



GÁBOR GÁNGÓ, FERENC HÖRCHER, GÁBOR KOVÁCS,
BÉLA MESTER, TIBOR PICHLER, RAFAŁ SMOCZYŃSKI,
TOMASZ ZARYCKI

The Impact of the Noble's Legacy in Shaping Citizenship in Central Europe

ABSTRACT: These working papers represent the interim stage of research carried out within the framework of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences interdisciplinary project entitled „The Impact of the Noble's Legacy in Shaping Citizenship in Central Europe” (2014–2016). It is concerned with the role of post-feudal gentry's legacy in the study of the peculiarity of the civic models in Hungary and in Poland. The project aims to enlarge the field of the European citizenship studies by exploring a specific Central European models, with their genesis characterized by a strong position of the gentry's heritage, the significant role of the intelligentsia, the lack of revolutionary experience, a weak heritage of the modern nation state and relatively poor bourgeois traditions. These historical peculiarities make the CE region substantially distinct when compared with the civic models produced in Western European countries. Although the impact of the post gentry legacy on both Polish and Hungarian society shows significant uniformities, the precise definitions of this impact remain locally embedded. Both in Poland and in Hungary there are considerable differences in the structures of post-feudal legacy and its impact on contemporary social systems and political culture. Thus the cross-national research provides a valuable base for advancing and producing new input in this field.

KEYWORDS: citizenship studies • Central Europe • gentry • political culture

Happiness, Liberty and Security in Leibniz's Specimen for the 1669 Polish King Election

With his approach to the 1669 Polish King election from the perspective of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's polemic treatise, which offers a deep insight into the individualistic political culture, republican constitutionalism and exclusivist anti-Western-ism in 17th-century Poland, Gábor Gángó – in his paper *Happiness, Liberty and Security in Leibniz's Specimen for the 1669*

Polish King Election – contributed to the better understanding of the early modern roots of Central European gentry’s heritage.

Gángó’s paper proposed an approach to some of the central concepts of political theory, such as happiness, liberty, and security, as they appear in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s 1669 pamphlet for the Polish king election. It is entitled *Specimen demonstrationum politicarum pro eligendo Rege Polonorum novo scribendi genere ad claram certitudinem exactum* (*Specimen of Political Demonstrations for the Election of a Polish King, Completed in the New Way of Writing in Order to Attain Clear Certainty*) and referred to in the following for short as *Specimen Polonorum*. The title suggests, and the scholarship took this suggestion at face value, that Leibniz’s main concern could be, by the propositions presented *more geometrico*, and by the chains of the *sorites*-arguments, a possibly perfect application of the style of the moderns to a political subject matter.

In his paper, however, the author took another approach: one stating that Leibniz had an antagonist whose reasoning he wanted to refute with the demonstrative arguments of the *Specimen Polonorum*. This was Andrzej Olszowski on whose *Censura candidatorum sceptri Polonici* Leibniz focused while writing his pamphlet rather than on the scientific and philosophical works of the Moderns.

The key sentence of the re-interpretation of the *Specimen Polonorum* is one of Leibniz’s *en passant* remarks. At the end of his pamphlet Leibniz mentioned that his aim was not only to defend the Pfalzgraf Philipp Wilhelm von Neuburg, in the interest of whom he was labouring during the whole winter of 1668–1669 in Mainz, but also to argue against other candidates, four in number, while neglecting the rest of them. In response to a foreseeable objection he added that he did not bother with further candidates since nobody argued for them or came to their defence: “Cur eos refutem, quos nemo defendit”. Thus the question emerges quite naturally: who defended the others?

Polish historiographers used to enumerate more than twenty writings in close connection with the 1669 king election. These various pamphlets made out the wider polemic context of Leibniz’s *Specimen Polonorum*, even if his booklet did not appear in time but several months after the election in June 1669. In other words, Leibniz’s pamphlet could not have any impact on Polish politics, but Polish politics had a big impact on Leibniz’s pamphlet.

On closer inspection these lists about the pamphlets reveal, however, that after the exclusion of hand-written texts – obviously out of reach – or those published after Leibniz had finished his one in early 1669, there remains only one occasional treatise published before his own in the last months

of 1668 which not only could be read by Leibniz but which adopted critical attitude towards the persons Leibniz defended and favourable towards those who were criticized by him. This was the book of the Vice-Chancellor of the Kingdom of Poland, bishop of Chełmno, Andrzej Olszowski, and his work is one of the earliest classics of Polish political literature. It was Olszowski who gave a new and definitive track to the election campaign by supporting the choice of a national-Polish ("Piaśt") candidate: the Duke Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki who indeed was elected the king of Poland as Michael I (1669–1673). Olszowski's pamphlet, together with other brochures in connection with the Polish king election, was and still is available in Baron Johann Christian Boineburg's library in which, on the owner's commission, Leibniz was working on his *Specimen Polonorum*.

As to the general similarities between Olszowski's and Leibniz's pamphlet, above all it should be mentioned that it was Olszowski who had reduced to five the number of candidates who would merit either support or criticism, i.e. to the Muscovite candidate, Pfalzgraf Neuburg, Louis II of Bourbon, Prince of Condé, Charles Duke of Lorraine and the Polish national candidate. While Leibniz's *Specimen Polonorum* discusses the same persons as Olszowski's *Censura candidatorum*, other pamphlets dealt with different candidates in different groupings. Olszowski's decision to choose five particular candidates with the omission of all the others – as well as his way of defending the Polish candidate and that of criticizing the others, first of all the sexagenarian, ailing, and German-hearted Pfalzgraf Neuburg to whom Olszowski preferred as his second-best choice the 26-year-old, promising and independent Charles, Duke of Lorraine – basically determined the thematic structure of Leibniz's pamphlet advocating the election of a 53-year-old, healthy and half-German-half-Polish Neuburg against Charles, a teen-aged and insignificant creature of the Habsburg Emperor.

