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The Case of Slovenia from the Point of View of the Theory of Citizenship

ABSTRACT: Some general ideas and concepts of the theory of citizenship are introduced and presented and then applied to reflect on the specific situation in Slovenia. The author pays great attention to the three political virtues: civility, the capacity to object to the centers of power, and the virtue of public reason. In the contemporary Slovenian society these three central civic virtues are not sufficiently developed or cultivated. The article tries to contribute to the understanding of such a condition by taking into account Slovenian history. It focuses on the period from 1941 to 1990 (from the beginning of the occupation to the change of the regime, from a socialist one-party system to a liberal democracy).

KEYWORDS: theory of citizenship • civic virtues • Slovenia • civility • virtue of public reason • solidarity • communism • violence

We carried out our revolution with blood
and we cleaned up our house very well
during the revolution!

TITO¹

[F]or we must – with the experience of the
totalitarian century that our people expe-
rienced in the whole extent – start again
to live with the spirit of the two thousand
years old tradition of the gospels and with
the praxis of modern, liberal and tolerant
community.

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¹ J. Pirjevec, *Jugoslavija: Nastanek, razvoj ter razpad Karadjordjevićeve in Titove Jugoslavije (Yugoslavia: the rise, development and downfall of Karadjordjevic's and Tito's Yugoslavia)*, Koper 1995, p. 156.

² D. Jančar, *Temna stran meseca (The dark side of the Moon)*, [in:] D. Jančar (ed.), *Temna stran meseca: kratka zgodovina totalitarizma v Sloveniji 1945–1990 (The dark side of the Moon: a short history of totalitarianism in Slovenia 1945–1990)*, Ljubljana 1998, p. 23.

1. Introduction

In the present text some general ideas and concepts of the theory of citizenship are introduced and presented, and then applied to reflect on the specific situation in Slovenia. The theory of citizenship deals with the praxis and virtues of citizens needed for modern liberal pluralistic democracies to function³. Theory classifies those virtues into several groups⁴: from general virtues which must be respected by every good society (justice, respect of law), economic virtues (like work ethics, abilities to adapt quickly to economic and technological changes), and political virtues. The last group includes the virtues of citizens and the virtues of politicians. For instance, a virtuous politician should not encourage people or give them false hopes across certain limits just to get their support. Moreover, a virtuous politician should not give a promise she/he cannot fulfil⁵. In this article three political virtues are taken into consideration: civility, the capacity to object to the centres of power, and the virtue of public reason⁶.

We can notice that in the contemporary Slovenian society the three central civic virtues that we have stressed above are not sufficiently developed and cultivated. In this text we will try to contribute to the understanding of such a condition by taking into account Slovenian history. There are important factors in the (recent) Slovenian history which can help us to understand such a situation. In the article we particularly focus on the period from 1941 to 1990 (from the beginning of the occupation to the change of regime (from socialist one-party system to liberal democracy)). The Slovenian history from 1941 to 1990 has been characterized by a fratricidal war, violence of the communist authorities and by a totalitarian or authoritarian political system.

³ For the theory of citizenship and civic virtues see W. Galston, *Liberal purposes: goods, virtues, and diversity in the liberal state*, Cambridge 1991; W. Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction*, Oxford 2000; F. Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*, New York 1995; A. MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues*, London 1999; R. Audi, *Religious Commitment and Secular Reason*, Cambridge 2000; K. Flanagan & P. C. Jupp (eds.), *Virtue Ethics and Sociology: Issues of Modernity and Religion*, Basingstoke & New York 2001; R. D. Putnam (together with R. Leonardi & R. Nanetti), *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton 1993.

⁴ Cf. W. Galston, *Liberal purposes...*, *op. cit.*; W. Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy...*, *op. cit.*

⁵ Cf. W. Galston, *Liberal purposes...*, *op. cit.*

⁶ Cf. W. Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy...*, *op. cit.*

2. Civic virtues (in Slovenia)

2.1 Civility

Civility is a kind of political and social decency. Its importance lies in the fact that it is a (maybe the first) bulwark of a non-discriminatory, exclusive or non-solidarity society. Hate speech, the mockery of someone due to their physical or mental drawbacks or handicaps, their physical difference (shape of their eyes, colour of their skin, *etc.*), or their (culturally) conditioned clothes *etc.* are examples of a violation of this virtue.

Another virtue is the capacity to object to the centres of power. This virtue is vitally important for democracy: just think of the media for instance. It is extremely important to understand the historical reasons for flourishing (or non-flourishing) of this virtue in society. Societies with a totalitarian or authoritarian past have serious difficulties cultivating this virtue, (contemporary) Russia being the most obvious and well-known example.

The lack of civility in Slovenian society can be observed in the example of victims of the communist revolution. Many people speak about bones, not about persons when referring to those killed for being the ideological enemies of communism, and they call people who research the killings bone collectors. Such a discourse has, of course, the function of opening the door to discrimination against the victims as persons. The exclusion of victims from the group of people whose violation of personal dignity must be sanctioned is, of course, a part of rendering the crimes and their persecution unimportant and even evil. The problem in Slovenia is that the majority are – pervaded by the utilitarian ideology of a good emancipative movement and bad anti-modern forces (see the text below) – *de facto* insensitive for such a violation of decency and civility.

2.2 The capacity to object to centres of power

In Slovenia, the problem of cultivating the virtue of the capacity to object to the centres of power is equally hard as it is in the case of the cultivation of truthfulness and the capacity for dialogue or civility. Important historical factors contribute to this issue⁷. Foreign domination shaped Slovenians into being authority-dependent people. An important role here was also played by the Roman Catholic Church (hereafter RCC). The absence of having their own state co-influenced the dependency of Slovenians on the RCC and the

⁷ See: J. Juhant, *Im Feuer der europäischen Ideenzüge: Slowenien*, Wien & Zürich & Berlin & Münster 2008, Ch. 9.

