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Aftermath: Whatever Happened to the Second Volume of *Being and Time*?

ABSTRACT: The aim of the article is to reconstruct the possible contents of the Second Half of *Being and time*. Author begins with presentation of the hermeneutical logic of philosophical concept formation, it is formal indication; then describes the announcements of the Third Division in *Being and Time*. Finally, the original Heidegger's concept of philosophy is recalled to stress the meaning of the third division of Part One of *Being and Time*.

KEY WORDS: Heidegger • formal indication • transcendence • temporality • *Dasein* • *Being and Time*

The first volume was drafted in the course of 1926 under publish-or-perish conditions and appeared in print in April 1927 under the title “Being and Time, First Half”, both as a separate edition and together with only one other lengthy article (Oskar Becker’s *Mathematische Existenz*) in Husserl’s “Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung”. The decision to divide his opus magnum into two volumes was made in the first days of January 1927, as Heidegger relates it in retrospect, during a visit to Karl Jaspers in Heidelberg, “on the day that the news of Rilke’s death reached us” (GA49 40)¹. The purpose of the visit was to discuss the page proofs of *Sein und Zeit* (= SZ) that Heidegger had been forwarding to Jaspers. During the course of this visit, it became clear to Heidegger that his elaboration up to that point of the pivotal third division of *Being and Time* (= BT), entitled “Time and Being”, would have been incomprehensible to keen minds like Jaspers and Rilke. The published portion thus contains only the first two divisions of the systematic Part One of BT. “Moreover, external circumstances (the excessive length of the “Jahrbuch” volume) fortunately prevented the publication of this division [I,3]” (GA66 413/366). Its first elaboration “was ‘destroyed,’ but a new start was made, on a more historical path, in the lecture course of Summer Semester 1927” (GA66 413f/366f). Combined his-

torical-systematic attempts seeking a lucid elaboration of various aspects of this crucial third division continued into 1930. Heidegger's still unpublished file of notes entitled "Supplements to *Being and Time*" contains the draft of a preface to the third edition of the book, handwritten in the middle of 1930, which announces a completely new reworking of the published First Half of *Being and Time* and a second half that would embody only the third division of Part One, sufficiently surcharged historically. But in 1931, the third edition of "BT, First Half" appeared unchanged. The book project entitled *Being and Time* had now finally come to a dead end (*Holzweg*), although Heidegger communicated his decision to abandon this path through BT in personal letters to only a few confidants. For example, on September 18, 1932, he writes to Elisabeth Blochmann: "People think that I am writing SZ II, and are even talking about it. That's OK with me. SZ I was once a path that led me somewhere, but this path is now no longer trodden and has become overgrown. That is why I can no longer write SZ II. I am not writing any book" (Heidegger/Blochmann 1989, 54). Even earlier, on November 14, 1931, Heidegger writes to Rudolf Bultmann about new directions in his work now being carried out behind "the mask of someone who 'is writing his second volume'".

The larger reading public was not informed of the abandonment of this path until the seventh edition published in 1953, which deletes the phrase "First Half" from the title with the following prefatory explanation: "After a quarter century, the second half can no longer be added unless the first half were to be presented in a new way. Yet the path it has taken remains a necessary path even today, if our *Dasein* is to be aroused and moved by the question of being" (SZ V). The necessity is derived from the *Da-sein* experience in its radical interrogative power, secure in the revolutionary direction of its questioning and the interrogative domain of be-ing that it projects and into which it finds itself thrown. "SZ (1927) [...] originated [...] as an initial path of making the question-of-being evident as fundamentally as possible and at once in an actual performance [of this question] in a gestalt that points beyond all former ways of posing that question" (GA66 413/366). Accordingly, "what was unsatisfactory in the division that was held back was not an insecurity in the direction of questioning and its domain, but only an uncertainty in its proper elaboration" (GA66 414/367). Secure in its direction of questioning, but inadequate in its proper elaboration – to the point of being incomprehensible to sharp minds like Rilke and Jaspers: where exactly is the fatal flaw in the third division, which after repeated attempts to elaborate it, was never to appear? The im-proper elaboration would gradually be attributed to the language of metaphysics. Heidegger's explana-

tion in the *Letter on Humanism* (1947) strikes us as a good summary and initial overview of the following detailed accounts of these various failures of elaboration. In this context Heidegger is trying to deflect the misinterpretation of the “projection” of the understanding-of-being as an achievement of subjectivity. It can be thought only as the ecstatic relation to the clearing of being:

The adequate actualization and completion of this other thinking that abandons subjectivity is surely made more difficult by the fact that in the publication of *Being and Time* the third division of the First Part, *Time and Being*, was withheld (cf. *Sein und Zeit*, p. 39). Here everything is reversed. The division in question was held back because thinking failed in the adequate saying of this turning [*Kehre*] and did not succeed by means of the language of metaphysics. The lecture *On the Essence of Truth*, thought out and delivered in 1930 but not printed until 1943, provides a measure of insight into the thinking of the turning from “Being and Time” to “Time and Being.” This turning is not a change of standpoint from *Being and Time*, but in it the thinking that was sought first arrives at the locality of that dimension out of which *Being and Time* is experienced, that is to say, experienced in the fundamental experience of the oblivion of being. (GA9 327f./249f.)

A Hermeneutic Logic of Philosophical Concept Formation: Formal Indication

Simply put, the language of metaphysics is the language of subject and object, which dominates the grammar and logic of the Western languages. The limitations this imposes on Heidegger’s way of thought leads him to remark, just before he outlines the parts and divisions of *Being and Time*, “For the [...] task [of grasping beings in their being] we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the ‘grammar’” (SZ 39). His early development already manifests a series of inventive steps to overcome this restrictive paradigm pervading the Western languages. From his review article on *Recent Research in Logic* (1912) to his *Habilitationsschrift* (1915–16) on the Scotist doctrine of categories and meaning and speculative grammar, the young Heidegger’s interest revolves around a “logic of philosophy” (Lask’s book) that examines the peculiar phenomena at the margins of the ruling grammar of the subject-predicate relation, such as existential statements and impersonal sentences. The logic of philosophical concept formation, which for the neo-Kantian Lask is not a formal but a transcendental logic, is developed by Heidegger into a phenomenological (hermeneutic, ontological) logic

of philosophical concept formation. Already in the war emergency semester of early 1919 he replaces the well-known neo-Kantian impersonal assertion of the transcendental difference – “It ‘is’ not, but it validates [or more generally, ‘it values’]” – with newly coined impersonal sentences that serve to indicate an ontological difference between be-ing and beings: “It ‘is’ not, but it’s worlding, it’s happening, it’s appropriating itself [*es er-eignet sich*]” (Kisiel 1993, Chapter 1). Thus in *Being and Time* we find existential-ontological statements such as, “It [temporality] is not, rather it’s t e m p o r a l i z i n g i t s e l f [*zeitigt sich*]” (SZ 328). Likewise, the horizon of this temporality “simply ‘is’ not, but rather it’s temporalizing itself” (GA26 269/208).

Heidegger’s quest for a non-objectifying language of being in the framework of a phenomenological logic of philosophical concept formation becomes particularly clear in the dramatic closing hours of the 1919 war emergency semester (GA56/57 107–117/90–99). Here he tries to free the main methodological concept of phenomenology, the concept of intentionality, in its application to the “original something” (life in and for itself, lived experience), from all traces of a formal logical misinterpretation as a rigid dualism of subject and object. Objectifying life and treating it theoretically serve to strip life of its very vitality (de-vivification) and tear it out of its historical context (de-historicization and un-worlding). In its pure phenomenological formality, intentionality is purely and simply a directing-itself-towards. As c o m p o r t m e n t as such, it is i n d i c a t e d in its pure moment of the formal “towards,” which Heidegger considers the heart, the center, the middle, the origin, the concealed source, of life – the intimate happening of its be-ing. The toward-which (*das Worauf*) of this comportment is initially described as a unitary intentional relation from motivation to tendency and back, in an intentional “circular” motion of “motivated tendency or tending motivation” (GA56/57 117/99). It then becomes passionate action before it is described more fundamentally as thrown projection in *Being and Time*. There, “the toward-which [*das Woraufhin*] of the primary projection” constitutes the m e a n i n g of *Dasein* qua temporality, whose circular motion is re-described as a thrown projecting of a pre-structured context (the world) “according to which something becomes comprehensible as something” (SZ 151, 324). Meaning is thereby constituted by the circular interplay between the toward-which, the telic (purposive) direction of *Dasein*, and the preceded context of the world in which “things fall into place and make sense” in the present.