Since the *Censura candidatorum* pointed to the weak sides of Neuburg, the pamphlet gave ideas to Leibniz how to argue for Pfalzgraf with some hope to reverse the public mood. From this perspective, the scientific project of the *Specimen Polonorum* is nothing else but part of the polemics. If Olszowski wrote as a Polish nobleman who loves his fatherland, then Leibniz wrote like a (presumptive) Polish nobleman named Geogrius Ulicovius Lithuanus (i.e., Jerzy Ulikowski from Lithuania) who loves rationality more than the fatherland. Leibniz realized that Neuburg's weak spot was patriotism and he tried to parry it with rational thinking, on the one hand, and with an emphasis on his links with former dynasties in Poland, on the other. Thus Leibniz seems to be very far from believing naively that in political matters emotions can be defeated by rational arguments. Much more probably he must have come to

the conclusion that appealing to nationalistic feelings in the case of Neuburg was well-nigh impossible, he had no other choice but to address the rational side of Polish noblemen. Leibniz's *Specimen Polonorum* is, surely in accordance with its author's intentions, one of the earliest examples in modern political thought of not using but *u s i n g* rational arguments systematically. In other words, the scientific project of the *Specimen Polonorum* is not independent of the material content. It is not a self-amusing philosophical pyrotechnics of a young political journalist: the scientific project is rooted in the polemic context and answers a challenge posed by it.

Olszowski's passages about the old *Rzeczpospolita* seem to have given Leibniz an occasion to demonstrate his progress in the classics of political theory, evaluating against their background the Polish democracy exerted as a monarchy and dealing with ethical issues in relation with the nation's happiness, liberty, and security. The first part of the *Specimen Polonorum* is very close to a mirror for princes, with many explicit and implicit references to Aristotle, Machiavelli and Hobbes. The second part is an analysis of the international situation with regard to the literature contemporary to it. The third part focuses on the internal politics of Poland: Leibniz quoted here the pamphlet literature, genealogical descriptions and historical accounts. Leibniz's aim with this structure was to strengthen Neuburg's situation before comparing him with the only serious rival, the national-Polish "Piast."

To the key concepts he found in Olszowski's text, Leibniz gave in his response a philosophical foundation by embedding them into the discourse of the Ancients and the Moderns. The young lawyer accepted Olszowski's concept of Polish liberty and equality as given categories of Polish political life. He also demonstrated that Olszowski's concept of happiness and security was incompatible with that of liberty and tried to re-interpret them in harmony with the random conditions of political reality. He proved that it is impossible to stay equally independent from each neighbour, to maintain the institutions of home policy and to ignore the various threats from abroad to which Poland was exposed at the same time. While Olszowski lent no attention to the recent territorial losses Poland had suffered in the East (first it had to cede East Prussia to the Elector of Brandenburg and then renounce the Ukrainian territories eastward of the river Dnieper in favour of Russia, according to the terms of the truce of Andruszow in 1667), Leibniz's response was based on the due consideration of these circumstances.

From a methodological point of view, Leibniz started from the empirical premise of a progression from basic facts of Polish political reality to the conclusions relevant to political recruitment (that is, combining methods of enhancing and preserving true knowledge during demonstration). The

fact that he never raised questions concerning the principles of the Polish constitution shows that the *Specimen Polonorum* was written by an outsider. He accepted them dispassionately as random conditions under which he has to find solution to the given political problem. An internal point of view, on the contrary, would not only be engaged emotionally but would also consider the random conditions as parts of the problem. A proposed solution in any case reflects the framework of political institutions as well. In East European late feudal political cultures the principal gap is between programmes of insisting on existing institutions *ad absurdum*, even at the cost of a material bankruptcy and of a material modernization which necessarily erodes the institutional framework. It renders Leibniz's argument as that of a "Polish nobleman" principally incredible that he wanted to modernize and safeguard the institutions at the same time. This position existed only on a level below state sovereignty. He proposed the Poles to give up sovereignty and incorporate the Polish state into the Holy Roman Empire to be able to administrate their republic on the basis of a public law they just prefer.

Since in the *Specimen Polonorum* Leibniz's ambitions concerning political theory and scientific demonstration are subordinated to the pamphlet's concrete political aspirations, therefore any new approach to the philosophical and scientific aspects of it has, thus, to be preceded by the thorough clarifying of the context-bound political intentions.

Court, Count and County. Vienna, The Széchenyis and the Nobility in early 19th century Hungary

If Leibniz tried to rethink the institutional political framework of Poland hand in hand with a programme of modernisation, while playing down the importance of sovereignty, Ferenc Hörcher's paper presented an early 19th century Hungarian case which in this respect resembled Leibniz's late 17th century example. The Counts Ferenc and István Széchenyi both suggested ways to negotiate the political will of the autonomous freedom of the Hungarian Diet and the reason of state of the Hapsburg Empire. Also comparable was the failure of these efforts, due to the importance attached to issues of public law and what they regarded as political independence by the Hungarian nobility.

Ferenc Hörcher's research paper, dedicated to the memory of Prof. László Péter, reconstructed some of the key issues of the 19th century Hungarian political elite and of the contemporary intelligentsia.¹

¹ His essays were published posthumously in *Hungary's Long Nineteenth Century. Constitutional and Democratic Traditions in a European Perspective*. Collective Studies, ed. M. Lojkó, Brill, Leiden 2012.