RCC has become the crucial authority for them⁸. This historical development has led to a certain ambivalent relationship loaded with tension that has also influenced the subsequent history of Slovenians; under communism Slovenians, who were raised over a long history to be obedient persons, were placed under iron authority. Slovenians were raised for order and assiduity. On the one hand they are easily (traditionally conditioned) subjected to authority, and on the other hand they exercise their authority exactly as intensely when they themselves are authority. With the communists such a tendency is clearly observable. Slovenian communists were the most obedient executors of orders in communist Yugoslavia. Such historical reasons help us understand the anthropological characteristic of Slovenians: they have little tendency to change the given circumstances, they would rather adapt to them. In such historical conditions, the Catholic faith shaped Slovenians into stable and patient members of society, more inclined to suffering than to aggression. This is manifested even today in the fact that the suicide rate amongst Slovenians is one of the highest in Europe. The communist regime of course suppressed the cultivation of the sense of freedom based on listening to one's own conscience and reason. Instead, it raised people to listen to an all-encompassing ideology which was, however, far from the truth and reality. Instead of using their own reason and conscience, people were stimulated to adapt and to confirm their actions, beliefs, feelings and even imagination to the ideological narrative offered by the authorities. The habit of adapting oneself to the offered ideology rather than listening to your conscience and reasoning based on evidence is naturally not easy to discard. It represents a serious obstacle to the cultivation of critical thinking and hence of freedom in society.

In this regard it is also very important that the RCC (and also other churches and religious communities) recognises the importance of acting as a provider of the context which gives sense to the cultivation of the dignity of a person, consisting in the free use of their own reason and conscience, and in acting according to them. The foundation of every free and democratic society can only be an individual who himself/herself is not regarded as an instrument. Rather, he/she is a goal in himself/herself, the main goal is a personal flourishing and freedom of every concrete individual. We can call such a position personalistic⁹ liberalism. No church or religion should

⁸ See: *ibidem*, p. 154.

⁹ In order to make the following text more understandable, let me shortly explain the meaning of terms instrumentalism, personalism and utilitarianism as I use them. Instrumentalism is an attitude that does not regard some particular persons as a goal, but at best just as a mean to some other goal (domination of the Arian race, reaching of communism).

serve people the truth “on a silver platter” but instead should do everything to ensure that free people themselves pursue the truth. It should resist the temptation of being an all-knowing dictating revealer that de facto does not treat people as persons but in a paternalistic or even instrumental way. It should do all it can to reveal to people the sense of being both truthful and free (in the sense of following their own reason and conscience). That is the only principle foundation of resisting to damaging instrumentalism of which several totalitarian or authoritarian doctrines, economicism or (in the Slovenian case) morally insensitive pragmatic and utilitarian direction today and in the future are only manifestations that can, perhaps more easily than we think, mutate from one form to another. This is the fundamental and the most important mission of the RCC and of every church and religious community, including the political dimension of our life.

2.3 The virtue of public reason

The virtue of public reason consists of several moments; it is a complex virtue. Its heart represents the capacities for empathy, solidarity, responsibility for the common good, and the capacity for dialogue. Its first important moment is the capacity to articulate our own interests in a publicly understandable way, and to argue for our claims on the basis of publicly relevant reasons. Second, we should not just express our demands and then stop listening to what people say about them and what interests, needs and demands others have in society. In order to actually fulfil this demand, a virtuous person must, from the aspect of the virtue of public reason, be capable of conversation, dialogue and empathy with others. However, even if a strong will and capacity to listen are present and even if there is a dialogue among parties with opposite opinions there are questions in our culturally and morally heterogeneous society about which we cannot reach an agreement. In this case, the capacity to clench our teeth and assent to something even if we do not approve of it in the given situation is the best option (among bad choices). For instance, even if we actually think that

Personalism is an opposite of instrumentalism. For a personalist, every person is always the goal. The main aim of a personalist is the flourishing of every person. The key relevant difference between utilitarianism and personalism is that utilitarianism as such allows for instrumental treatment of particular concrete persons (if this contributes to the increase in total amount of happiness) whereas personalism does not. Calculative manipulation with persons is compatible with utilitarianism, but not with personalism. Thus utilitarianism can function as a foundation or an origin of instrumentalistic attitude. The fatality of the cultivation of a calculative attitude by victims themselves is exemplified by the realization of the Holocaust (see Z. Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*, Cambridge 1995).

every abortion is in fact an act of killing someone, in a given situation we may not support the legal prosecution (potentially with the repressive apparatus of the state) of people carrying out an abortion for we may be aware that in a given situation such coercive measures might bring or actually do bring more evil than good¹⁰.

2.3.1 Dialogue

Dialogue constitutes the heart of the virtue of public reason. There are several necessary conditions for any dialogue to take place, the most basic and general being: freedom and equality, openness (absence of taboos), and empathy¹¹. Freedom and equality exclude coercion in dialogue, i.e. the influence of power differences between the participants in dialogue must be sufficiently eliminated. The second condition demands the real possibility be created for every topic and every assumption of the participants in dialogue to be taken into consideration. This implies that no taboos are allowed in real dialogue. Empathy is needed to really 'transfer' our position to the other and vice versa. A good description of empathy including its goal and actual realisation is provided by the concept of intellectual solidarity developed by David Hollenbach¹². Intellectual solidarity as an attitude is the striving toward my participation in the experience and intellectual life of the other and of an aspiration and endeavour to make the participation of the other part in my experience and intellectual life. True dialogue is the realisation of intellectual solidarity. Freedom of dialogue also demands that we are not obliged to reach any consensus on the topics of disagreement. Of course, there may be a hope that such solidarity will enable a proper solution, agreement, reconciliation and similar to be reached. Yet, all of this should not be understood as an imperative because otherwise dialogue is not free. While there should be no taboos in dialogue, it should not be started with the things that separate us deeply, but with the things that we have in common and that are subject to our agreement. Dialogue is not limited to verbal communication, it is a much deeper way of communication, and a very primitive one¹³. Mediators in conflicts are very well aware of this and one of the initial goals of their strategy is to bring the representatives of conflicting parties to a physically common

¹⁰ Cf. W. Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy*, *op. cit.*

¹¹ Cf. D. Yankelovich, *The Magic of Dialogue: Transforming Conflict into Cooperation*, New York 2001.

¹² Cf. D. Hollenbach, S. J., *The Common Good & Christian Ethics*, Cambridge 2003.

¹³ See Th. Luckmann, 1990. *Social Communication, Dialogue and Conversation*, [in:] I. Markova and K. Fopp (eds.), *The Dynamics of Dialogue*, New York 1990, pp. 45–61.

place where they mutually interact as complete human beings, not just verbally. In a way, this was also stressed by Gadamer and others¹⁴ when they emphasised the importance of live communication, not just written. Not every communication is already dialogue. Otherwise dialogue would not be such a problem. Dialogue is also not something that can take place, so to say automatically, among people especially nowadays when people with very different cultural and moral characteristics are brought together and (must) live with one another. On the contrary, the virtue of dialogue is a complex virtue that must be learned and cultivated¹⁵.