Formal indication thus becomes the “methodological secret weapon” in Heidegger’s logic of philosophical concept formation (Kisiel 1997). In the published First Half of *Being and Time* it is mentioned about

a half-dozen times without explanation (SZ 53, 114, 116f., 179, 231, 313–315; but also “provisional indication,” 14, 16, 41). The undiscussed theme of “formal indication,” as hermeneutic phenomenology’s guiding “logic of philosophical concept formation,” thus would have to become a central topic of discussion in the third division. This is confirmed by a footnote (deleted after the 6th edition of SZ) that dispatches the following themes for discussion in a specific chapter (two) of Division 3: “Only in terms of the temporality of speech [*Rede*: discursivity] – that is, of *Da-sein* as such – can the ‘origin’ of ‘meaning’ be clarified and the possibility of concept formation be made ontologically understandable” (SZ 349).

On the way to *Being and Time*, Heidegger passes through a whole series of increasingly more profound formal indications. But each should be seen not only as a struggle to bring out different nuances of the motivated tendency of human life but also as a formal deepening of the dynamic prestructuring (*Praestruktion*) of intentionality, which is first understood as pure directing-itself-towards: as an intentionality with the three dimensions of relational sense, containment sense, and actualization sense (1920–22), supplemented by a unifying temporalization sense and a truthful safekeeping in 1922; as *Da-sein* (1923), being-in-the-world (1924), to-be (*Zu-sein*, 1925), ex-sistence (1926), and transcendence (1927–30). Thus the pure formula for the structure of care in *Being and Time*, “ahead-of-itself-being-already-in-(the-world) as being-in-the-midst-of (entities encountered within-the-world)” (SZ 192), is clearly intentional in the broader (pre-theoretical) sense. The “new start” of Division 3 “on a more historical path,” in Summer Semester 1927, thus reaches the following conclusion by way of a series of formal indications: “Intentionality is the *ratio cognoscendi* of transcendence. Transcendence is the *ratio essendi* of intentionality in its diverse modes” (GA24 91/65). In Kantian terms, transcendence becomes the “condition of the possibility” of intentionality.

Finally, the entire series of formal indications will prove to have “the condition of its possibility in temporality and temporality’s ecstatic-horizonal character” (GA24 379/268). Intentionality, transcendence, existence: at their root they each formalize their temporal structuration and indicate the temporal telos that together constitute the very sense (*Sinn*) of existence. What in factic life could be more formal than time? And with regard to its indicative indexical function, what in factic life could be more concrete and immediate and nearer to us than time, my time, your time, our time? Time is at once the ultimate formality and the most intimate and immediate proximity of being, the original thrust of its facticity. In a note that belongs among the new attempts to elaborate Division 3, Heidegger remarks: “tem-

porality: it is not just a fact, but itself the essence of the fact: facticity. The fact of facticity (here the root of the ‘reversal of ontology’). Can one ask, ‘How does time originate?’ [...] Only with time is there a possibility of origination. [...] But then, what is the meaning of the impossibility of the problem of the origination of time?’ (Heidegger 1991, p. 9).

There are accordingly two interrelated aspects of time that must be thought together in formal indication, its dynamic prestructuring and its concretion, factic life in the uniqueness of its facticity, “the fact of facticity.” Heidegger formally indicates this singular aspect of *Dasein* in the following pronominal terms: “The be-ing that concerns this being in its very be-ing is in each instance mine [yours, ours]” (SZ 42). In other contexts, the ontological indexicals of the personal pronouns, “I am, you are, we are,” are expressed in the more overtly temporal particularities of “my time, your time, our time” to indicate the unique one-time-only lifetime that each of us is allotted as our very own (GA31 129f/89f). Underlying the *Je-meinigkeit* (in-each-instance-mine-ness) of *Dasein* is thus the *Je-weiligkeit* (to each its while) of be-ing. Time has long been regarded as a principle of individuation, but it is important here to identify this as the time proper to each of us in order to distinguish it from the common time which we all share in the public domain. It is therefore time proper that is the principle of individualization. My (your, our) history is also very much a factor in proper time, for we are clearly individualized by the particular historical context in which we find ourselves. Precursors to *Dasein* in Heidegger’s early development include the “historical I” and the “situation I” or, together, the historically situated I. Coming to terms with our proper temporal selves as *Da-sein* involves the hermeneutic task of explicating our selves in our proper historical context. And on the ontological and pre-ontological levels, the hermeneutics of facticity is a formally indicative hermeneutics where, fundamentally, be-ing as time is properly singular, historical, and finite.

Announcements of the Third Division in *Being and Time*

The alert reader of *Being and Time* can to the present day detect the traces of incompleteness scattered throughout the extant text by way of the places marked “to-be-continued” with trail markers still left largely intact. The markers that project the contents of the third division that would have concluded the systematic Part One of *Being and Time* are clustered around the pivotal §69. Then there are the references to the three divisions of the historical Part Two on the “phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology” (cf. the book’s outline on SZ 39), whose themes to some extent get

conflated into the more historical attempts at reformulating the problematic third division of Part One. Early on in *Being and Time*, explicit reference is made to the second division of Part Two on the phenomenological destruction of Descartes' *cogito sum* (SZ 89). The longest footnote in *Being and Time*, on traditional conceptions of time (SZ 432–433n.), promises to continue the discussion in the first (on Kant's doctrine of schematism and of time) and third (Aristotle's treatise on time) divisions of Part Two. There are two other references to division II.1 on Kant (SZ 319n., 427n.), which will find its partial fulfillment in the book *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929).

The stumbling block, of course, is the systematic third division, which in its first elaboration proved to be too opaque for Heidegger's intellectual peers. §69 (SZ 350–66) provides several explicit clues in regard to its overall content: "That the intentionality of 'consciousness' is grounded in the ek-static temporality of *Dasein*, and how this is the case, will be shown in the following Division" (SZ 363, note). This explicit reference to Division 3 is further evidence that it would have included a major methodological section on the sense-of-direction of a formally indicative hermeneutics. The same §69b includes a similarly directed reference, which indicates that this division was to treat not only the "idea of phenomenology, as distinguished from the preliminary conception of it which we indicated by way of introduction [§7]", but also its corresponding existential conception of science understood as "a way of existence and thus as a mode of being-in-the-world that discovers beings or discloses be-ing" (SZ 357). With its emphasis on the temporal process of disclosive discovery and focus on the "ontological genesis of the theoretical attitude", the existential conception differs sharply from the logical conception, which regards science in terms of its verified results and defines it as "a grounded coherence of true, validated propositions". In view of these contrasting conceptions of derivative and originary truth, "a fully adequate existential interpretation of science cannot be carried out until the meaning of being and the 'connection' between being and truth have been clarified in terms of the temporality of existence" (SZ 357). And this clarification is the "central problematic" (SZ 357) of Division 3. As a preparation for these tasks of the following division, §69c (SZ 364–66) develops "the temporal problem of the transcendence of the world," that is, the problem of how the world temporalizes itself as the toward-which of the temporal ecstases into a horizontal unity in accordance with the "horizontal schemata" – the respective "whithers" of the ecstases. The temporal transcendence of the world is thereby founded ecstatically-horizontally. The ek-static unity of temporality is also designated at the start of §69 as the

cleared clearing of *Dasein* that grounds the disclosedness of the there (cf. SZ 35of.). The clarification of the connection between being and truth thus begins with *Dasein*, whose fundamental characteristic is the understanding of being. In turn, the understanding of being is made possible by disclosedness, that is, disposed understanding – dynamically understood as thrown projecting (cf. §44c, SZ 230). The thrown projection that is *Da-sein* in its ek-sistence is ultimately – and so finitely – grounded in ecstatic temporality, in the cleared clearing of the t/here. In this way time is used as the “preliminary name” for truth, which is now understood as disclosedness, clearing, unconcealment. “Being and truth ‘are’ equiprimordially” (SZ 230).