The paper concentrated on the conflict between the Hapsburg court in Vienna and two Hungarian aristocrats, the father, Count Ferenc Széchenyi, and the son, Count István Széchenyi, between 1790 and 1848, a period which is generally regarded as a (or the) Reform Era of Hungary. The conflict could develop as a result of mutual distrust. It was, however, not simply the usual give-and-take between the supreme political power residing in the metropolitan centre and a minor one embodied by some provincial aristocrats. This would have been nothing new in the Kingdom of Hungary, “in which royal office was vested to rule and govern the country.” The crown, as the king and his court was usually referred to, could hardly have been balanced by the country’s diet, where the estates of the country were represented. It was safeguarded by certain immunities and privileges which came to be called the constitutional tradition of the kingdom (“whose customary rights the monarch had to maintain”), but which could hardly take the country’s fate into its own hands. It was forced to leave final decisions in the hands of the leaders of the Viennese court.²

The diet itself was divided into two parts. Magnates were invited to the diet personally, where they formed the Upper House. The Lower House was constituted by noble representatives of the county assemblies, each of which remained one of 52 independent little kingdoms within the large one. A special importance should be attributed to those large sectors of the nobility which had very poor financial and economic resources and which after some time, in fact, mixed with the non-noble sectors of society. Both of them faced the same risks: they did not have their own resources of subsistence and therefore got dependent on noble patrons and landlords. These lowest levels of the nobility consisted of the poor, sandalled nobles (*bocskoros nemesség*) and of the landless armalists (*címeres nemes*).³ These socially and economically underprivileged social segments played a major role in the debates of the Reform Era, at one time supporting the Crown while at other times joining the nobility in their efforts to fight to heal their grievances.

A further significant point to be taken into consideration is that the Széchenyis belonged to those aristocratic circles of Hungary which consisted of the barons, who had their estates in Western Hungary and who traditionally belonged to the Catholic community in a land where reformation had a large and deep impact. Catholicism usually meant a kind of natural alliance with the Viennese court. The Széchenyis, starting out as loyal subjects of the Catholic King, showed that the Hungarian Catholic elite was

² L. Péter, *Hungary’s Long Nineteenth Century*, p. 4.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 309.

not necessarily satisfied with the existing ways political power was exercised by Vienna when it tried to rule the country. Although this combination of Catholicism and opposition had earlier radical precursors, like the Prince Ferenc Rákóczi II., who led a national uprising against the Hapsburgs in the first decade of the 18th century, it was in fact a sign of a new era, when traditional loyalties had to give way to modern political alliances, including most importantly the national belonging. While the aristocracy in Hungary traditionally had a cosmopolitan upbringing and a cosmopolitan way of life – both of the Széchenyis in their youth lived the typical high life of Vienna based aristocrats of the Hapsburg empire: father Ferenc and his son István represented a rather new phenomenon by being devout Catholics and outspoken supporters of a novel, nationalistic approach to politics when they became honoured members of their respective generations.

However, there remained important differences between the attitude of the Széchenyis and that of the majority of the Hungarian nobility, of whom the lower house of the Diet consisted. While the nobility was happy to identify itself with “a policy based on grievances: *gravaminal policy (sérelemi politika)*”, the Széchenyis were not ready to make that move, and instead remained within the court’s halo. While the nobility found foreign rule (i.e. the rule of a foreign house over the kingdom of Hungary) morally unacceptable, the Széchenyis, whose mother tongue was German, and whose aristocratic rank was due to Hapsburg kings, did not have much problem with accepting this international dimension of their country’s political life, and did not make efforts to delegitimize the Hapsburgs on the throne. After all, since 1301 the *usus* in Hungary was to elect, or at least to accept, a Hungarian ruler from an internationally recognised foreign dynasty.

It was László Péter who referred in this context to a discrepancy in the ways the Hungarian constitutional tradition was interpreted by the Hungarian elite. As he argued, “[b]efore 1848 the Court, the aristocracy of the Upper House, the Church hierarchy and the university jurists understood the political system as a *monarchia pura* in which authority was solely in the hands of the monarch. Yet, he had to rule in accordance with the laws of the country, so his kingdom was to be regarded a *monarchia limitate* rather than a *monarchia absoluta*”,⁴ and in this sense the ruler was lacking the absolute freedom so characteristic of tyrants. On the other hand, the gentry of the Lower House of the Diet interpreted the constitutional tradition as that of a *monarchia mixta*, where authority is divided between the monarch and the

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

nation.⁵ This discrepancy of the interpretation of the constitutional regime became important in the Age of Enlightenment, when the large number of reform legislation by Joseph II created a general impression that a centralised political will wants to rule the country in an absolutistic manner while being supported by the less numerous middle cases and with the oppositional capacity of the Diet being disregarded.⁶

The two ways of constitutional interpretations were connected to two different ways of making sense of national history. The mainly protestant nobility focused on the problem of national independence, a narrative in which the policy of grievances played a crucial role and which raised questions of public law (i.e. complains of the court's disregard for the Hungarian constitutional tradition). On the other hand, the aristocrat's usual story was construed in terms of the interest of the whole empire, and a major role was played by the virtues of loyalty and compromise. In other words, the aristocracy tried to play the role of a bridge connecting the opposite poles of the Crown and the country. This role of transmission was helped by their education, for a long time controlled by the Jesuits and their metropolitan culture, gathered during their long trips abroad and their stays in the imperial court.