In addition, there are important factors that jeopardise the realisation of dialogue or even make impossible. Such an obstacle was the leading prejudice of the former communistic totalitarian regimes, that of the class enemy, that caused hate and exclusion. Its consequences are still present today and bring about mistrust among members of society. The most dangerous obstacles to dialogue are namely hate and mistrust¹⁶. They most often originate in violence.

The degree of generalized trust¹⁷ in Slovenia is very low. The most important negative factors of generalized trust in Slovenia are the following¹⁸: communist past, low level of truthfulness, the feeling of growing economic inequality (and extremely negative attitude of Slovenians toward it), negative

¹⁴ Cf. R. Hartmann, *Chances and Limits of Dialogue in a Globalized World*, [in:] J. Juhant & B. Žalec, *Surviving Globalization: The Uneasy Gift of Interdependence*, Münster 2008, pp. 95–106.

¹⁵ See: D. Yankelovich, *The Magic of Dialogue: Transforming Conflict into Cooperation*, New York 2001.

¹⁶ See: *ibidem*, p. 113 and next, p. 122 and next. For the nature, conditions, factors, kinds and function of trust see A. Baier, *Trust and Antitrust*, "Ethics", Vol. 96, No. 2, 1986, pp. 231–260, M. B. Brewer, *In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A Cognitive Motivational Analysis*, "Psychological Bulletin", Vol. 86, No. 2, 1979, pp. 307–324, T. O. Buford, *Trust, Our Second Nature: Crisis, Reconciliation and the Personal*, Plymouth 2009, F. Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*, *op. cit.*, T. Govier, *Social Trust and Human Communities*, Montreal 1997, R. Hardin, *The Street-Level Epistemology*, "Analyse & Kritik", 14, 2, 1992, pp. 152–76, R. Hardin, *Trust and Trustworthiness*, New York 2002, J. D. Lewis & A. Weigert, *Trust as a Social Reality*, "Social Forces", 63, 4, 1985, pp. 967–985, N. Luhmann, *Trust and Power*, New York 1979, C. McLeod, *Trust*, [in:] *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, accessible at <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/trust/> (June 15th, 2011), B. Rothstein, *Trust, Social Dilemmas and Collective Memories*, "Journal of Theoretical Politics", 12, 4, 2000, pp. 477–501, R. C. Solomon & F. Flores, *Building Trust: In Business, Politics, Relationships, and Life*, Oxford 2003, E. Uslaner, *Trust as a Moral Value*, [in:] D. Castiglione & J. W. van Deth & G. Wolleb, *The Handbook of Social Capital*, Oxford 2008, pp. 101–121.

¹⁷ For the explanation of this concept see E. Uslaner, *Trust as a Moral Value*, *op. cit.*

¹⁸ See B. Žalec, *Nezaupanje kot ključni dejavnik slabega delovanja skupnosti, organizacij in družbe (Mistrust as the key factor of malfunction of community, organizations and society)*, "Dignitas", Year 13, No. 51–52, 2011, pp. 351–373.

opinion about the work of courts, corruption at high level and lack of (self) responsibility. We should also mention the genocide that has taken place in the recent Slovene history (see the text below). Genocide is an extreme form of mistrust because it means that mistrust to a particular social group is cultivated to such a degree that solely the physical existence of this group is perceived as a danger that cannot be afforded¹⁹.

The possibility of expressing criticism in communication is also one of the essential elements of true dialogue. Dialogue is impossible without critical thinking. But for dialogue to be really possible – without causing destructive effects that could result in ruining it – the principle of discerning someone from his/her convictions and acts is de facto necessary. In the opposite case of identifying persons by their beliefs and deeds, we are actually telling those persons that they are bad, and not only that their deeds or attitudes are bad²⁰.

The virtue of public reason is especially important for developing deliberative democracy, as opposed to aggregate democracy²¹. The development of democracy according to the deliberative model is particularly important

¹⁹ See D. Chirot & C. McCauley, *Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass Political Murder*. Princeton & Oxford 2006. For the sociological and legal aspects of Slovenia as a democratic state governed by the rule of law see A. Igličar, *Sociološko-pravni vidiki Slovenije kot pravne in demokratične države (Sociological and legal aspects of Slovenia as a democratic state governed by the rule of law)*, "Dignitas", Year 13, No. 51–52, 2011, pp. 58–76. The research of public opinion from 2004 showed that Slovenians trusted less their legal system than citizens of France, Germany, Canada and USA in the comparable period. The research of public opinion in 2011 showed that the degree of trust of Slovenians in court, state administration, prime minister, government, parliament and political parties is rather low. The mentioned institutions are ranked in the stated order (from the top to the bottom). The trust in courts equals the trust in clergy. At the top we find firemen. (Cf. Igličar, *Sociološko-pravni vidiki Slovenije kot pravne in demokratične države*, op. cit., pp. 66–67). For the violation of human rights and basic liberties in Slovenia from 1945 to 1990 see L. Šturm, *O kratenju človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin v obdobju 1945–1998 (Violation of human rights and basic liberties in Slovenia from 1945 to 1990)*, [in:] D. Jančar (ed.), *Temna stran meseca: kratka zgodovina totalitarizma v Sloveniji 1945–1990*, op. cit. (hereafter: *Temna stran ...*), pp. 65–102. Communists in Slovenia (in that period) faithfully followed Krylenko's command that court is an organ of the class-struggle of workers against their enemies (see V. Simoniti, *Permanentna revolucija, totalitarizem, strah (Permanent revolution, totalitarianism, fear)*, [in:] *Temna stran ...*, pp. 39–52).

²⁰ We should treat people in the spirit of love towards a man and hate towards his incompleteness, weakness, vices, "sins". As St. Augustine wrote: «Et hoc quod dixi de oculo non figendo, etiam in caeteris inveniendis, prohibendis, indicandis, convincendis, vindicandisque peccatis diligenter observetur, cum dilectione hominum et odio vitiorum» (*Epistola* 211, par. 11). See also *Regula ad servos Dei*, 4, 28. Both texts of St. Augustine are accessible at *S. Aurelii Augustini opera omnia: patrologiae latinae elenchus*. Available at: <http://www.augustinus.it/latino/> (July 24th, 2011).