Finally, the concluding section of *Being and Time* (§83) naturally provides a pair of directive questions, one phenomenological and the other horizontal, that serve to bridge the transition into the division that is to immediately follow in the Second Half of *Being and Time*.

§69 has already posited the task of explicating the more phenomenological conception of phenomenology as distinguished from its formal preconception developed from the etymology of phenomeno-logy: “Letting that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” (SZ 34). But for such apparently transparent phenomena, there is obviously no need of a method of explication. What the “method” of phenomenology is called upon to explicate is “manifestly that which first of all and most of all precisely does not show itself, which, over against that which first and foremost does show itself, remains hidden, but which at the same time belongs to what first of all and most of all does show itself, indeed belonging to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and ground” (SZ 35). At this ground level, phenomenology is ontology, which is of the essence of philosophy. Accordingly—and Heidegger lifts this definition bodily from SZ 38 into the concluding section on SZ 436—“Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, starting from the hermeneutic of *Da-sein*, which as an analytic of existence has secured the guiding thread of all philosophical questioning there where such questioning arises and to which it returns”. But then Heidegger asks, “Can ontology be grounded ontologically or does it also need an ontic fundament? And which entity must take over this function of founding?” (SZ 436) The answer, of course, flows directly from the foregoing definition of philosophy: it is *Da-sein*, who already is the question of being, who is called upon to be the ontic fundament of fundamental ontology, philosophy, by re-asking the question of being in its own way and for its own time. The hermeneutic of *Dasein*, governed as it is from beginning to end by the formal indication of existence, is through and through a formally indicative hermeneutics

of *Da-sein*, which is in each instantiation mine, yours, ours. This will raise questions about the nature of philosophy that will work themselves out in the ensuing years that attempt to complete the project of *Being and Time*.

The concluding sentence of *Being and Time* asks, “Does Time itself manifest itself as the horizon of Being?” (SZ 437) The question is clearly the direct and immediate transition to Division 3, which is to bear the title, *Time and Being*. In later years, Heidegger will observe that it is in fact the horizon of the understanding-of-being that is intended here. But this is already evident to the careful reader of *Being and Time*, and will be made even more evident in the attempt at a new elaboration of Division 3 by way of a more historical route in SS 1927.

SS 1927: The Basic Problems of Phenomenology

Heidegger’s older students like Karl Löwith knew in advance that the lecture course of Summer Semester 1927 was to be a “new elaboration of Division 3 of Part One of *Being and Time*” (GA24 1n.) by way of a more historical path. But because of the long historical detour that it takes through the “destruction” of four traditional theses about being in order to come to four basic problems of phenomenological ontology, the course covers only a part of the path projected in §69 toward establishing the correlation of being and truth in terms of temporality, before it had to be broken off for lack of time.

The “first and last and basic problem” of a phenomenological science of being is: “How is the understanding of being at all possible?” (GA24 19/15). More explicitly, “Whence—that is, from which antecedently given horizon – do we understand the like of being?” (GA24 21/16). The already developed analytic of *Dasein* gives a first answer: “time is the horizon from which something like being becomes understandable at all. We interpret being by way of time (*tempus*). The interpretation is a Temporal [*temporale*] one. The fundamental subject of research in ontology [...] is Temporality [*Temporalität*]” (22/17). Ontology is not only a critical and transcendental science (cf. 23/17), but also a Temporal one (cf. 324/228), which is hence quite different from all other, so-called positive sciences. But it is like the positive sciences in one way. A positive science must objectify the entities that lie before it upon the latent horizon of their particular being, upon the whither of the “projection of the ontological constitution of a region of beings” (457/321)—their being what and how they are. Similarly, ontology must objectify being itself “upon the horizon of its understandability” (459/322)—that is, upon Temporality. Ontology becomes a Temporal science “because Tem-

poral projection makes possible an objectification [*Vergegenständlichung*] of being and assures conceptualizability, and thereby constitutes ontology in general as a science” (459f/323). “It is in the objectification of being as such that the ground act constituting ontology as a science is performed” (398/281). This basic act has “the function of explicitly projecting what is antecedently given upon that toward which it has already been projected [and unveiled] in pre-scientific experience or [pre-conceptual] understanding” (399/282). The explicit objectification “thematizes” (GA24 398/281), and “thematization objectifies” (SZ 363). This explicit articulation of the basic concepts of a science, or explicit interpretation of its guiding understanding of being, determines the distinctive conceptual structure of the science, the possibility of truth that pertains to it, and its manner of communicating its true propositions (SZ 362f.). The true propositions of scientific ontology are a priori, transcendental, and Temporal (GA24 460f./323f.). The phenomenological language of being as such is the language of Temporality, which is properly “the transcendental horizon for the question of being” (461/324). With this, the announced goal of Division 3, “the explication of time” as just such an interrogative horizon, has been reached (SZ 39). Thus, Temporality is the transcendental horizon of the understanding of being especially in its more question-worthy moments in the radical questioning “of” being.

Temporality (*Temporalität*) is the temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) already laid out in the existential analytic of *Da-sein* but now thematized in its function as condition of possibility of the pre-ontological and ontological understanding of being, and thus of ontology as such (GA24 324/228, 388/274). In this function, Temporality is “the most origivative temporalizing of temporality as such” (429/302). As the most original temporality, it is the most radical – the temporality that is fundamentally factual down to its abyssal ground, that is, the “propriating event” (*Er-eignis*), if we may here use the later Heidegger’s favorite word for be-ing. But in 1927 Heidegger hesitates to plunge into the concealed depths of temporality, “above all with regard to its Temporality,” and to enter “the problem of the finitude of time” (437/307f.).

[...] to what extent is a negative, a not, involved in Temporality in general and, conjointly, in temporality? We may even ask to what extent time itself is the condition of possibility of nullity in general. [...] Closer consideration shows that the not and also the essential nature of the not, nullity, likewise can be interpreted only by way of the nature of time and that it is only by starting from this that the possibility of modification – for example, the modification of presence into absence – can be explained. [...] We are not well enough prepared to penetrate into this obscure region. [443/311f.]

One reason for this hesitation lies in the incompleteness of the analyses of Temporality as a whole as “temporality with regard to the unity of the horizontal schemata belonging to it” (GA24 436/307). The horizon of ecstatic temporality is understood more precisely as the horizontal schema of the corresponding ecstasis. For every ecstasis, as a removal-unto, also has in it an anticipation of the formal structure of the “whither” of the remotion, which is never an indefinite removal into nothingness. This anticipated whither of the ecstasis is the horizontal schema that belongs to it (GA24 428f/302). In *Being and Time* (SZ 365), the horizontal schemata are expressed prepositionally, that is, in a meaning-like way, following the model of meaning as the pre-structured toward-which (SZ 151): the for-the-sake-of (the ecstasis of the future as coming-towards), the from-which of thrownness or the to-which of abandonment (past as having-been, *Gewesenheit*), the in-order-to (present). But in Summer Semester 1927, Heidegger proposes to designate the horizontal schemata with the Latin expressions for the “tenses” (*Tempora*) of time. “Here, in the dimension of the interpretation of being via time, we are purposely making use of Latinate expressions for all the determinations of time, in order to keep them distinct in the terminology itself from the time-determinations in the previously described sense” (GA24 433/305). *Praesens* is used instead of “present” (*Gegenwart*), where *praesens* now means the horizontal schema of the present. More precisely, *praesens* (instead of the in-order-to) is supposed explicitly to “constitute the condition of possibility of understanding handiness as such” (434/305).