The two Széchenyis' individual political and social mission is to be understood in this context. While the father was a key representative of the first reform generation of the 1790s, inspired by foreign (mainly British) examples and his friendship with intellectuals and writers, the son, count István, became the first voice to raise the nation from a slumber after decades of political oppression by the Hapsburgs during the second half of the 1820s and during the 1830s. The father was a Josephinist kind of reformer who pressed the issue of constitutional regeneration during the reform diets of the first half of the 1790s. Before the Hapsburg's cruel suppression of the national awakening, after they had unmasked a coup of the Hungarian Jacobins, he retreated in to a kind of romantic religious enthusiasm. The son published a programme of national and liberal capitalism, which was to be taken over from him by the leaders of the gentry in the forties. His book on credit⁷ was a ground-breaking study of the economic disaster caused by the institution of *avicititas* (ősiség), making it impossible for landowners to make use of bank credit. It is interesting to compare the two of them as it gives one a nice

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ To be sure, Joseph II had his own supporters among the lines of the Hungarian aristocracy, nobility and intelligentsia, including Ferenc Széchenyi and his non-noble secretary, József Hajnóczy.

⁷ Entitled *Hitel* (*Credit*, 1830).

picture of the elite of these two generations of reformers. Count Ferenc in his youth was a public administrator under the government of Joseph II for a few years in the 1780s who gets disillusioned by the voluntarism of the king and takes part in the reform movement which tried to modernise the Hungarian constitution to enable the Diet to take a better control over political events. But in none of these roles could he create anything really memorable, as opposed to his function of the greatest patrons of Hungarian culture. He offered his book collection and collections of numismata and natural treasures to the nation, out of which the National Museum and the public national library was created by him and the diet. His son, count István, published a number of volumes in which he argued in favour of substantial reforms in the countries constitutional and economic arrangements and took the role of the minister of Public Works and Transport in the first revolutionary government of 1848 of count Lajos Batthyány. But again, his most memorable public acts were those of an independent thinking aristocrat who on his own initiative constituted new national institutions, including the Hungarian Academy of Science, a National Casino, and with other supporters, the National Theatre of Hungary.

In both cases, the most original acts belong to the newly born sphere of civil society: as aristocrats they realised they had the financial resources to act in the interest of the nation without relying on the support of the state and its official head, the king. This was partly due to the fact that none of the two actually earned the trust of the leaders of the empire. Count Metternich, the first official of the empire, regarded István as a potentially dangerous rebellious Hungarian magnate. Although count István tried to win him over from time to time, it was too late when he got through in the late 1840s, when the lower gentry took over the initiative from the magnates. Now Széchenyi had to fight Lajos Kossuth, the charismatic leader of the progressive, national liberal opposition who was less of a loyal subject of the crown very revolutionary in his attitude, and who had been imprisoned already in his youth for illegal anti-governmental activity.

Both of the Széchenyis tried to mediate between the Court and the country, and although none of the two actually succeeded in this effort, they played an important role in the creation of the Hungarian nation. On the other hand, none of them could get rid of their old fashioned ideas of a mixed constitution in which aristocracy had a pivotal role in mediating between the monarch and the Diet. Their efforts to help connect opposite political poles were made fruitless by the lack of moderation on both sides, i.e. on the side of the autocratic rulers and their rebellious gentry opposition. They themselves made a number of mistakes, too, miscalculating their own

influence, and disregarding the fact of their own isolation from the main body of the national elite. And yet, their efforts echoed in the Austro-Hungarian Settlement of 1867.⁸ For a few decades it succeeded to harmonise the imperial interest with the national one, before the disaster of WWI, which – together with the independence movements of the national minorities of the empire – destroyed the dual monarchy in a spectacular way.

The Extension of Rights as a Key Concept of the Political Thought of the Hungarian Reform Era (1825–1848)

The topic of another lecture presented by Béla Mester, *The Extension of Rights as a Key Concept of the Political Thought of the Hungarian Reform Era (1825–1848)*, is interlinked with the contributions of Ferenc Hörcher and Gábor Kovács. The former discussed the same period from a different point of view; the latter analysed some consequences of the phenomena touched upon both in Hörcher's and Mester's lectures. Béla Mester's talk focussed on the transformations of feudal institutions in Hungary and their ethical impact within the modernisation process of Hungarian politics. The 19th-century slogan of the Hungarian liberal opposition, "extension of rights," referred to an alternative model for legal equality of the members of a modern political nation.

In the first part of his talk, Mester gave a brief account concerning the transformation of philosophical discourse at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries into that of national philosophy. In the second part, the author discussed the tension provoked by modernization of the public realm in the system of feudal institutions. The third part offered a case study of a political trial and its role in the public sphere. In the final section, Mester outlined Lajos Kossuth's contribution to the emergence of the modern political public space in Hungary. He also showed how elements of the ancient political ethos survived after the 1848 revolution.

One of the novelties of the liberal political programme of the Hungarian Reform Era was expressed in the slogan advocating *homeland and progress*, instead of the traditional dilemma of *homeland or progress*. Under this devise the Hungarian liberal opposition pursued the politics of the *extension of rights* against constitutional privileges. Though abolished, these privileges had long-distance cultural consequences for political behaviour until the emergence of the ethnocentric concept of

⁸ László Péter always protested against the imprecise terminology of the Austro-Hungarian *Compromise*.

the nation in the early 20th-century: a process which is touched upon in Gábor Kovács's paper.