²¹ Cf. W. Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy...*, op. cit.

for the stability of democracy and society in general. Such a democracy presupposes that issues (of controversy) are debated among the opposite parties, that people are acquainted with several views and with a broader set of possible consequences of their decisions. So responsibility is clearer, disappointments are reduced etc., which contributes to a more transparent, more democratic and freer directing of society, and of course to its stability. It is exactly this last value that is of great importance in modern times of instability, and therefore the carrying out of deliberative democracy should be one of our central aims which of course presupposes the cultivating of the virtue of public reason in society.

3. Origins of violence: the importance of solidarity

Tolerance and the culture appropriate for a modern pluralistic and value heterogeneous society are seriously endangered by violence. Following Gandhi and Sen, we may say that the reduction of violence as much as possible is a reasonable value that every healthy society should strive for²². Accordingly, we should ask ourselves about the nature of society that hinders or stimulates violence. We consider the following characteristics to be crucial: personalism, inclusion and solidarity.

The opposite of inclusion is marginalisation. Marginalisation causes violence which, in turn, threatens stability and democracy in society. Inclusion means solidarity, material, intellectual and other, that means our sharing of intellectual life and of other goods in society, participation in the common good of society. The extreme case of exclusion is, for instance, a violation of human rights (like in concentration camps) and for this reason Hollenbach²³ understands human rights as an institutionalisation of human solidarity. A personalist society is society in which the dignity of persons is respected. The development of the capabilities of persons to freely use their reason (the capacity to know) and their conscience is supported and cultivated in personalist societies. Our thesis is that a negative factor of violence is solidarity and that violence often originates in a lack of solidarity. What is the evidence supporting this thesis? It can be found at several levels: from neurological through psychoanalytical to psycho-historical.

Neurological evidence is provided by modern cognitive science. Joachim Bauer reports on this matter²⁴. For instance, he reports on a special

²² Cf. A. Sen, *Democracy as Universal Value*, "Journal of Democracy", 10, 3, 1999, pp. 3–17.

²³ Cf. D. Hollenbach, S. J., *The Common Good & Christian Ethics*, Cambridge 2003.

²⁴ Cf. J. Bauer, *Prinzip Menschlichkeit: Warum wir von Natur aus kooperieren*, Hamburg 2006.

substance called dopamine which our body secretes when we are in good relations with other beings, when we are included in a human group and similar. The secretion of dopamine brings about good mood and it is a kind of a natural drug we are addicted to. In the case of being excluded, we experience some sort of an abstinent crisis and it is possible to search for a dopamine surrogate in inappropriate ways, for instance by using synthetic drugs, going to a prostitute etc. This supports the flourishing of criminal business which in turn brings violence into society and generally endangers the whole society. Margot Sunderland²⁵ directs us to the importance of a proper loving relationship with our children in order to avoid the very damaging bio-chemical state of a baby's brain which can be permanent. The systems of vital importance, connected with the chemical substances that have effects on emotions, like opioids, noradrenalines, dopamine and serotonin – these systems are still developing in undeveloped brains – might be seriously damaged and might cause a chemical non-equilibrium in a brain. Sunderland, for example, claims that a low level of serotonin is one of the key factors of depression and also of violent behaviour²⁶. Serotonin, a chemical substance in the brain is a very important factor for social and emotional intelligence. An optimal level of serotonin might stabilise one's mood, diminish aggressiveness and for that reason plays an important role in the strengthening of good relations. Researchers have shown that monkeys that were very respected in their society and were at the top of the social hierarchy had the optimal level of serotonin. The level of serotonin is strongly influenced by human relations, either positively or negatively. Researchers have proven that stress in early life might influence the system of serotonin in the developing brain of a little child in a damaging way. On the contrary, the loving moments you share with your child positively influence the level of serotonin in the ventromedial cortex. If a child shares many beautiful moments with you, they will get used to the optimal level of serotonin in their brain and that will become a part of their true personality. A low level of serotonin in animals and humans is connected with their impulsive behaviour. Serotonin, a chemical substance which equilibrates one's mood, in that case cannot calm the emotional reactions of a man or an animal down. When such a person or an animal gets angry, we are not just dealing with a mild form of irritation or reluctance but with a mad, horrible fury. It is well known that monkeys with a low level of serotonin are

²⁵ Cf. M. Sunderland, *Znanost o vzgoji* (Slov. trans. by S. Jesenovc Petrović and B. Petrović Jesenovc, orig. *The Science of Parenting*, London 2006), Radovljica 2008.

²⁶ Cf. *ibidem*, p. 43.

impulsive and aggressive²⁷. That should be enough about the neurological reasons. We think the message is clear enough.

The findings of psychoanalysis point in the same direction. The phenomena that psychoanalysis describes as identification with the aggressor, the protective mechanism of projection and projective identification, and the protective mechanism of splitting²⁸ should be mentioned here. In the first case, collectives that are themselves victims of violence consequentially carry out similar violence on other collectives. As far as the last phenomenon is concerned, we deal with people whose parents did not respond to their needs or offer them their attentiveness, care or love in their childhood. Such an attitude causes the development of a negative self-image in their children. The complex in which the negative self-image is interwoven with a twofold relationship with the parents (on the one hand such people usually speak about a kind-hearted daddy and mummy, but, on the other, they perceive them as monsters, they hate them) results in violence towards other people. Psychotherapists are familiar with the fact that violent patterns of behaviour are transmitted from one generation to another (many victims of violence in their later life themselves search for a violent environment) if proper treatment does not break the cycle of transmission. Last but not least, the aggression someone directs towards themselves should also be considered, namely suicide.

In his essay about trauma and suicide among aborigines at the North Pole and in Australia²⁹, Antoon A. Leenaars hypothesises that a similar phenomenon as in Australia and at the North Pole also took place in Lithuania under the Soviet occupation. The characteristic of aboriginal societies is that before the colonial occupation the suicide rate among the population was not high. The same is true of Lithuania. Today, all these societies are burdened by suicides as if they were an epidemic. In the case of aboriginal societies the rate of suicide is five times higher than among the white population. According to Canadian researchers the causes of such suicides among Inuits are: poverty, divorce, and loss of children, accessibility of firearms, alcoholism, personal and family health problems, past sexual and bodily abuses. But Leenaars thinks these phenomena are the effects of genocide.

²⁷ Cf. *ibidem*, p. 223.

