive areas: sensory intuition, intellect, and reason. However, the exact makeup of these three areas can differ from one kind of rational being to another

to the extent that some of them may be simply empty. Humans are blessed – or cursed – with the body and the presence of the body imposes certain cognitive limitations; hence, the direct insight into things in themselves is impossible, hence the importance of sensory intuition. However, God is purely spiritual being and thus His way of acquiring knowledge differs from the human way. Does God even acquire knowledge? He is omniscient; thus, He already possesses all knowledge; thus, the sensory part of the cognitive mechanism is redundant for God.

As an infinite being, God has a special status in the Kantian universe; therefore, His cognitive apparatus should probably also be treated in a special manner. This is, actually, what Kant himself suggested when saying that we should not ascribe to God intellect "in the proper sense" of the word (*Critique of judgment* §90.2/5.465) since cognitive categories for God would lose any meaning because for God, seeing objects would be tantamount to creating them (B138–139, B145; 28.1053). God would not see and then analyze objects which would exist before the act of seeing them, but He would bring them into being through the act of seeing, which is a feat no other being could repeat[3]. This is reflected in the terminological distinction made in passing between original intuition possessed by God and derived intuition that characterizes all other rational beings (B72). In the *Inaugural dissertation*, this faculty is described as *intuitus intellectualis*, the faculty through which objects as they are in themselves are immediately present without their needing "to affect our senses," whereby the divine intuition is perfectly intellectual (§10/2.396–397). In the *Critique of judgment*, Kant spoke about God as intuitive intellect, *intellectus archetypus* (also briefly mentioned in A695/B723), and original/primal intellect as enabling the possibility of explanations in terms of final causality (§77/5.406–408, 410). Therefore, intuition and intellect are blended into one faculty, intellectual intuition or intuitive intellect. This process can be carried even further when as already indicated in Kant's early writing, *A new presentation of the first principles of metaphysical knowledge* (1755): "God does not need reasoning; because everything is most clearly open to his gaze, one act of representation puts before his intellect which things are harmonious or disharmonious, whereby he does not need an analysis as the dark night of our intelligence necessarily does" (1.391). The view is endorsed in his lectures, *Philosophical theology* (1783–1784) (28.1053)[4]. Reasoning thus

[3] Cf. H. Vaihinger, *Commentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Stuttgart 1892, vol. 2, pp. 508–511; S.R. Palmquist, *Kant's critical religion*, Aldershot 2000, pp. 86–87.

[4] These statements are: "fundamentally a way of telling us how the properties of God must be u n l i k e those of creatures. They give no positive information about the constitution of the divine attributes," A.W. Wood, *Kant's rational theology*, Ithaca 1978, p. 86.

would be a sign of God's imperfection since it would mean that, through the process of reasoning, God would need to acquire knowledge about something He does not currently possess. Therefore, it is not surprising to read that "reason" is a term which is "beneath the dignity of the divine nature" (28.1053). God, therefore, does not need the faculty of reason, either, and His divine mind would have just one faculty – a pure intellect with which God knows everything at once and *a priori* (28.1051) and using reason would indicate the existence of limitations of intellect (1053) – which in finite rational beings is present as intuition, intellect, and reason[5]. In all this, however, we should be fairly certain that the highest being does not have to be limited by "all constraints which sensation imposes on intelligences that we know from experience" (A640/B669).

It appears that finite spiritual beings (angels) need a cognitive apparatus, but the mechanism may have a different setup than in humans. Maybe their set of intellectual categories is different than in humans, and yet, eventually, they would be able to arrive to at least the same or better knowledge as humans do. And Martians, should they exist, may have a more complicated existential configuration, say tripartite, not bipartite as in humans (the body and soul), and thus their sensory forms may be more complicated as well. Therefore, humans have a perception mechanism which "does not have to necessarily characterize every [rational] being the way it [characterizes] man" (A42/B59). It could be well nigh impossible for humans to understand the workings of a different cognitive setup (different forms of intuition, different set of concepts, and different way of using them) than in the human race, but this does not mean that such different cognitive arrangements do not exist (A230/B283). Of course, such different arrangements would have to be harmonious wholes since for a different type of intuition than human, "our functions of thinking would be meaningless in application to them" (A286/B342). In any event, all rational beings have an inborn ground for the cognitive mechanism: sensory intuition, intellect, and reason; however, the content (particular forms in the intuition, concepts in intellect, ideas in reason) is determined by the natural environment into which they are born and by the nature of their constitution. That is, the three cognitive abilities are inborn and along with them "laws of intellect and reason" (such laws are mentioned in A57/B81; cf. the phrase "*leges intellectus et rationis*" used in the *Dissertation*, §1/2.389)[6]. These laws are generic and need to be instantiated for