In Hungary, the debate on Kant (1792–1822) was the direct predecessor of the Reform Era in the field of philosophy as a public discourse. The Kantian philosophical backgrounds of the creation of the modern Hungarian political nation clearly appeared in a discussion at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in the summer of 1847, less than a year before the revolution on the topic of national philosophy. According to the proposal formulated by its participants, a distinction should be made, in harmony with Kant's teaching, between the categories of school philosophy and cosmopolitan philosophy. But going beyond Kant, they proposed an additional contradistinction concerning the *ars philosophandi*: there are individual philosophies on the one hand, and the national philosophies on the other. Individual philosophy is more than acting merely as a schoolmaster, but less than the creation of a new philosophical system. National philosophy is on the same level of universality as the cosmopolitan one with the qualification that it is formulated in Hungarian with the help of the vocabulary of the economic, political, and cultural life of the nation.

The dominant political language of the resistance against the Vienna Court was that of republicanism, with Classical reminiscences rooted in the culture of late Humanism. This discourse conceived Hungary, in line with a widely accepted legal fiction, as a monarchy with freely elected kings. The republican discourse was able to maintain the identity of the political community, but, just because of its oppositional role the republican discourse was unable to incorporate ideas about the modernisation of the body politic. The political languages of modernisation, in connection with the establishment of a modern, rational bureaucracy and the *raison d'état* as an ideology behind them, belonged to the vocabulary of the mercantile think-tank in Vienna. Between these hopelessly incompatible positions emerged the new language of the modern public realm which was in a position to fulfil the requirements of the national engagement of the antique republicanism as well as those of the modernisation fever of the court reformers. It is the language of the refinement of the society, after the model of the Scottish Enlightenment, where the term refinement emerged as a term of 18th-century social philosophy. This discourse was highly popular in intellectual circles, especially among writers and artists, and it made serious impact on the modernisation of the social space between the public and the private, in the sphere of the cultural periodicals, in the sub-political life of the saloons and in the world of the societal events. This political language can be considered as an early version of the Central-European anti-politics. It

was able to develop complete programs of the gradual development of the different spheres of social life, such as the education of women, the desirable structure of theatres, periodicals, or the preferable system of literary genres; but it was unable to touch the political questions in themselves, in their strict meaning.

The vocabulary, rhetoric and argumentation of this new political language proved to be successful in the transformation of the legitimation and *ethos* of the political institutions. The greatest innovation consisted in the shift in the concepts of nation and citizenship. According to the ancient thesis, the noblemen were considered as the sole heirs of the citizenship, and they were equal with each other in this aspect. According to the new political language, the programme of modernisation went hand in hand with the planned, gradual extension of the right of political participation from the noblemen to an electorate limited by financial census, as well as with an extension prospect for the whole people in the far future. The task of a national and progressive politician is a double one in this regard; defending the existing, yet restricted to the noblemen, forms of freedom against Vienna, and fighting for the extension of the existing forms of freedom to the large strata of the nation.

The first paradigmatic example of this transition of values was a political trial. Baron Miklós Wesselényi, one of the main leaders of the opposition, gave a political speech in the county assembly of Szatmár County. His argumentation for the necessary social and political reforms and against the privileges of the noblemen was based on the negative example of the revolt of the Galician peasants -one assisted by the Vienna court and directed against the (Polish) landlords; in this revolt people were fighting, on their part, for their political liberty. Wesselényi was accused of high treason because of his hints about the role of the Vienna Court in the peasant's revolt. During the years of the trial, the rights of a privileged politician for the freedom of speech met the requirements of the modern media for the freedom of the discussion of the trial in the public realm, and the defence of feudal privileges was transformed into the demand of the freedom of speech in general.

This task was achieved by Lajos Kossuth and his modern political periodicals. His regular reports from the Diet and the County Assemblies transformed the politics from the business of privileged noblemen to a public affair in the strict and modern meaning of the term. But this transition was far from being complete. Fiction and theory in Hungary of the second half of the 19th century abounds in the artistic images of the survival of the ancient values within the modern framework, both from ironic or heroic point of view. It was a commonplace in the discourse of this time that the method

of election campaign organisation, or the rhetoric of a speech in the newly elected representative assemblies of the modern parliamentary system were all managed by the same customs, and partly by the same persons who were the masterminds of the similar machinery during the ancient regime. A scene from Maurice Jókai's novel *Sons of the Stone-Hearted Man*, about the period of the revolutionary war of 1848–1849, expressed the mixture of old-fashioned and modern values in the same mind with regard to personal dignity in the mirror of the prohibition of physical punishments by the revolutionary government. According to the novel, a warrior of a semi-regular troupe of the revolutionary army was accused of the transgression against the army rules and he was convicted to a physical punishment by the next regular commander. He complained that the revolution had generally abolished physical punishments. The commander said, it was true, but there was a case of emergency because of the war circumstances. 'But I am a nobleman, the stock of the law cannot touch my body', said the guilty warrior, as an *ultima ratio*.

The Narrative of Dual Society in the Interwar Hungarian Sociological and Political Thought

The subject-matter of another lecture entitled *The Narrative of Dual Society in the Interwar Hungarian Sociological and Political Thought*, presented by Gábor Kovács, complemented the contribution of Ferenc Hörcher so far as the interwar period gave rise to new constellations in social, political, and cultural-intellectual terms. Kovács offered a comparative case study of three Hungarian thinkers. Their narrative interpreted the Hungarian social development as divergent from Western models and offered an interpretive framework of Hungarian *Sonderweg* in East European historical trajectories. Thus, Kovács's paper focused on the lasting consequences of the impact of the noble legacy on collective mentality in Hungary.