²⁸ See J. Bohak, *Religija in nasilje – psihoanalitski pristop (Religion and violence – a psychoanalytical approach)*, “Znamenja”, 38, 3–4, 2008, pp. 35–48.

²⁹ Cf. A. A. Leenaars, *Trauma and Suicide among Aboriginal People: Stories from the Arctic and Australia (with Particular Reference to the Situation in Lithuania)*, [in:] D. Gailienė (ed.), *The Psychology of Extreme Traumatization: The Aftermath of Political Repression*, Ankreta & Vilnius 2005.

The arrival of colonialists was from the point of view of aborigines a threat of destruction to aboriginal world, culture and, last but not least, of extermination of aboriginal peoples. Colonialists were prepared to exterminate aboriginal people. As Leenaars points out something similar might be said about Soviet occupation of Lithuania. Soviets wanted to assimilate Lithuanians and thus to destroy their previous world and culture. Similar things happened in Slovenia after communists took power in 1945. We witnessed a radical attempt to destroy the traditional, Catholic, bourgeois and rustic world and culture in Slovenia³⁰.

One might object that in the case of Slovenia we cannot talk about genocide if we accept the UN *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* from 1948³¹. This convention limits genocide to the intention to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. However, the definition of genocide from UN convention is not adequate. We can consent to Leo Kuper³² that this definition is not good and that its main drawback is that it leaves out the political groups from the list of groups it protects³³. In modern world the political differences are at least equally important as a foundation for mass killings and destruction as racial, national, ethnic or religious differences. Thus, Chirot and McCauley claim³⁴ that the greatest genocides of the 20th century were ideological, not ethnical. Besides, the genocides of racial, national, ethnic or religious groups are the consequence of political conflicts or they are connected with them. Despite critical remarks, Kuper thinks that it is not good to change the meaning of the expression which is internationally accepted. Yet, on the other hand such a use of the expression genocide renders an adequate consideration of "genocides" committed over groups not covered by the definition of UN convention impossible. For this reason, Kuper uses expressions like liquidating or exterminating acts. This solution seems to us rather ill-fated because these expressions are too loose. Thus, I keep the word genocide but I use it as refereeing also to crimes over political groups and classes. I use the word genocide for any intentional destruction of persons solely on virtue of their

³⁰ Cf. J. Dežman, *Tranzicijska pravičnost, op. cit.*, p. 372 and next.

³¹ Accessible at <http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/convention/text.htm> (May 4th, 2011).

³² Cf. L. Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in Twentieth Century*, Harmondsworth 1981, see also A. Jones, *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction*, London 2011, pp. 16–17.

³³ The deficiency that political, economic and cultural groups are not alleged in UN convention is partly repaired by the *Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms* (Rome, November 4th 1950, accessible at <http://www.media-forum.si/slo/pravo/pravni-viri/evropska-konvencija.pdf> (May 4th, 2011)).

³⁴ Cf. D. Chirot & C. McCauley, *Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass Political Murder*, Princeton 2006.

(factual or just ascribed) belonging to a particular group. It follows that there can be many kinds of genocide. In scientific literature we can find a set of many different terms³⁵: classicide, democide, ecocide, eliticide, ethnocide, femicide/feminicide, fratricide, gendercide, judeocide, linguicide, memoricide, omnicide, politicicide, poorcide, urbicide.

For the mass killings in Slovenia in spring 1945, we may use the terms classicide (a term coined by Mann³⁶) and politicicide³⁷ (an expression introduced by Harff and Gurr³⁸). Classicide is intentional mass killing, liquidation or destroying of people on the basis of their belonging to a particular social class. Politicide is destroying of people on the basis of their belonging to a particular political group. Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr maintain that revolutionary one-party states are the most often perpetrators of politicicide³⁹.

If we add to the above evidence the numerous examples showing, almost as a rule, that violent persons and collectives were themselves subjected to violence, we may conclude that the violation of solidarity is the fundamental source of violence in society.

4. The Slovenian case

Slovenia (currently with about 2 million citizens) is the only member state of the EU that has itself experienced (as a victim and as a perpetrator) all three forms of totalitarianism: fascism, Nazism and communism. Perhaps only the Greek experience can be seen as comparable up to a certain degree⁴⁰. The most important of them, also for the present situation, is communism in its Titoistic version. A *Kulturkampf* took place in Slovenia already in the 19th century among anti-modern Catholics and liberals, but it reached its culmination and actually transcended the scope of this concept (becoming a fratricidal war between the sides directed by the communist and anti-communist sides (mostly Catholics)) during the Second World War and immediately after it.

³⁵ Cf. A. Jones, *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction*, op. cit., 26 and next.

³⁶ Cf. M. Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*, Cambridge 2005, p. 26.

³⁷ Pučnik also characterizes mass killings in Slovenia after the war – carried out by the state – as genocide. See J. Pučnik, *Množični poveljni poboji (Mass killings after the war)*, [in:] *Temna stran ...*, p. 40.

³⁸ Cf. B. Harff, *No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1995*, "American Political Science Review", Vol. 97, No. 1, 2003, pp. 57–73.

³⁹ Cf. A. Jones, *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction*, op. cit., 2011, p. 28.

⁴⁰ Cf. J. Dežman, *Tranzicijska pravičnost*, op. cit., p. 258, n. 13.

Slovenia was maybe the biggest mass scaffold and graveyard in Europe after the end of the Second World War⁴¹. More than 600 hidden mass graves are scattered all around Slovenia⁴². In such murders without any court process immediately after the Second World War thousands of Slovenians were killed. What are the exact numbers of the killed? The leading Slovenian expert for the hidden mass graves in Slovenia has written:

The exact number of victims lying in secret graves will probably never be known. The Republic of Slovenia has in the past few years succeeded in preparing a name-list of all residents of Slovenia who died a violent death in the Second World War and immediately after. Judging by the available data, around 15 % – that is around 13.960 (of those 12.587 Home guards, 160 Slovene Chetniks, and 1.127 civilians) – of about 84.000 people who died by January 1946 were individuals killed after the war ended⁴³. Trying to answer the question of how many Croats and people of other nationalities were killed in Slovenia and where their remains could be found is even more difficult. As there is almost no primary archive material about the killings, mass graves or the number of victims as well as due to very rare excavations of the posthumous remains, to estimate or even to determine such a number could all too soon become a subject to manipulation and reach unprecedented levels⁴⁴.