[5] Palmquist, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

[6] "For Kant, inborn are only the cognitive powers themselves and with them the laws according to which they function by their nature", M. Oberhausen, *Das neue Apriori: Kants Lehre von einer "ursprünglichen Erwerbung" apriorischer Vorstellungen*, Stuttgart 1997,

a particular type of the rational being in a particular natural environment. This environment and the fact that humans have body and soul determine that, for example, human sensory intuition is filled with the form of space and time after birth[7]. If "laws of intellect and reason" are seen as basically the same as *leges menti insitae* of the *Inaugural dissertation*, then it appears that Kant did not abandon in his critical stage the view of the inborn character of character of some aspects of cognitive apparatus[8].

Different rational beings may have different sets of, for instance, forms of sensory intuition. It remains an open problem whether the same form is truly the same when shared by different finds of being. Is space the same in humans and it is in Martians? In pre-critical writings Kant allowed for different kinds of space. God could create non-Euclidean spaces, and different worlds that are characterized by such different spaces (*Thoughts on the true estimate of living forces* (1747), §10–11/1.24–25): "there is a hope that, as it is in empirical matters, space may one day be discovered endowed with other properties, or even perhaps a two-sided rectilinear figure" (*Dissertation* §15D/2.404). In the *Critique of pure reason* such a possibility is also allowed because there is nothing contradictory in the concept of two straight lines coming together and the concept of a figure. However, it is impossible to construct such a figure (A220–221/B268)[9]. which would indicate that Kant limited himself to the Euclidean space. And yet, at one point, he very cautiously allowed for such a possibility and only in the first edition when he stated that "it can only be said that, as far as it has been observed so far, no space that would have more than three dimensions has been found" (A24).

p. 99; "the functions of judgment … remain potentially in the inborn basis of intellect", A. Rosales, *Sein und Subjektivität bei Kant: zum subjektiven Ursprung der Kategorien*, Berlin 2000, p. 115; the forms of intuition are not inborn, but "they have an inborn ground in powers and abilities," p. 261, cf. pp. 51, 85–87, 109–110, 161–162, 314.

[7] Thus, this would be "an innatism of specific ways of representing, not of specific representations," G. Zoeller, *From innate to 'a priori': Kant's radical transformation of a Cartesian-Leibnizian legacy*, "Monist" 72 (1989), p. 232. A suggestion that innateness is just "the 'regulative' function that belongs to critical thinking with which each man can systematize his knowledge and action", Y. Yamane, *Zur "kritischen Verwandlung" des Begriffs "angeboren" bei Kant*, [in:] V. Rohden, R.R. Terra, G.A. de Almeida, M. Ruffing (eds.), *Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants*, Berlin 2008, vol. 2, p. 839, or a regulative principle through which each man hopes for the harmonious character of the world (p. 842) includes innateness in the cognitive apparatus. However, it precedes the formation of this apparatus and thus it is, at best, a regulative meta-function or meta-principle.

[8] Cf. Oberhausen, *op. cit.*, pp. 111, 117, 215, 218.

[9] Incidentally, "it was Kant's appreciation of the fact that non-Euclidean geometries are consistent […] that, among several different considerations, led him to say that Euclidean geometry is synthetic" G.G. Brittan, *Kant's philosophy of science*, Princeton 1978, p. 70.

This may mean that a non-Euclidean space can still be found, but hardly on earth if it was not found there thus far.

How does the mechanism of shaping the cognitive apparatus work? This is a great unknown since, from the human point of view, this mechanism belongs to the level of things in themselves. Human cognitive apparatus can tell us only so much. In that respect, Kant explicitly claimed human ignorance concerning why the structure of a particular cognitive mechanism is the way it is. In his polemic with Eberhard he wrote, "we could give no ground why we have this particular kind of sensation and such nature of intellect by connection of which experience is possible" (8.249). This is beyond the capacity of our reason and even beyond the right to pose the question why space is used as the form of sensory intuition and not any other form (A557/B585). We cannot judge about the sensory intuitions of "other thinking beings" whether they are restrained the same way as ours or in any other way (A27/B43); it is possible that their intuition also uses space and time, but this is impossible to decide (B72). It is undetermined how the multiplicity is given to intuition before the synthesis of intellect.