After WWI, Hungary had to confront the shocking experience of the Trianon Peace Treaty imposed upon the country by the victorious Allied Powers. The shock traumatized the entire Hungarian political community from the political elites to lower class people and gave an opportunity to the rise of the culture of defeat (a notion coined by Wolfgang Schivelbusch). It thus induced a paradigm-shift of Hungarian political elites concerning their nation-building strategy. Between the times of Austro-Hungarian compromise (1867) and WWI the Magyar gentry had adopted an assimilation strategy in a multi-ethnic country. After the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the method of assimilation had been replaced by that of dissimilation, hand in hand with

the idea of protecting ethnical, or, in contemporary terms, racial identities. Albeit the continuity in the elites was only partial, the agricultural and petit-bourgeois classes adopted elements of gentry manners and mentality.

The subsequent parts of Gábor Kovács's paper offered a comparative analysis of three thinkers: Gyula Szekfű, Dezső Szabó and Ferenc Erdei. They held different positions in the interwar ideological-intellectual field: Szekfű was an academic historian; Szabó was a very talented writer, political essayist and pamphleteer, while Erdei was a sociologist and sociographer. What connects them is the narrative of dual society used in different contexts.

Gyula Szekfű's book *Three Generations and What Comes after Them*, published directly after the First World War, became a best-seller, a cult-book of Hungarian intellectuals and educated middle-class readers. It was a history of a decline, a *Verfallsgeschichte*, which was a widespread and popular genre in the post-war Europe, especially in the defeated Germany, the ally of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in WWI. Szekfű was inspired by the ideas of German conservative revolution; in his interpretation of modernity he drew on the ideas of Rudolph Kjellén and Werner Sombart. Liberalism was the target of Szekfű's sharp criticism, the main culprit of the Hungarian catastrophe culminating in the disintegration of the country after the Great War. According to Szekfű's diagnosis, the subsequent three generations of the Hungarian gentry from the 1830s onwards adopted this political ideology in a country whose conditions totally differed from the ones of Great Britain. Liberalism, in its native land, was an outgrowth of special constellations, both economic and political. Liberalism, in Szekfű's assessment, was an exotic plant in continental Europe sprouting from seeds carried by ideological winds: when it attains its full growth, it poisons the local social and political flora.

Capitalism, this inevitable corollary of modernity, in Hungary developed in a way very different from Western European models. The gentry-led Hungarian feudal society proved to be unprepared for market-competition because it lacked the necessary skills. The concept of dual society helped explain the tensions of Hungary's lopsided modernization. In Hungary, Szekfű argued, a strange symbiosis had emerged: it was a response to the challenge of capitalistic modernity. The gentry and the peasantry constituted the so-called national society, while entrepreneurs and workers of foreign origin formed the new capitalist society – the modern *Gesellschaft* based on contractual rationalistic relations. This uneasy co-existence in itself promised future conflicts. Moreover, as Szekfű argued, it was to generate ethnical and cultural conflicts. Here, Szekfű made use of the well-known subject matter of 19th-century right-wing journalism: Jewish immigration

and assimilation. Jewish immigrants from Galicia occupied the empty niches of the emerging capitalist society: the entrepreneurial strata were recruited from them. Their culture gave them a competition advantage over the protagonists of national society, first of all over the gentry. Szekfű strongly criticized the Hungarian gentry because of its wrong response to the challenges of modernity: instead of changing their attitudes and adapting themselves to the new circumstances during the economic boom after 1867, they occupied the political and administrative key positions of the public administration.

The forefather of the Hungarian populist movement, Dezső Szabó exerted an enormous influence upon the contemporary public thought with his novel *The Swept Away Village* (1919). His cultural criticism denied the idea of historical progress; instead of it, Szabó advocated the alternation of collectivistic and individualistic periods in history. In Szabó's view, a new collectivistic era was to emerge at the turn of the 20th century which should replace the individualistic-capitalist civilization of the 19th century. In this collectivistic era, according to him, the rootless, individualistic way of life would be replaced by a rooted one, whose main representative is the peasant as the embodiment of an authentic human existence in harmony with the whole universe. The peasant is the base of the nation's vitality; he is the reservoir of a mythically perceived historical regeneration by which the decadent national community will be renewed. It is not difficult to recognize in this conception the contemporary German *völkisch* peasant myth, though Szabó – an exception in this respect in Hungarian cultural criticism – was inspired by French rather than German right-wing radicalism. In his expressionistic-metaphoric language, the peasant appears as a plant growing out of the soil and living in close contact with the mystical forces of the cosmos. This metaphor is conspicuously similar to Spengler's in his *The Decline of the West*.

Dezső Szabó's conception of dual society was pre-determined by his anthropology and philosophy of history. The *Leitmotiv* of his interpretation of Hungarian history was xenophobia and ethno-centrism. This history, according to him, had been burdened by the domination of social strata of "foreign" ethnical origin who occupied the key positions of social and political life, while excluding the "true-born" Hungarians from them. Szabó did not exclude the possibility of joining the Hungarian national community from outside, i.e. assimilation. Nation was for him not only an ethnicity-based community but also a historical work-in-progress. However, strategic positions must be occupied by "true-born," ethnically "pure" Hungarians.

Dual society, in the ethnicist interpretation of Szabó, is not a modern development but a lingering phenomenon accompanying Hungarian history

from the beginnings. Szabó agreed with Szekfű on the point that in modern times this dualism had been modified by the emergence of social structures based on the free competition of capitalism. In his theory, the Jews appeared in a similar role as in the conception of Szekfű. Szabó's anti-Semitic approach is far from being a biological one: he described Jews as a wonderful race vested with enormous talents; their harmful social role is the consequence of the constellations of the Hungarian scene, where they are the rivals of a traditional society unprepared for the competitive capitalism. Szabó's proposed solution is a revolution emancipating Hungarian peasantry and the allocation the representatives of this social group to the sweeping majority of key positions in economic, social and cultural life.