Data that we find in the works of some other Slovenian historians allow the following approximate representation:

Table 1: Victims among Slovenians⁴⁵

Slovenian population in 1941	1.500.000	100 %
	Number of victims	Percent of whole population
Victims of the fratricidal war	30.000	2 %
Victims killed by partisans or communists	25.000	1,7 %
Victims killed by partisans or communists after the war	18.000	1,2 %
Victims killed by anti-communist side	4.000	0,3 %
Political emigrants after the war	7.000	0,5 %

⁴¹ Cf. *ibidem*.

⁴² Cf. M. Ferenc, *Independent Slovenia and concealed mass graves*, op. cit.

⁴³ Cf. Z. Čepič & N. Borak & J. Fischer, *Slovenska novejša zgodovina. Od programa Zedinjene Slovenije do mednarodnega priznanja Republike Slovenije. 1848–1992* (Slovenian recent history), Vol. 2, Ljubljana 2005, pp. 790–795.

⁴⁴ M. Ferenc, *Independent Slovenia and concealed mass graves*, op. cit.

⁴⁵ See J. Dežman, *Tranzicijska pravičnost*, op. cit., S. Granda, *Slovenija: Pogled na njeno zgodovino* (Slovenia: A view on its history), Ljubljana 2008.

The goal of the communists in Slovenia and the whole of Yugoslavia⁴⁶ was of course revolution, to which all their activity was subordinated, and their main goal was not fighting the occupation forces but destroying the ideological (class) enemy. To support this thesis: the number of occupation forces killed in Slovenia by Slovenian partisans was only around 5.000 which is just a fifth of the Slovenian victims who were killed for being an ideological enemy⁴⁷.

The logic of Titoism is pretty simple: everything that serves the revolution is good, everything that opposes or hinders it must be eliminated, even with intense violence. However, the question remains why the revolution captured Slovenia to such a high degree. Titoism was sustaining itself through permanent crises and purges. The indulgences to liberalism only served to strengthen the power of the particular rule of individuals or groups. Tito's competencies in the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution are only comparable with the powers of Hitler, Stalin. Tito did not settle the question of his successor, either. Such a structure of power, which was only a front for the political reality, meant that the extremely difficult future of Yugoslavia was predictable⁴⁸. Silvin Eiletz proved⁴⁹ that purges were the centre of life in the Yugoslav communist party from its beginning. Tito accepted the Stalinist model of mutual reckonings inside the party and succeeded to survive it as a winner. His years in Moscow are surely an important origin of the subsequent homicides Tito is mainly responsible for. In the Moscow years Josip Broz-Valter (later Tito) hardened. He was shaped by fear and horror. Further, Tito's team was also educated in Moscow (the Slovenian top communists Kardelj, Kidrič, Bebler were important parts of the Yugoslav Party leadership) and involved in the same hardening system. The Slovenian circle around Tito implemented the Stalinist model in Slovenia without mercy. This is a part of the answer why in just one year an important share of Slovenian people became wild and criminal even though there are no historical premises to explain such a development. Up until 1941 Slovenians were "normal" people and every crime was prosecuted by the police. One year later and this small nation was captured

⁴⁶ See D. Bajt, *Nesmiselnost partizanskega osvobodilnega boja (Absurdity of the partisan liberating struggle)*. An interview given to B. Nežmah. In: B. Nežmah, *Zrcala komunizma: intervjuji 1994–2005 (Mirrors of communism: interviews 1994–2005)*, Ljubljana 2007, pp. 35–47.

⁴⁷ See J. Dežman, *Tranzicijska pravičnost, op. cit.*, p. 284.

⁴⁸ See: *ibidem*, p. 262.

⁴⁹ Cf. S. Eiletz, *Titova skrivnostna leta v Moskvi: 1935–1940 (Tito's mysterious years in Moscow: 1935–1940)*, Celovec & Ljubljana & Dunaj 2008.

by a storm of crime, and after 1945 this crime was not prosecuted by the police but became legal⁵⁰.

How was that possible? Some important facts must be noted in this regard: communist leaders educated in Moscow came back to Slovenia; the secret police (OZNA (UDBA)) was established⁵¹; communist leaders (partly educated in Moscow, partly by partisans, partly in post-war Yugoslavia) quickly started with prosecutions, torture and killings. The transition from “normality” to “wildness” is then accountable by means of mass psychology⁵². In the end, the process of the ideological transformation of Slovenian society evolved into a state in which broad layers of the nation, many of them wilfully, supported the authoritarian socialist system and were associated with numerous political organisations. Ultimately, communism in Slovenia was not some dictatorship of the minority above the majority: the majority supported the regime and sympathised with it. After the fall of communism, people with blood on their hands integrated into the democratic system, appearing as if they were incapable of committing such crimes at all⁵³.

In this brief overview of the recent history of Slovenia we should say that those who suffered were not only the killed persons themselves, but also their relatives (widows, children, *etc.*). They were subjected to horrible torture, discrimination and humiliation. Children were robbed of the love of their parents. Such victims numbered between 150.000 and 200.000 people⁵⁴.

In 1990, a plebiscite about secession of Slovenia from Yugoslavia was carried out in Slovenia: an attendance level of 93.2%, and a 95% affirmative answer. In 1991, Slovenia declared its independence and officially became a liberal democracy. Its *Constitution* defines it as a democratic state governed by the rule of law and as a social state. In 2004, Slovenia joined NATO and

⁵⁰ Cf. J. Dežman, *Tranzicijska pravičnost, op. cit.*, pp. 265–266, J. Juhant, *Im Feuer der europäischen Ideenzüge: Slowenien, op. cit.*, pp. 153–206.

⁵¹ Hannah Arendt pointed out that the characteristic of totalitarian regimes is a very high rank of secret police. Above it is only the leader. Cf. H. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, London 1962.

⁵² For such an account, see J. Dežman, *Tranzicijska pravičnost (Transitional justice)*, [in:] J. Dežman (ed.), *Poročilo Komisije Republike Slovenije za reševanje vprašanj prikritih grobišč 2005–2008* (Report of the Commission of the Republic of Slovenia for solving the questions regarding the concealed mass graves 2005–2008), Ljubljana 2008, pp. 266–269. Dežman concludes: “When the conditions were given for the development of killing personality and the production of hatred other as the ideological-political product started, the transition from boys who attended religious education and mass to serial murderers was possible (*op. cit.*, p. 269)”.

⁵³ Cf. J. Dežman, *Tranzicijska pravičnost, op. cit.*, p. 266.