As the condition of possibility of the “beyond itself,” the ecstasis of the present has within itself a schematic prefiguration of the where out there this “beyond itself” is. [...] *Praesens* is not identical with present, but, as basic determination of the horizontal schema of this ecstasis, it joins in constituting the complete time-structure of the present. Corresponding remarks apply to the other two ecstases, future and past (repetition, forgetting, retaining). [435/306].

But Heidegger treats only the ecstasis of the present in regard to *praesens*, and says nothing at all about the other ecstases in regard to their presumably Latinized tenses and schemata, the *futurum* and *praeteritum*. Yet *praesens* in particular is not independent; it stands in an inner Temporal connection with the other Temporal schemata. “In each instance the inner Temporal interconnections of the horizontal schemata of time vary also according to the mode of temporalizing of temporality, which always temporalizes itself in the unity of its ecstases in such a way that the pre-

edence of one ecstasis always modifies the others along with it" (436/307). In a summary of the prepositional nexus already laid out in *Being and Time*, Heidegger had already emphasized that the relations of the in-order-to can be understood only "if the *Dasein* understands something of the nature of the for-the-sake-of-itself" (418/295). An in-order-to (present) can be revealed only insofar as the for-the-sake-of (future) that belongs to a can-be is understood.

But the *futurum*, as the condition of possibility of understanding the self of *Dasein*, does not come under consideration at all, not even in its inner connection to *praesens*. With his exclusive treatment of *praesens*, Heidegger appears to yield to the domination of the traditional metaphysics of constant presence, which understands the being of beings only "in the horizon of productive-intuitive comportment" (GA24 165/117) and would soon find its epochal denouement in the contemporary age of technology. In this way the most brilliant insights of the analytic of *Dasein*, for example, insights into the existential priority of the future and into the historicity of *Dasein*, are not pursued any further and silhouetted upon the fundamental horizon of the most radical temporality. Heidegger's break with Plato's anamnesis-thesis had already been projected in his transformation of Pindar's saying, "become what you [always already] are," into "become what you are to be"; in *Being and Time* the directive is "be what you will be" (cf. SZ 145), "become what you yourself are not yet at all" (cf. SZ 243), or "become what you can be" (cf. the statements on "resoluteness", SZ 305f.). But this transformation is not taken further, into the uttermost Temporal horizon and into its abyssal implications. The levels of *Dasein*'s historicity – for example, how, in the resolute "repetition" of a communal destiny in the "natural" course of a change of generations, the past perfect of preceded *Dasein* assumes the form of the future perfect of a community – remain uninvestigated in the Temporality of their modes of being. For example, the practical historical science of Christian theology, which takes as its object the historically transmitted and repeated happening of revelation for the community of faith, is corrected only in a formally indicative way by philosophical concepts and not comprehended in a philosophically scientific way, that is, Temporally (*Phenomenology and Theology* [1927–28], GA9 45–77/39–61). With the renunciation of the language game of Temporality, the dream of philosophy as a Temporal science – that is, the objectification of being itself on the horizon of time – comes to an end. The thought that philosophy cannot be a science at all then becomes the main theme of *Introduction to Philosophy*, the lecture course of Winter Semester 1928–29.

Transcendence – Horizon – Temporality

Nevertheless, the conceptual pair “transcendence – horizon” persists in the next lecture courses, although *Temporalität* virtually disappears from Heidegger’s vocabulary and henceforth appears only “in brackets”. The course of SS 1928, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, renews the elaboration of ecstatic-horizonal temporality without any reference to Temporality. In contrast to the previous year’s emphasis on the horizon of *praesens*, originary temporality is now focused on the ecstatic being-toward-itself in the mode of the for-the-sake-of-itself (GA26 276/213). “This approaching oneself in advance, from one’s own possibility, is the primary ecstatic concept of the future” (GA26 266/206). The for-the-sake-of is the distinctive mark of the *Dasein* that is in each instance mine (yours, ours), “that it is concerned with this being, in its being, in a particular way. *Dasein* exists for the sake of *Dasein*’s being and its can-be. [...] It belongs to *Dasein*’s essence to be concerned in its being about its very being” (239/186, my emphasis). The for-the-sake-of-itself thus formally determines an ontological circuit from be-ing to be-ing that transcends beings—the “circle” (278/215) of self-understanding, of freedom, of selfhood and its binding obligations in be-ing. “Freedom gives itself to understand, freedom is the primal understanding, i.e., the primal projection of that which freedom itself makes possible” (247/192). But what does freedom make possible? The meaningful context of the world, “the wholeness of beings in the totality of their possibilities” (231/180), which gets its specifically transcendental form of organization from the particular for-the-sake-of in each instantiation (cf. 238/185). The world temporalizes itself primarily from the for-the-sake-of, from the ecstasis of the future, and is grounded in the ecstatic unity and wholeness of the temporalized horizon (275 & 273/211f.). Heidegger now speaks of an “ecstematic” unity of the horizon, that is, a systematic unity that is temporalized by the unity of the ecstases (269/208). This horizonal unity weighted toward the future is the “temporal condition for the possibility of world” (269/208). Because this horizon is not an entity, it can nowhere be localized. It shows itself only in and with the ecstases as their organized *ecstema*. Its horizon is “not at all primarily related to looking and intuiting, but by itself means simply that which delimits, encloses, the enclosure. [...] It ‘is’ not as such, rather it temporalizes itself” (269/208). Or better: It’s worlding! (*Es weltet*) – to use an expression that Heidegger now revives (GA26 219–221/170–173), after having coined it in 1919. With this formulation, Heidegger seeks to indicate that the world is not an entity, but rather a temporal How of be-ing. The world, the unity of the temporal horizon, is

nothing that is and yet 'it gives' [*es gibt*]. The 'it' [*das 'es'*] that gives this non-entity is itself not entitative, but rather is the temporality that temporalizes itself. And what the latter, as ecstatic unity, temporalizes is the unity of its horizon, the world [...] that which simply arises in and with temporalization. We therefore call it the *nihil originarium*. [272/210].

It's worlding, it's giving, it's temporalizing itself: these are the impersonals of sheer dynamism of facticity. "The primal fact, in the metaphysical sense, is that there is anything like temporality at all" (GA26 270/209). Sheer facticity is the *nihil originarium*, and the product of the "peculiar productivity intrinsic to temporality" is "precisely a peculiar nothing, the world" (272/210), the historical world. Thus the primal fact of temporality is no *factum brutum*, but rather "primal history pure and simple" (270/209), "the primal event of appropriation [*Urereignis*]" (274/212). The impersonal sentence "it's appropriating itself [*es er-eignet sich*]" already makes an appearance in 1919 as the *principium individuationis*, that is, the principle of facticity as such (GA26 270/209; cf. GA56/57 75/63f.). But in *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Heidegger emphasizes the ontical upshot of the "historical happening of transcendence," in which "beings are already discovered as well" (281/217). The metaphysical primal history of *Dasein* as temporality also documents the completely "enigmatic" tendency to understand beings as intratemporal, extratemporal, and supratemporal (274/212). Of course, "the event of the world-entry of beings" happens only as long as historical *Dasein* exists, which as being-in-the-world gives beings the opportunity to enter the world. "And only when [being-in-the-world] is existent, have [extant] things also already entered world, i.e. become intraworldly" (194). "There is time, in the common sense, only with the temporalization of temporality, with the happening of world-entry. And there are also intratemporal beings that transpire 'in time' only insofar as world-entry happens and intraworldly beings become manifest for *Dasein*" (272/210). The thorough elaboration of world-entry is in part Heidegger's answer to the basic metaphysical problem of the ontological relation between realism and idealism (SZ §§ 43, 44c) in his confrontation with Max Scheler (GA26 164–9/131–4), which he inserts into this lecture course on the occasion of Scheler's death. Intraworldliness and intratemporality do not belong to the essence of the extant in itself, which remains the same entity that it is and as which it is "even if it does not become intraworldly, even if world-entry does not happen to it" (251/194). The happening of the world-entry of beings is only the transcendental condition of possibility for the fact that extant entities reveal themselves in their in-itself, and thus "for [extant] things announcing themselves in their not requiring world-entry

regarding their own being” (251/195; cf. 194f./153). The fact that we are called to let beings be what and how they are is another sign of the facticity and thrownness of temporal *Dasein*, whose powerlessness in the face of beings is disclosed in transcendence and in world-entry (cf. 279/215). The freedom of transcendence is at the same time the binding character of the ground.