> But about peculiarity of our intellect to bring up the unity of apperception *a priori* through the means of categories and this particular kind and number of them, it is as little to say concerning its basis as why we have these particular and no other functions for judgment or why time and space are the only forms of our possible intuition (B145–146).

The problem of innateness becomes more intricate when the moral sphere of practical reason is also included in the picture. Kant mentioned the problem of innateness in this context in the first chapter of his *Religion within the limits of reason alone* (1793). He established in the *Foundations* that all rational beings are apparently guided by the categorical imperative, and yet mankind presents a rather sorry image of constant misbehavior and incessant violation of this highest moral law. In an attempt to tackle the problem, Kant made apparently confusing and even contradictory statements when he said that that predisposition to evil is both innate and acquired. How can that be?

According to Kant, the nature of man is understood as a subjective ground of man's exercise of freedom in general (6.21). This objective ground that characterizes all rational beings is tailored to the human race and applies only to this race. Also, the good or evil character "that distinguishes man from other possible rational beings" is "innate in him" (21), innate in the sense that it is "posited as the ground before every use of freedom in experience (in the earliest youth way back to birth) and is thus considered as

present in man at birth" (22). However, to have a good or evil "disposition as an inborn constitution from nature does not mean here that it has not been acquired by man" (25). The disposition, that is, "the first subjective ground of the adoption of maxims can be only one and it applies universally to the entire use of freedom. However, this [disposition] itself must have been accepted by free will," although the ground of this adoption is unknown (25). This disposition or rather its ultimate ground is the attribute of the will that belongs to it by nature (25). Man has a predisposition to self-love from which follows the desire of having high standing in the eyes of others (27). There is also a propensity (*Hang*) to evil which is innate and yet also acquired (29). It belongs to mankind in general and to the character of the human race (29). Propensity to evil is subjectively necessary in humans, and this natural propensity to evil is a radical innate evil in human nature (32). If there were in man only the moral predisposition, he would act only according to the supreme moral maxim; but to man's nature belongs also "equally innocent natural predisposition" which makes him act according to the subjective principle of self-love (36). Goodness or evil of a particular human being depends of giving priority to the moral law or to the law of self-love (36), where the moral law is the province of the will, self-love – of the heart (37). Evil heart can coexist with good will and this brings hope for a particular man to mend his heart (44) through personal conversion, whereby his moral disposition becomes like the disposition of the moral archetype which is modeled on Christ.

It appears that the presence of particular elements of moral constitution should be considered from three perspectives, that is, on three different levels of generality: all finite rational beings, humankind, and a particular human being (there is one more level which has a special and separate standing: the domain of the divine).

All finite rational beings are characterized by the presence of the categorical imperative which is associated with practical reason and the will. This imperative is an innate element in all finite rational beings that come into being anywhere in the universe. To be sure, humans are included in this number.

However, humans have a particular makeup: they have the mind and the body and this bodily part is also reflected in the moral makeup of man, in his predisposition to self-love and in the propensity to evil, and thus in his possession of the heart that can lead someone morally astray. From the perspective of humankind, this propensity is innate. From the perspective of the rational being, it is acquired, acquired as part of the constitution specific to humans; when a human being, in general, is born, the categorical

imperative is implanted in him as a rational being and, in addition (and thus as acquired), the propensity to evil, which belongs to him as a human being. It is little doubt that the corporeal side of the human being is responsible for this innate-acquired propensity to evil. Humans have no say about their possessing the body; they simply are born with the mind (the soul) and the body. As Kant stated, sensory apparatus (*Sinnlichkeit*) is innate in us (6.34–35), which, as *pars pro toto*, means that we are born with the body. That the body may cause a moral havoc is indicated by Kant's reference to Paul's statement, "I do what I don't want" (Rom. 7:15) and the body is to blame for it, since in the preceding verse Paul stated, "I am a corporeal being, sold to the slavery of sin." However, how is it exactly that the body should cause such moral problems, remains a mystery: the ground of man's being good of evil is inscrutable to us (6.21, 43).

On the lowest level, there is a particular human being. There is a constant struggle in each human being between the law of self-love and categorical imperative. The latter should always have an upper hand over the former, and if it does not, this is this particular human being's fault. The relative strength of the will and of the heart will determine for this particular human being whether it should so happen.