⁵⁴ Cf. *ibidem*.

the EU, while in 2007 it introduced the euro currency (becoming the first post-communist country to do so).

The RCC was under pressure already during the war and especially after it. It is true that some of the clergy supported the anti-revolution, but only some members of the Ljubljana's diocese. But after the war the communists also imprisoned clerics from the province of Primorska who had fought against fascism, and clerics who during the war had been banished from the provinces of Styria (Štajerska) and Upper Carniola (Gorenjska). Many clerics were tortured or killed (in unexplained circumstances). From 1945 to 1961, of around 1.000 clerics 429 went before the court, 339 were punished with imprisonment, 73 financially and 9 were sentenced to death (4 of these sentences were actually carried out). The communist authority tried to break the Church down by all means: physically, ideologically and of course economically. Although the communist regime in Yugoslavia was later more indulgent in the field of domestic policy, special departments inside the secret political police were never dismissed. The communist authorities tried to organise the anti-Roman Catholic Church, and of course also sought to split the RCC internally and deepen the discord with the Protestant and Orthodox churches. After the war, some Protestant clerics were also persecuted, along with some members of smaller religious groups like Jehovah's witnesses⁵⁵.

Table 2: Victims among clerics in Slovenia from 1945 to 1961⁵⁶

Number of all clerics in Slovenia	1000	100 %
	Number of victims	Percent of whole number of clerics
Clerics that went before the court	429	42.9 %
Punished by imprisonment	339	33.9 %
Financially punished	73	7.3 %
Sentenced to death	9	0.9 %
Death sentence actually carried out	4	0.4 %

Yet, despite all of this, things slowly started to settle down. In 1961 the Ljubljana diocese was established, in 1968 the Ljubljana metropolis was set up (the Maribor diocese was subordinated to it). According to the Osimo agreements from 1977 (signed by Italy and Yugoslavia), the question of the Koper

⁵⁵ Cf. S. Granda, *Slovenija: Pogled na njeno zgodovino, op. cit.*, p. 235, J. Juhant, *Im Feuer der europäischen Ideenzüge: Slowenien, op. cit.*, pp. 165–176.

⁵⁶ Cf. S. Granda, *Slovenija: Pogled na njeno zgodovino, op. cit.*

diocese was finally settled and it was included in the Ljubljana metropolis. In the framework of the Yugoslav bishops' conference, the Slovenian provincial bishops' conference was established which in 1992 formally seceded from the Yugoslav one. In 2006, three new dioceses were established: Celje, Murska Sobota and Novo mesto. The first two form part of the Maribor archdiocese, while the third one belongs to Ljubljana. The Vatican recognised Slovenia as an independent state in January 1992, confirming the efforts of the Slovenian Catholic Church which had actively participated in efforts for independence. Pope John Paul II visited Slovenia twice, in 1996 and 1999⁵⁷.

The magnificent result at the plebiscite indirectly made lustration impossible⁵⁸. It could not have been carried out completely, but at least those responsible for the most horrible crimes after the war could have been justly punished. Instead, no person was put on trial, not to mention being sentenced. The dull reckoning with the totalitarian past is a huge problem for Slovenia. In any case, the political polarisation (that sprung up during the independence process) the separation between new parties and those arising from the old communist party and its successors is one of the characteristics of Slovenia's political reality. The past also strongly separates Slovenians in present times⁵⁹.

A huge number of people in Slovenia were deprived of any solidarity (intellectual or material), were excluded (for instance a violation of their human rights, which is an extreme form of exclusion) and their personal dignity was not respected etc. This group constitutes the unarmed victims of the war and post-war killings and their relatives (widows, children etc.). The level and content of private and public discussion in Slovenian society indicates that today an important section of Slovenian society does not show any solidarity or true compassion to these victims. They do not see it as an injustice that their unjust suffering is not justly recognised or responded to. A kind of utilitarian and pragmatic ideology is preferred to justice and a moral stance⁶⁰.

⁵⁷ Cf. *ibidem*, p. 235. About the situation of the RCC in Slovenia after the Second World War see also F. M. Dolinar, *Katoliška cerkev v Sloveniji po drugi svetovni vojni (The Catholic church in Slovenia after the Second World War)*, [in:] *Temna stran ...*, pp. 222–233 and T. Griesser-Pečar, *Procesi proti duhovnikom in redovništvu po maju 1945 (Processes against clerics, monks and nuns after the May 1945)*, [in:] *Temna stran ...*, pp. 113–125.

⁵⁸ J. Juhant, *Im Feuer der europäischen Ideenzüge: Slowenien*, *op. cit.*, 180–183.

⁵⁹ Cf. S. Granda, *Slovenija: Pogled na njeno zgodovino*, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

⁶⁰ The quantitative research of N. Toš and group provides some empirical evidence for our thesis see N. Toš in skupina (N. Toš and group), 1990. *SJM90/2 – Stališča Slovencev o ustavi (Standpoints of Slovenians about the constitution)*, Ljubljana 1990. Accessible at: http://www.cjm.si/sites/cjm.si/files/File/e-dokumenti/SJM_vrednote_v_prehodu_2.pdf (January 2nd, 2012).

Many people do not care at all whether the crimes will ever be sanctioned and the suffering at least partly ameliorated. Interest in the truth and morality is totally absent as regards victims from the Catholic hand. On the other side, a lot of hostility is present against the RCC. These two phenomena are interrelated. In an important part of Slovenian society the RCC is perceived as greedy, hypocritical and a threat to freedom. The mentioned victims are also perceived as a necessary cost in the process of emancipation from fascist and clerical totalitarianism. Some critics of the RCC speak about the fourth totalitarianism, namely the clerical totalitarianism of the RCC, and warn that the aim of the RCC is to take the place of the communist party in society⁶¹, even though according to empirical data on the religiously relevant attitudes of Slovenians that seems incredible. Many people support the exclusion of people who speak about the killings because they perceive them as endangering free society and the achievements of the modern emancipative movement in fighting anti-modern forces, and as just using the victims for their own anti-emancipative and anti-modern goals. These views are widespread among ordinary people but, of course, they also have representatives among the theoretical elite⁶².