To sum up what has been said in sheer temporal terms:

The ecstatic in its expansive sweep temporalizes itself as a worlding. World entry happens only insofar as something like ecstatic sweep [*Schwungung*] temporalizes itself as a particular temporality. [...] The entrance into the world by beings is primal history pure and simple”. [GA26 270/209].

The explication of the sweep of world-entry is not completely new in Heidegger. In a decisive closing statement in the war emergency semester of 1919, he observes,

But this means that the sense of the something as the experienceable implies the moment of ‘out towards’, of ‘direction towards’, ‘into a (particular) world’, and indeed in its undiminished ‘vital impetus’ [*Lebenschwungkraft*]” (GA56/57 115/97).

The upsurge of the originary spring [*Ur-sprung* = origin] of life, in its motivated tendency and tending motivation, receives its thrust from the momentum of time (GA56/57 117/99, 95–8/80–3, 60f./51). In SS 1928, Heidegger acknowledges Bergson’s ontical language of the *élan* of time as the source of ontologically directed expressions – for example, the being of the ecstases

resides precisely in free ecstatic momentum [*Schwung*]. [...] Temporality is the free sweep of the whole of primordial temporality; time expands and contracts itself. (And only because of momentum is there throw, facticity, thrownness; and only because of its onsurging sweep is there projection). [GA26 268/207f.].

Thrown projection rather than motivated tendency, is now the basic movement of *Dasein*. The basic projection of transcendence, which finds its possibility in the unity of ecstatic sweep, now becomes “the upswing, regarded as sweeping over all possible beings that can factually enter there into a world” (270/209). World-entry is, to begin with, an ecstatic happening of worlding, that is, the unifying sweep of the carrying-away (*raptus*) of the ecstases into a unitary horizon. As an expansive sweep into the ecstatic unity of time, the horizon is not an objectification, since this sweep cannot be represented as “anything thing-like, present at hand” (268/208).

The transcendence of *Dasein* is an upswing (*Überschwung*) into the possibilities of the world, which itself is “the free surpassive counter-hold of the for-the-sake-of” (GA 26 248/193). Transcendence means leaping over the beings that already factually and factually exist and so leaping into “an excess of possibilities, within which *Dasein* always maintains itself as free projection” (248/192). *Dasein* is always “farther” than any factual entity. In the “reach of its rich domain [*Be-reich*]” of the understanding-of-being lies the inner possibility of enrichment: “*Dasein* always has the character of being-richer-than, of outstripping, sweeping-over” (273/211). It is, in its ordinary temporalizing, an effusive exuberance of possibilities. Transcendence, according to Plato, is *epekeina tes ousias*: “The for-the-sake-of (transcendence), however, is not being itself, but surpasses being, and does so insofar as it outstrips beings in dignity and power” (284/219, Heidegger’s rendition of *Republic* 509b). “The freedom toward ground is the outstripping, in the upswing, of that which carries us away and gives us distance” (285/221). Yet we must also emphasize the unfreedom of finite transcendence: “On the basis of this upswing, *Dasein* is, in each instantiation, beyond beings [...] but it is beyond in such a way that it first of all experiences beings in their resistance, against which transcending *Dasein* is powerless” (279/215).

The next lecture courses, delivered upon Heidegger’s return to Freiburg as Husserl’s successor, document the first signs of the gradual and often halting and even silent abandonment of the conceptual constellation “transcendence – horizon – Temporality,” which had formed the original core of the projected third division of *Being and Time*. In “On the Essence of Ground” (his article for the Husserl *Festschrift* composed in October 1928) Heidegger speaks, without explicitly mentioning Division 3, of *Being and Time*’s “sole guiding intention [...] the entire thrust, and the goal of the development of the problem”: “what has been published so far of the investigations on ‘Being and Time’ has no other task than that of [...] attaining the ‘transcendental horizon of the question of being’” (GA9 162n./371n.66). But he also notes that “in the present investigation, the Temporal interpretation of transcendence is intentionally set aside throughout” (GA9 166n./371n.67). Yet Heidegger’s personal copy of the 1929 edition contains two handwritten marginalia that still recognize Temporality as the condition of possibility of temporality: “the essence of the ‘happening’ – temporalizing of Temporality as a preliminary name for the truth of be-ing [*Seyn*].” (GA9 159/123, note a; 171/132, note a). In the *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), temporality or “the originary unity of the ecstatic removal that clears and conceals itself” (GA65 234/165) is understood as the first beginning’s transition to the grounding of the time-play-space

(*Zeit-Spiel-Raum*) of the site of the moment (cf. GA65 18/13, 29/21, 294/208). In order to complete this passage of transition, it was necessary “above all to avoid any objectification of be-ing, both by w i t h h o l d i n g the ‘Temporal’ interpretation of be-ing and by attempting to make the truth of be-ing ‘visible’ independently of this interpretation (freedom toward ground in ‘On the Essence of Ground’ [...])” (GA65 451/317). Thus, in the course of SS 1930, freedom and not the unitary horizon of Temporality is designated as “the condition of the possibility of the manifestness of the being of beings, of the understanding of being” (GA31 303/205). Nevertheless, one could always still “identify” freedom and temporality by way of mediating concepts like “possibility.” The displacement of Temporality by freedom is in fact already in full swing in SS 1928, where freedom is already related to the “play” and “leeway” (*Spielraum*) offered by the particular possibilities of the historical world into which we happen to find ourselves thrown. Freedom is thus actualized by transcendence to the world disclosed as the “temporal playing field” (*Zeit-Spiel-Raum*) of historically transmitted possibilities. World becomes the historical playing field where we play out our most fundamental freedom of transcendence. “‘World’ is the name of the game that transcendence plays” (GA27 312; cf. 300, 306ff.). Freedom here is not a property possessed by humans but is rather the happening that possesses or “properizes” the unique human being into ex-sisting its historically particular being-in-the-world. It is this freedom that serves to re-place horizon-schematizing Temporality (1927) with “time-play-space,” or “time-space” (*Zeit-Raum*: from 1934) for short, of the later works (GA66 424/375). In the end, therefore, time-space can be traced back, by way of a series of transformative re-placements, to its *locus classicus* in Kant’s transcendental schematism of the imagination, which is essentially spatial-temporal in form.

The very idea of a “horizon of time” comes under intense critical scrutiny in a litany of questions (GA29/30 219f/145f) in Winter Semester 1929–30, in the context of a phenomenological interpretation of the essence of radical or “deep” boredom. It has long become a commonplace, Heidegger notes, to invoke a single yet threefold horizon of time when we wish to gather all beings together simultaneously in all three perspectives of time – with respect to the present, in retrospect of the past, and in prospect of the future, “the perspectives of all a c t i o n a n d i n a c t i o n of *Dasein*” (GA29/30 219/145). But the complete indifference induced by total boredom – “being bored with it all” – empties this temporal horizon of beings as a whole in all respects and turns this horizon into an empty expanse “not at all actually articulated and delimited according to the past and future” (222/148). The lengthening of the while of *Dasein* that characterizes boredom (= *Langeweile* = “long

while”) only accentuates this hollowed expansion into the full expanse of the temporality of *Dasein* (229/153). In such total boredom, *Dasein* as a whole, left empty and oppressed by the indeterminacy of the long while of total boredom, with a sense of being everywhere and yet nowhere, in fact becomes captivated, spellbound, entranced by its temporal horizon.