Lower levels inherit as innate all that characterizes higher levels and what appears for the first time on a particular level is also considered innate from the perspective of this level. What is new on a lower level is considered acquired from the vantage point of a higher level. This is true for both aspects of reason: theoretical reason and practical reason, both having three levels of generality, which can be summarized in the following table:

	First level: Finite rational being	Second level: Mankind	Third level: A particular human being
Theoretical reason	Intuition Intellect Reason Judgment and purposiveness	2 forms 12 categories 3 ideas	Individual strength
Practical reason	Will and categorical imperative	Heart and self-love	Individual strength of the will and the heart

For a human being in general (a part of mankind), categorical imperative is innate and so is the principle of self-love, but from the point of view of a finite rational being in general, self-love is acquired. For a particular human being, say, Mr. Brown, the faculty of intuition, the two forms of intuition (space and time), and the degree of perspicacity of his own intuition are all

innate: when Mr. Brown is viewed as a finite rational being, only his faculty of intuition is innate, whereas the fact of possessing space and time as forms of intuition, and the strength of his intuitive faculty are acquired; when he is considered from the point of view of mankind, only the strength of his intuition is considered acquired, whereas intuition, and space and time are all considered innate.

For all this, we can add an analogy to generative grammar.

According to generative grammarians, each human has an innate linguistic competence, which is an ability to learn any language into which the human is born. There exists a built-in universal grammar (UG) allowing for acquiring a particular language since each language is a particular instantiation of the innate UG. This grammar is parameterized and a particular grammar is considered an instance of the UG with particular values for the parameters. Learning a language thus amounts to extracting from one's experience the parameter values which are used by speakers of one's linguistic environment and using them to activate the rules of the UG in the manner best suiting this environment.

The concept of the UG inspired some research of the problem of universals in the area of morality resulting in an introduction of the concept of the universal moral grammar[10]. It was even suggested that Kant's categorical imperative could be a part of this grammar[11].

The analogy of the UG can also be extended into the province of theoretical reason. The intuition-intellect-reason triad would be an equivalent of the universal grammar with which each rational being is endowed at birth. The elements of this triad are parameterized so that they are filled with proper forms-concepts-ideas that are fitting particular natural and social environment and may require some time to be fully developed: at least for humans some developmental process is required so that first seeds and beginnings of concepts in human intellect, where they lie ready, can become fully developed through experience and are released by intellect (A66/B91, A86/B118). It is also clear that the judgment faculty of the youth matures (A754/B782).

By analogy, a concept of the universal cognitive grammar can be introduced, at least in the context of Kantian philosophy. This grammar would specify what are the innate elements in each finite rational subject: the intuition-intellect-reason triad; what are their responsibilities:

[10] For a comprehensive discussion of the problem see J. Mikhail, *Elements of moral cognition: 'Rawls' linguistic analogy and the cognitive science of moral and legal judgment*, Cambridge 2011.

[11] G. Harman, *Explaining value and other essays in moral philosophy*, Oxford 2000, p. 225.

formatting data, conceptual processing, unification through ideas; specifying kinds of tools to be used to that end: forms-categories-ideas; but this grammar would leave it open what exactly these tools are: what and how many forms, categories, and ideas, which would be determined at birth and acquired according to the signals coming from the environment and the built-in abilities to shape them.

Finally, how does the idea of innatism fit Kant's critical epistemology? To avoid the problem, the innate can simply be treated as the synonym of the *a priori*[12]. The *a priori* and the innate have different meaning, although, theoretically, they may have the same scope of application. However, they don't. Scheler observed that the *a priori* can be just as much innate as it can be acquired. Moreover, for example, some insight does not become *a priori* because it is innate and it does not cease to be *a priori* if it is innate[13]. Therefore, for Kant's epistemology, the ground of possibility of cognition is innate and *a priori*; forms and categories are acquired, but they are also *a priori*. Such understanding is reflected in Kant's idea of education when he advocated the use of the Socratic method along with the idea that in education of children, "we should see to it that, generally, rational knowledge is not brought into them, but is drawn out from them" in spite of the fact that it is a protracted process (*Pedagogy* 9.477).

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[12] "Kant's a priori has undeniably very strong connection to the innate," or, stronger yet, in the realm of intuition "the a priori is in essence identical with the innate", Vaihinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 99, 100. Kant "is constrained to view space as innate in conscious form", although this is not a conclusion that "he could permanently stand by," N. K. Smith, *A commentary to Kant's "Critique of pure reason"*, London 1918, p. 93. Space, time, causality and other categories "can justifiably be called innate ideas in Kant's system", J.M. Penn, *Linguistic relativity versus innate ideas*, Hague 1972, p. 49.

[13] M. Scheler, *Formalism in ethics and non-formal ethics of values*, Evanston 1973, pp. 78–79.