Another closely related attitude is that we must speak about victims, that we must respect the dead etc. Yet the fratricide war is understood simply as a war between two totalitarian streams: communist and clerical; and the responsibility for such a mentality of the Slovenian communists is shifted to the side of the RCC as Slovenian communists are described as having been mentally shaped by the RCC and are therefore a mirror image of the RCC's totalitarian mentality⁶³. But the actual political impact of this attitude

To the question: "In the year 1945 Yugoslav and Slovene communist authorities secretly killed – in Rog and other places – thousands of the members of Home guard and other refugees that Englishmen sent back from Austria to Slovenia. Choose the answer that best expresses your view on those killings! How would you then characterize those events?", the following responses were given by the citizens: 1. As a horrible crime 48.0%; 2. As a big political mistake 19.5%; 3. As understandable act of revenge 6.6%; 4. As a tragic yet unavoidable consequence of the civil war 11.5%; 5. As a punishment for betrayal of own nation 8.0%; 6. I don't know 6.5%. The research shows that less than half of Slovenes thought that mass killings of refugees in Slovenia were a crime. All other do not think that somebody should be morally condemned or sentenced for it. The level and content of private and public discussion in Slovene society indicates that the public opinion has not importantly changed till today.

⁶¹ Cf. T. Hribar, *Euroslavenstvo* (Euroslavenianism), Ljubljana 2004.

⁶² See, for instance, B. Luthar & O. Luthar, *Monopolization of memory: the politics and textuality of war memorials in Slovenia after 1991*, "European Perspectives", Vol. 5, No. 18, 2003. Accessible at <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1342488.html> (February 1st, 2012).

⁶³ See, for example, T. Hribar, *op. cit.*

is that we should symbolically⁶⁴ respect the dead people, but politically keep fighting against the RCC as the most dangerous agent in modern Slovenian society.

Such an atmosphere of anti-RCC sentiment perceives the RCC as a greedy and power-seeking institution that threatens the freedom and achievements of emancipative movements (which had their erroneous deviations or movements, but now this is the past) which makes any solidarity with the victims of communism impossible. On the other hand, such a non-personalist and pragmatic or utilitarian stance toward victims of communism can be seen as a transformed survivor of what is in a sense an instrumentalist ethics of communism⁶⁵.

The period from 1941 to 1990 in Slovenia was marked by strong and widely spread presence of fear, violence, silence about the crimes of the communist regime and non-solidarity with its victims⁶⁶. All this was accompanied by very aggressive propaganda which pictured the opposite side as the embodiment of evil and inhumanity. According to the instrumentalist doctrine that Slovenian communists accepted, particularly two social “ele-

⁶⁴ In any case, only symbolic gestures are not enough. As Ferenc has insisted, beside symbolic acts we must support and carry out also concrete research and actions that exactly reveal and document factual truth about Slovenian past (cf. M. Ferenc, *Independent Slovenia and concealed mass graves*, [in:] J. Juhant & B. Žalec (eds.) *Reconciliation: The Way of Healing and Growth*, Berlin 2012, forthcoming). Pučnik pointed out that the popular tactics of people who want to prevent the revealing of truth was the supporting of symbolic gestures, erecting of abstract symbolic monuments and setting signs on the one hand and hindering of carrying out of concrete and determinate researches, collecting concrete data, making exact lists and catalogues etc. on the other (cf. J. Pučnik, *Množični poveljni poboji*, *op. cit.*, pp. 47–48).

⁶⁵ A pragmatic or utilitarian stance often, but not always (Putnam for instance argues for a kind of pragmatistic (Deweyan) position and at the same time refuses expressivism (or non-cognitivism) (cf. H. Putnam, *Capabilities and Two Ethical Theories*, “Journal of Human Development”, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2008, pp. 377–388), goes hand in hand with the refusal of the possibility of rational justification of value statements. This position is called expressivism or non-cognitivism, also emotivism. Richard Rorty was perhaps the most famous recent partisan of it. Accepting of expressivism (combined with a pragmatic or utilitarian attitude) is not only a characteristic of Slovenia or post-communist countries but also of the dominant mentality in the EU (institutions) in general (cf. D. Mieth, *The Role and Backgrounds of Religious Ethical, Legal and Social Issues in the Progress of Science*, [in:] J. Juhant & B. Žalec, *Surviving Globalization: The Uneasy Gift of Interdependence*, Münster 2008, pp. 149–161). Larry Siedentop directed our attention to the wide range of economicistic thinking in Europe and its dangers. He wrote that economicism has given a posthumous life to Marxism (cf. L. Siedentop, *Democracy in Europe*, London 2000).


⁶⁶ Cf. D. Jančar, *Temna stran meseca (The dark side of the Moon)*, [in:] *Temna stran ...*, pp. 11–23, V. Simoniti, *Permanentna revolucija, totalitarizem, strah (Permanent revolution, totalitarianism, fear)*, *op. cit.*

ments” were considered as especially dangerous class enemies that deserve regardless treatment: the so called “bourgeois right” and the Roman Catholic Church⁶⁷. Apart from them, farmers were also considered as “natural” enemies of communism⁶⁸.

5. Conclusion

Violence and fear are two main and fundamental negative factors of dialogue. Dialogue is the heart of the virtue of public reason. Hostile propaganda that we witnessed in Slovenia during the war and in the time of the communist power is an extreme form of non-civility. Fear, non-solidarity and a habit of silence are the best ground for the absence of capacity to object to the centers of power.

In the period of the totalitarian or authoritarian system in Slovenia, the central civic virtues were almost completely absent: civility in regard to those who were perceived as the enemies of the regime, a capacity to object to the centers of power and the virtue of public reason which is essentially constituted by dialogue. Solidarity with the victims of the communist regime was absent too. An insufficient cultivation of the mentioned virtues is also a characteristic of the present Slovenian society. Such a situation is in a large part due to the “ice berg of the past that still wants to rule over us”⁶⁹.

Culture consists of habits that change very slowly⁷⁰. In Slovenian (political) culture there are strongly present sediments of the past that mutilate development and cultivation of civic virtues in Slovenia⁷¹. 

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⁶⁷ See: V. Simoniti, *Permanentna revolucija, totalitarizem, strah*, [in:] *Temna stran ...*, p. 35.

⁶⁸ Cf. J. Dežman, *Tranzicijska pravičnost*, *op. cit.*

⁶⁹ D. Jančar, *Čemu ta knjiga, čemu razstava* (*Why this book, why this exhibition*), [in:] *Temna stran ...*, pp. 383–386.

⁷⁰ F. Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*, *op. cit.*

⁷¹ My thanks go to Janez Kolenc and Vojko Strahovnik for their valuable suggestions and comments of the versions of the present text.