This spell of time is broken by the moment of holistic insight into the unique situation of action of being-t/here, *Da-sein*, which is in each instantiation mine (yours, ours). Since this proper possibility is intimated in the entrancement in the temporal horizon, the two apparently juxtaposed aspects of temporality belong together in a “single unitary [temporal] phenomenon, in which [...] the *Dasein* in us swings [*schwingt*] out into the expanse of the temporal horizon of its temporality and only in this way is able to swing into the moment of essential action” (GA29/30 227/151). The inactivity induced by profound boredom is thus dispelled. The mood of radical boredom is precisely this swinging between the empty expanse of the temporal horizon and the peak of the moment of insight (*Augenblick*). The moment is the keen vision of *Dasein*’s resolute openness toward being-t/here, which in each instance, as existing, is in the comprehensively grasped situation of action, as this particular, singular, and unique being-t/here (GA29/30 251/169, 224/149). “The moment of holistic insight breaches the binding spell of time, and is able to breach it insofar as it is itself a specific possibility of time. It is not some now-point [...] but is the look of *Dasein* in the three [temporal] perspectival directions” (227/151). The entrancement of time is broken, and can be broken only by time itself, by the “breakthrough” – often characterized as a sudden insight – of transcendence into the peak experience of the holistic moment. Thereby time itself has now become still more enigmatic for us, “when we think of the horizon of time, its expanse, its horizontal function – among other things as spellbinding – and finally when we think of the way in which this horizon is connected to what we call the moment of holistic insight” (228/152).

Whence the necessity of this relation between ‘expanse’ and ‘peak,’ between horizon and holistic moment of insight, between world and individuation, and why does it arise? What kind of ‘and’ is it that links these terms? Why must that expanse of the spellbinding horizon ultimately be breached by the moment of insight? And why can it be broken only by this moment of insight, so that *Da-sein* attains its existence proper precisely in this breach? Is the essence of the unity and structural linking of both terms ultimately a breach? What is the meaning of this breach within *Da-sein* itself? We call this the finitude of *Da-sein* and ask: What does finitude mean? [252/170].

The finitude of the world, the finitude of the moment of individuation, the finitude of *Dasein* in the insecurity of its basic questioning: these intercalated questions of world, individuation, and finitude reach in their origin back to the question of the essence of time (252/171, 256/173), and the groundlessness and fundamental concealment of its finitude (306/209). Is the horizon of time a confining enclosure or a de-defining limit that is at once an opening of finite possibilities?

In the *Contributions* (1936–38), *Horizont* becomes a recessive term (GA65 177/124, 200f/140f), being replaced on the one hand by the more incipiently “being-historical” term, time-(play)-space, and on the other hand by its metaphysical German synonym, *Gesichtskreis*, literally “circle of vision,” which thus irredeemably ties it to two millennia of Occidental metaphysics of sight and light (GA65 250/176, 270/190f., 274/193, 363/254, 376/263, 444/312, 450/317, 493/347, 502/354, 505/355; GA66 300–3/268–270). A note from the same time period, written by Heidegger in the copy of *Being and Time* that he kept in his mountain cabin, in the section on the “Outline of the Treatise”, provides the third division on “Time and Being” with a new direction. This note lists three tasks that must be carried out in “the transcendence-bound difference [between time and be-ing]”: “The overcoming of the horizon as such. The return to the origin. The presencing out of this provenant origin” (SZ 39n., Stambaugh tr., 35). But it was not until the *Feldweg-Gespräche* (1944–45, GA77) that Heidegger thoroughly overcame and deconstructed the transcendental-horizonal construction of metaphysics: beyond the horizon and the re-presented objects that stand over against it and that it encircles, coming to meet us from afar there is the free expansiveness of an enveloping open, a “regioning region” or “countering country” (*gegrende Gegend*), in whose “while” things come to linger for a while, instead of standing over against us as objects (Heidegger 1959a, 38–43/63–68).

Philosophy: Not a Science but a Formally Indicative Protreptic

Since 1919, when Heidegger first characterized philosophy as the pre-theoretical primal science of original life, he repeatedly vacillated on the question of whether phenomenological philosophy is a primal science, or even a science at all. For philosophy, as primal science, is unlike any other science, since it aims to be a *supra*-theoretical or *pre*-theoretical – thus a *non*-theoretical – science, which appears to be a contradiction in terms, like a “square circle”. Already in the Winter Semester of 1919–20 Heidegger remarks that philosophy, as “originary science”, is not a science at all “in the true and proper sense” (GA58 230), since every philosophy presumes to do

more than mere science. And in the next semester he traces this “more” back to the original motive of philosophizing, that is, to the radically disquieting character of life itself.

This *pre-* and *supra-*theoretical “more” is thematized again in the Winter Semester of 1928–29, at the end of the phenomenological decade of Heidegger’s development (1919–1929). As Husserl’s successor, Heidegger returns again to the theme of the scientificity of philosophy in this first of the later Freiburg lecture courses, which bears the title *Introduction to Philosophy*. Philosophy is not a science among others, but is more originary than any science. “Philosophy is indeed the *origin* of science, but for this very reason it is not science – not even a primal science” (GA27 18). Because it gives science its possibility, philosophy is something more, something else, something higher and more originary. This “something else” is philosophy’s power of transcendence, of which science as such is incapable. In exercising this transcending power, this “freedom toward ground”, philosophizing is “an existing out of the essential ground of *Dasein*, becoming essential in transcendence” (GA27 218; GA26 285/221). It is not a science at all, not out of lack but out of excess, because through its overt dwelling in the understanding-of-being (*Seinsverständnis*) it is always in a bond of intimate friendship (*philia*; GA27 22) with the evidential “things themselves,” thus truer to the matters at stake and thereby “more scientific than any science can ever be” (219). Therefore the expression “scientific philosophy” is not only superfluous, like the term “round circle,” but also a misleading misunderstanding (16, 219, 221).

Philosophizing as explicit transcending, as explicitly letting transcendence happen, is grounded in the “primal fact” (GA27 223, 205) of the understanding-of-being, the thrown projection of being. Transcending is, first, the surpassing of beings, which happens in science on the basis of the prior, nonobjective, background projection of the ontological constitution of beings. On this basis, beings in themselves come to appear and can be articulated as openly lying before us (*positum*). “Against the background [horizon!] of the being that is projected in the projection, the entity that is thus defined first comes into relief” (196). But in this projection of the fundamental positive concepts of the sciences, being itself remains unconceived and, at first, even inconceivable. Nevertheless, the understanding-of-being is “nothing other than the possibility of carrying out the distinction between beings and being – in short, the possibility of the ontological difference” (223). There remains the radical possibility of developing the understanding-of-being into a conceiving of being, that is, into a question about what being itself is, and how such things as the understanding-of-being and transcendence

become possible. This self-articulating transition from the pre-conceptual understanding-of-being to the interrogative will to conceive being is philosophy as explicit transcending.

Philosophy is now sharply delimited from science, which is the cognition of beings as *positum* in a demarcated domain. “Neither being as such nor beings as a whole and as such, nor the inner connection between being and beings [in transcendence – T.K.] is ever accessible [...] to a science” (224). “Transcendence is nothing that could lie before us like an object of science” (395). Being itself is no *positum*, but is like a nothing, and is close to the nonentities of world and freedom. What, then, is the language of being, *onto-logos* (200f.), if it is not scientific language? For the propositional truth of science is founded “on something more originary that does not have the character of an assertion” (68). Philosophy as onto-logy, “the thematic grasping and conceiving of being itself” (200), in essence becomes a problem that can be solved only when we “unveil the full, inner direction of the essence of philosophizing” (217).

Significant in the edition of this 1928–29 lecture course is a single paragraph on time as the transcendental horizon of the question of being, that is, on the schematic-phenomenological *construction* of the concept of being by way of time at the heart of Division 3. This paragraph, as the editors note, was not read aloud in the lecture course (GA27 218n)². Even the discussion of the “*Konstruktion* of the problem of being” or the “*Konstruktion* of transcendence” (cf. 394, 396, 400), which occasionally surfaces in Heidegger’s lecture-manuscript, is not to be found in the more extensive student transcripts of the course. Instead, philosophizing as questing and questioning of the comprehensive concept of being becomes an everlasting inexhaustible deconstructive task – a task that “leads us again and again into situations from which there seems to be no exit” (216). And the question of being, which “leads us anew into abysses” (205), is only one path to philosophy, the path via science. In order to make the full concept of philosophy intelligible, this path must be supplemented by two further paths: via worldview and via history.