Ferenc Erdei was one of the founding fathers of Hungarian sociology in the interwar period. He associated the idea of dual society with a Third Way modernist utopia. The main loser of dual society, in Erdei's interpretation, was the Hungarian peasantry defined by him as a sub-society in a state of decomposition and unable to find its breakthrough to modernity.

Erdei's leading idea consisted in a self-contained, autochthone modernization of Hungary, the moving force of which he saw in the entrepreneur-peasantry stratum of the South Hungarian region. This stratum developed its own, particular settlement-form, the market town (*oppidum*)- a form between a city and a village; it had a self-government and was based on agricultural market production. This kind of settlement, in Erdei's strongly idealized description, has achieved a form of symbiosis between the town and its countryside; such symbiosis was based not on a hierarchical relation moulding the countryside into a lower, subdued position. It was, according to Erdei's vision, a Hungarian way of modernization. It is far more than *enbourgeoisement* in its strictly economic meaning because it encompasses the political emancipation of the town-dwelling peasants who are *citoyens* and *bourgeois* at the same time. They become peasant-citizens constituting a peasant-democracy which, for Erdei, could be the model of a grass-root, autochthone modernization. Any attempts to adopt Western modernization patterns are doomed to failure because of the existence of dual society.

But Hungarian dual society narrative must be inserted into a wider context, too. Concerning its origins, it emerged as an explanation of the role the Hungarian gentry played in the process of modernization. One of its main functions, from the beginnings, was to elucidate the ambivalences of Hungarian social development with all its differences from West European models. However, before the defeat in WWI it did not become a part of the mainstream public and academic thought. After the war, it became a widely

applied popular term as a theoretical response to the challenge of the disintegration of the Kingdom of Hungary, the so-called Empire of Saint Stephen. It proved to be a useful notion for various ends. With this narrative, its protagonists were able to defend and criticize the traditional gentry-based Hungarian social and political elites.

Citizenship Between Noble and Ethnic Nationalisms: The Slovak Perspective

After a series of Hungarian contributions there followed a presentation delivered by Tibor Pichler entitled *Citizenship between Noble and Ethnic Nationalisms: The Slovak Perspective* in which the author argued “why there is no noble legacy of citizenship in the case of Slovak nationalism developed by the Slovak intelligentsia.” Pichler took his point of departure from a situation generating the Hungarian noble nationalism. He traced it back to the centralisation effort of Joseph II to create out of his territories a *Gesamtstaat* ruled from one centre and introduce in Hungary a new administrative language – German. The reaction to this move was an anti-Josephinist defensive noble nationalism which came out strengthened from the diet 1790–1792. The adopted policy was to gradually introduce Hungarian as an administrative language thought as capable of strengthening the constitution of the country represented by the nobility – the noble nation. The noble nationalism received a new momentum at the diet of 1825 and in the period until the April laws of the revolution of 1848 which ushered the end of the society of estates and the beginning of civil society in Hungary by declaring equality before the law. It was a period of a discussion concerning social and economic modernization of Hungary – how to transform the body politic of *natio hungarica* into a society of citizens. The idea was to open it gradually to non-privileged strata of inhabitants. But language was and remained the crucial problem for Hungarian civility, as the country was multilingual.

Pichler noted that the noble privileged nation of Hungary was not unitary from the point of view of language. The Upper Hungarian Slovak mother tongue nobility was an integral part of the noble nation with a dominant political and territorial identity. *Natio hungarica* meant the nation of nobles. But there was another usage of “natio” – “nations” meaning “language” as a classification criterion of ethnic diversity in statistics. In the case of “Slavic nation” of the Lutheran Church of Hungary, “nation” acquired a special dynamics and led to the creation of a new ethnic language-based nationalism. It was launched by the intelligentsia defying the noble nationalism and its

project of a territorial, political, prospectively monolingual nation by imagining an institutionalised multilingual and multinational Hungary.

Pichler argued that a catalyst for the constitution of a language or ethnic nationalism, designed mainly by the Slovak Lutheran intelligentsia (priests and teachers), was the idea of a Union of Protestant Churches (Lutheran and Reformist), launched by Count Zay – general inspector of Lutheran Church in Hungary, in which the Slovak mother tongue believers had a majority over German and Hungarian believers. The Lutheran Slovaks called a distinctive “national language” religious and cultural tradition their own. A Union with the Reformist (Calvinist) Church, which was predominantly Hungarian, was perceived as a threat to the cultural tradition. Not having a political status of their own, the intelligentsia reacted by designing a Slovak language and cultural nationalism, territorialised and politicised during the revolution 1848. In 1843 a new literary language was codified with a motive to win over the Upper Hungarian nobility of Slovak mother tongue. They themselves had to learn Hungarian but their original language identity never trumped their political one, so they did not choose to embrace the nationalism of the intelligentsia based on language and an idealised and romanticised populism.