A goal common to both paths is important for our purposes. *Being and Time* had already articulated the transcendence of being-in-the-world

² The two sentences on a “transcendental horizon” before the paragraph in question were likewise not read aloud. I have compared the edition of GA27 with a much more extensive transcript of the course by Simon Moser and have supplemented and improved my citations from the edited version with clarifying turns-of-phrase drawn from the Moser transcript (hereafter referred to as SM). A copy of this Moser transcript is to be found in the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center at the Duquesne University Library.

and thereby the transcendence of the world (cf. SZ §69c). “If transcending means being-in-the-world, and if this in each instantiation is a way of comporting oneself in the world, a worldview, then explicit transcending – philosophizing – entails an explicit cultivation of a worldview” (GA27 354f.). Philosophy as worldview is a way of comporting (*Haltung*), what the Greeks called *ethos* (cf. 379) and what the later Heidegger will identify with the hermeneutic relation of being-human as the *Brauch* (tradition, custom, usage, practice) that develops from our dwelling in the world, the habit of a habitat (Heidegger 1959b, 125–28/32–34). “Philosophy is not one worldview among others, not one way of comporting among others, but the comportment that comes from the ground of transcendence, *the* grounding comportment pure and simple” (SM 678; cf. GA27 397). In philosophizing, as explicitly letting *Dasein*’s transcendence happen from its ground, the most originally possible comportment takes place (396).

Only in explicitly letting transcendence happen, in opening up the inner breadth and originality of transcendence, do the concrete possibilities of the [concrete] comportment [of factual existing] open up. But these concrete possibilities for the comportment [of factual worldviews] are not determined on the path of philosophy, but [in each instantiation] from the temporally particular *Dasein* itself. (397; cf. SM 679)

Cultivating a particular comportment and promoting it as a standard is not the task of philosophy as the fundamental comportment, which only expresses the conditions of possibility and the presuppositions for the originary action (*Urhandlung*) of comporting oneself in the world, that is, the “form” of its actualization (GA27 390). At most and at best, philosophy can be the “occasion” for the factually existing human being to have the possibilities of a way of comporting to open up in a free and nonbinding way. The individual human can then arrive at his/her own comportment and befit it to his/her own historical situation in free choice and decision (SM 679 = GA 27 397; also 381). The more originary the fundamental comportment of philosophizing *Dasein*, the more freely and less bindingly can the comportment happen historically in the *Dasein* of others. And the less bindingly the fundamental comportment happens, the more likely can the historical happening of the comportment be awakened in others.

Philosophy as a wake-up call and as the occasion for free decision and interpretation—this is philosophy’s exhortative function, which Aristotle already designated as a protreptic. This function of philosophy is connected to two temporally determined and interwoven features of the

transcendence of *Dasein*: its freedom and its historical particularity. Philosophizing – letting transcendence happen from its ground means precisely the development of that transcendence of *Dasein* which we call freedom.

[...] The essence of philosophizing consists in its cultivation of the leeway and space of free movement [*Spielraum*] into which concrete, historical *Dasein*, which in each instance is guided by a particular way of comporting, can enter. The fact that philosophy develops the leeway [= freedom] for the temporally particular attainment of a comportment means that philosophizing is essentially linked to the future. Just as myth is an essential and necessary recollection for philosophy, the future of its questioning is its real strength. But the present disappears, for the present is always only the peak of the moment of holistic insight that takes its power and its wealth from futural recollection. [...] With futural remembrance, we indicate the distinctive historical position that the metaphysical essence of philosophy bears within itself. [SM 68of.; cf. GA27, 398].

Philosophy is the liberation of the historically particular *Dasein* (GA27 401). Philosophizing, as letting the historically particular leeway of freedom happen for the peak moment of decision and the possibilities that have temporally ripened in that moment, is itself the primal action of letting-be (cf. 205), of *Gelassenheit* – “an originary action of the freedom of *Dasein* – indeed, the happening of the space of freedom of *Dasein* itself” (214), “a ‘deed’ of the highest and original kind, which is possible only on the basis of the innermost essence of our existence – freedom” (103). “Letting transcendence happen as philosophizing involves the originary letting of *Dasein*, the human’s trust in the *Da-sein* within him/her and in its possibilities” (401). “This entity [called] *Da-sein* [...] in and through its being, lets such a thing as a ‘there’ [a historical space of openness and disclosure] first be” (136).

And this “there” is always temporally particular, in each instantiation mine, yours, ours, and this means in each instance historical. As *Dasein* never exists in general, so “philosophy does not occur in general, in some undetermined somewhere or indefinite *Dasein*, or in itself” (SM 682 = GA27 399). “*Dasein* never exists in general. As concrete, it exists in a particular circumstance and, depending on these circumstances, in each instantiation secures for itself the essential and inessential situations [of action]” (227; cf. SM 407). The explicit and decisive leap into worldview as a comportment is necessarily the leap into one’s own historicity, into concrete historical circumstances, into the specific historicity of one’s own questioning from the whole of one’s own historical situation (cf. 400). In a radical sense, philosophy leaps into the historicity of its factic *Dasein* in order to attain

originality and strength and to be what is essential (cf. SM 682f.). The fact that the essential and originary is revealed only in historical concretion is a difficulty that is considered along the third path to the full essence of philosophy. This difficulty is nothing other than the problem of the essence of philosophical truth as opposed to scientific truth, and thus the problem of the essence of truth as such. This problem of truth belongs together with the problem of being (in the first path) and the problem of the world (in the second path) within the architectonic of philosophy. More precisely, each of these problems constitutes the whole of philosophy (cf. SM 683).

Philosophy is not a science, but a directive exhortative protreptic. The course of Winter Semester 1929–30 emphasizes this point from the unique perspective of Heidegger’s very last treatment of formal indication. In contrast to scientific concepts, all philosophical concepts are formally indicative. “The meaning-content of these concepts does not directly intend or express what they refer to, but only gives an indication, a pointer to the fact that anyone who seeks to understand is called upon by this conceptual context to undertake a transformation of themselves into their *Dasein* [into the *Da-sein* within themselves]” (GA29/30 430/297; 428/296). Because such concepts can only address the challenge of such a transformation to us without being able to bring about this transformation themselves, they are but *i n d i c a t i v e* concepts. They in each instance point to *Dasein* itself, my (your, our) *Da-sein*, as the locus and agent of this transformation. “Because in this indication they in each instance point to a concretion of the individual *Dasein* in man, yet never bring the content of this concretion with them, such concepts are *f o r m a l l y* indicative” (429/296). But when concepts are generic and abstract rather than proper to the concrete occasion in terms of which they are to be interpreted, “the interpretation is deprived of all its autochthonous power, since whoever seeks to understand would not then be heeding the directive that resides in every philosophical concept” (431/298). Yet the kind of interpreting that seeks out its own facticity in each instance is not “some additional, so-called ethical application of what is conceptualized, but [...] a prior opening up of the dimension of what is to be comprehended” (428f./296). The concepts and questions of philosophizing are in a class of their own, in contrast to science. These conceptual questions serve the task of philosophy: not to describe or explain man and his world, “*b u t t o e v o k e t h e D a s e i n i n m a n*” (258/174).

These formally indicative, properly philosophical concepts thus only evoke the *Dasein* in human being, but do not actually bring it about. There is something penultimate about philosophizing. Its questioning brings us to the very brink of the possibility of *Dasein*, just short of “restoring to *Dasein*

its actuality, that is, its existence” (GA29/30 257/173). There is a very fine line between philosophizing and actualizing over which the human being cannot merely slip across, but rather must overleap in order to dislodge its *Dasein*. “Only individual action itself can dislodge us from this brink of possibility into actuality, and this is the moment of holistic insight [into the concrete situation of action, and be-ing]” (257/173). It is the originary action of resolute openness, letting be, or freedom toward ground, in each instantiation concretely reenacted in accord with one’s own unique situation and particular while of history which authenticates our existence and properizes our philosophizing. It is in such originary action, repeatedly reenacted from one generation to the next, that ontology finds its ontic founding. Just as Aristotle (and so the metaphysical tradition) founded his *prote philosophia* in theologia, so Heidegger now founds his fundamental ontology on “something ontic – the *Dasein*” (GA24 26/19).

The Demise of *Sein und Zeit*, 1930

The lecture course of SS 1930, entitled *The Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy*, can be construed as one final attempt to further develop the thematic intended for the third division of *Being and Time*. In this course, Heidegger proposes to introduce philosophy by way of the question of the essence of human freedom. Now philosophy is at once a going-after-the-whole of being and a going-to-the-roots of being, which turns out to be ourselves, who as individuals question being on the basis of a prior understanding-of-being. In which horizon does this understanding-of-being operate? Answer: time, specifically my time, your time, our time, thus a particular lived time and not some universal time (GA31 130/90). For each of us has, or more properly, *is* our own time, the time that in each instance (*je*) individualizes each one of us to our own self. Our own self, our own time? “Or is it not much more the case that time possesses us?” (129/89). The question of “being and time” at the root of philosophy thereby becomes a challenging question that at once goes-to-the-roots of each and every individual. And this is where the question of the *essence* of human freedom comes in, where freedom is not a property of the human being but rather where the human being is a possibility of freedom. “Human freedom is the freedom that breaks through in the human being and takes him/her up into itself, thereby enabling him/her to be human” (135/93). Thus, “essence” is verbal here, being understood as a fundamental happening – “It’s essencing!” – that appropriates the human being to itself and brings him to his proper self.

This verbalizing of *wesen* is made central in the talk *On the Essence of Truth*, which Heidegger delivers on three occasions toward the end of 1930. The talk concludes with the turning sentence, “The essence of truth is the truth of essence”, where the latter “essence” is equivalent to verbal be-ing understood as the properizing event that happens to each to us. This turn is first announced in a pivotal sentence in the middle of the talk, “The essence of truth is freedom,” where “freedom” is not a property of the human being but rather the reverse, humans are in fact properly possessed by freedom, the “ek-sistent unconcealing *Da-sein*” within themselves.

The path through *Being and Time*, finally abandoned by the end of 1930, is in the end adjudged to be an overgrown path that could no longer be trodden, and nevertheless a necessary path strewn with tasks to be taken up by further thinking: “The path through SZ [is] unavoidable, yet it is a dead end [*Holzweg*] – a path that suddenly stops. [...] SZ – only a transition, which [stands] undecided between ‘metaphysics’ and the appropriating event”³. With the *Contributions* (1936–38), Heidegger begins increasingly to apply a fundamental critique or “destruction” to the publication *Being and Time* in order to retrieve these further tasks. Correspondingly, in 1941 he could write:

We take ‘Being and Time’ as the name for a meditation whose necessity lies far beyond the activity of any individual, who cannot ‘invent’ this necessity but cannot master it either. We thus distinguish the necessity named ‘Being and Time’ from the ‘book’ with that title. (‘Being and Time’ as the name for a appropriating event in be-ing itself. ‘Being and Time’ as the formula for a meditation within the history of thinking. ‘Being and Time’ as the title of a treatise that tries to carry out this thinking). [GA49 27].

Appendix: The Earliest Draft of the Third Division Retrieved

Whenever Heidegger reports having “destroyed” a manuscript, the term *Vernichten* should never be taken in the absolute sense of total annihilation, say, by fire. For the poverty-stricken Heidegger living in the “needy times” of post-WWI Germany, it usually meant that the manuscript was cut into smaller pieces and placed into a bin of scrap paper near his writing desk for future retrieval and recycling. In the case of the earliest draft of the third division, it has to date resurfaced in the Heidegger Archives in Marbach in the form of a file of some 200 note pages wrapped in a cover sheet labeled “I.3” which was carefully stored with the folio pages of the handwritten

³ *Der Weg: Der Gang durch’ Sein und Zeit*, unpublished typescript, 1945.

manuscript of the lecture course of Winter Semester 1925–26. A selection of about 30 pages from this file has been published (Heidegger 1998), but these include none of the many pages – and an entire file – that are marked with the number “69”. For the entire folder is a collection of notes that refer to the themes, and even to particular chapters, of the unpublished Division 3, and which were probably composed in 1925–27. A summary of the classification of the notes suggests an outline of about six chapters in the missing division. Chapter 1 would have probably borne a title such as *Phenomenology and the Positive Sciences* and would have treated the method of ontological (versus ontical) thematization. “Temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) and Worldliness” is the explicit title given to Chapter 4, which would have taken its themes primarily from §69c of *Sein und Zeit*. One also finds remarks, expressions, and turns of phrase throughout this text that do not appear in Heidegger’s known lectures and publications: for example, the temporal division of “awaiting” into “expectative – presentative – perfective”; “moments of existence” such as “the formally futural” and “the formally perfect”; the claim that “time is a self-projection upon itself (its horizontal [aspect], its ecstatic [aspect])”.

All of these grammatical allusions serve to frame a footnote (found only in the first six editions of SZ) which is attached to a grammatically oriented paragraph in §68d on *The Temporality of Discourse* (SZ 349). Since the footnote reads, “Cf. Division Three, Chapter II of this treatise”, it portends an insight into the thematic structure of the very first draft of Division 3. §68d in part refers to problems that are highlighted in §69 as substantive themes to be treated in Division 3, like the development of the problem of the connection in principle between being and truth on the basis of the problematic of temporality. But in §68d the elaboration of this basic problem of phenomenology now becomes the presupposition for “the analytic of the temporal constitution of discourse and the explication of the temporal characteristics of language-structures”. Central to an ontological explication is the widely dispersed grammar of the verb “to be” in the classification of the variations of its conjugation. For discourse does not primarily temporalize itself in one particular ecstasis. The verb is grounded in the whole of the ecstatic unity of temporality. Furthermore, the three tenses are mingled with “the other temporal phenomena of language – ‘aspects’ and ‘temporal stages’”. In particular, contemporary linguistics, which is obliged to carry out its analyses with the help of the common concept of time, cannot even pose the “problem of [the] existential-temporal structure of aspects [*Aktionsarten*]” (SZ 349).

Verbal action is grammatically divided into three basic types: 1) momentaneous, instantaneous, iterative; 2) continuous, ongoing, lasting, im-

perfect; 3) perfect, complete, perfecting. This grammatical division of verbal action (“aspects”), it may be noted, will find an experiential variant in the phenomenological division of three types of boredom in WS 1929–30, which are based accordingly on a wavering fleeting time, a limited constant time, and the time of *Dasein* as a whole, which is spell-bound by a horizon. For horizontal time as Temporality is an ontological, transcendental, or *a priori* perfect “which characterizes the kind of being belonging to *Dasein* itself” (SZ 85, note in the cabin copy). “Each ecstasis as such has a horizon that is defined by it and that first of all completes that ecstasis’ own structure” (GA24 435/306). The open horizon where each ecstasis ends is a perfective sign of the finitude of temporality, for “this end is nothing but the beginning and starting point for the possibility of all projecting” (GA24 437/308). The enabling of the transcendental perfect has the character of a prior letting-be (*Seinlassen*) (SZ 85), or better, release d n e s s (*Gelassenheit*), where the perfective suffix is both active and passive, in the ambiguity of the middle voice: it means both already-having-let-be-in-each-instance and ongoing letting-be. There is accordingly a whole series of perfective existentials in *Being and Time*: thrown e s s, dispose d n e s s (*Befindlichkeit*), discover e d n e s s, disclose d n e s s, falle n e s s, resolute n e s s, etc. The perfect expresses an action that has somehow become definitive and that is always still in the further process of becoming. The perfect is used only when the effect of earlier activity is still at work. Heidegger comments, for example, that in perception, understood in terms of intentionality, what is central is neither perceiving nor the perceived; instead, p e r c e i v e d n e s s as a habitual state is the enabling center of the intentionality of perception, the sense of its intentional direction, which is neither subjective nor objective and which, as that which makes perception possible, can ultimately be understood only on the basis of the essence of time (GA24 95ff./68ff)⁴.

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