Pichler pointed to the Štúrists, a group of Lutheran intellectuals led by Ľudovít Štúr as the originators of this new concept. Štúr built on the concept of language conceived as an inner characteristic of a people, an attribute of existential importance. As such, speakers of a language had an existence of long duration, although not of political independence, in contrast to what a nation should have, because Štúr as a reader of Hegel knew that constitution, laws and habits represent a nation politically. Therefore, according to Pichler, the starting point of Slovak nationalism was the construction of a new continuum in history reaching out into the Great Moravian pre-Hungarian past showing signs of state possession and the claim to become once more a subject of history. Štúr’s nationalism was based on the will to become historically active and this philosophy of history steeped in Slavic context was an ideological prerequisite for a later political project of gradual nation-building. In Pichler’s view, the substitution of philosophy of history for politics is a typical feature of romanticism in politics being, as a rule, identity politics.

However, as Pichler continued the hope to attract the Slovak speaking nobility turned out to have been illusory. The Slovak nobility’s identity was defined by being a member of *natio hungarica*. So, the project of integration of all Slovak speaking social strata, irrespective of denominations, into one nation-building did not materialise. If noble nationalists engaged in building

a unitary Hungarian political nation based on assimilationist language policy were institutionalised actors, then ethnic nationalists on the Slovak side, by way of comparison, were intellectuals without political standing, acting through print media but lacking an effective organisational structure. They were not perceived by the ruling elite as an institutional political adversary. The Slovak intelligentsia as well as the Slovak population of Upper Hungary nevertheless had a latent political potential which showed itself during times of crisis and later on after WWI. They were capable to make others stronger – this was the latent power of Slovak nationalism waiting for a chance for itself.

Pichler, while returning to the problem of noble legacy, emphasized that the Upper Hungarian nobility of Slovak mother tongue eventually did not join the Slovak ethnic nationalism because politically and socially it was an organic part of the Hungarian nobility. It gradually acquired the knowledge of Hungarian, although in the rural landlord community Slovak was used, too. Pichler clarified that the nobility is not part of the tradition of mainstream Slovak national narrative, nor of the Slovak nation-building. On the other hand, he admitted that one cannot see an impact of noble, especially landed gentry's *savoir vivre*, on diverse strata of society until 1918 (an impact on *moeurs*). There are plenty of hints to it in the Slovak belles-lettres and sociography. This gentry socialising pattern was criticised by a new generation of Slovak nation-builders at fin de siècle. They stressed modern and middle class norms of work ethics and achievement as roads to success and criticised elder nation-builders for their gentry-like behaviours. In Czechoslovakia the public discussion on the development of democratic morality included the campaign against moral Hungarianism which meant gentry ethos and habits.

Pichler concluded that until the break-up of Hungary in 1918 the nobility remained in control of politics. The ruling noble nationalism in its etatist form however, taking hold with the ascension to power by Kálmán Tisza, was not able to design a creative open policy. This was because it consequently blocked the extension of franchise, and the Nationalities' Law of 1868 remained a theory. The crucial political question in a polyglot country – the use of particular languages in public space – was persistently neglected. Noble nationalism remained a prisoner to the project of monolingual civility being incapable to make concessions for multilingual civility.

Mapping Noble Legacy of the Polish Citizenship Model

The last paper by Rafał Smoczyński and Tomasz Zarycki, entitled *Mapping Noble Legacy of the Polish Citizenship Model*, offered reflections on the Polish citizenship model by exploring late nineteenth and early twentieth century ideological narratives, which formed the basis of modern Polish political and civic community. At the very outset authors critically analysed the dominant normative pattern of Polish citizenship, which is implicitly based on a widespread assumption about the universal application of the modern European republican model – a model that seemingly legitimizes European identities and their national legacies. In fact, the most recognizable citizenship model in Europe is the model formed by imagery of the French Revolution. According to Smoczyński and Zarycki, this model represents an example of the successful universalization of the *bourgeois* ideology, commonly “naturalized” in the Western world and adopted by political philosophy as an ideal type. However, as they argued following Brubaker, European models of citizenship are far from homogenous. While challenging the Polish citizenship model with respect to the ideal bourgeois model, they argued that such an analysis could benefit, for instance, from a Foucauldian genealogical perspective or from a Bourdieusian “field of power” perspective. This analysis may show the particular historical origin and development of various models of citizenship, whose universalization, imitation and reproduction have different historical dynamics.

The authors claimed that the part of the argument about the historical peculiarity of the Polish model of the civic sphere, as it emerged after the period of its formation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, indicates a strong reliance on the intelligentsia’s ethos and practices. In contrast to Western core countries, the Polish model of citizenship was marked by a specific structure of agrarian society dominated in the field of power by the intelligentsia strata that originated mainly from a weakened landed gentry. This peculiarity also distinguishes the Polish citizenship model from the German one, which was partly impacted by the growing importance of the *Bildungsbürgertum* strata’s ideology. This ideology however, as authors claimed cannot be equated with the intelligentsia’s ideological universum which evolved from the landed gentry’s ethos. However, their argument went beyond plain “uses of the past” analysis, which commonly indicates that contemporary Polish political culture, to a large extent, has been “programmed” by a gentry legacy. Without denying the importance of the feudal past for the contemporary model of Polish citizenship, they attempted to analytically

focus on the making of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries field of power in Poland in which the material and institutional changes were as important as the symbolic ones. In doing so, the authors employed the Bourdieusian perspective of “field of power” (instead of the traditional concept of the elite). This method allowed for the reconstruction of the field and rules which governed the games of the major social and political actors of the analysed period. This analysis made the description of the dynamics of change to the citizenship model more versatile than a conventional one-dimensional historical approach. The field of power approach combines the analysis of tensions in many dimensions of social structure (especially cultural, political and economic dimensions) while allowing for the operationalization of the interaction between horizontal divisions in elite circles and vertical social divisions.

Authors argued that this perspective has emerged as being particularly helpful, while attempting to avoid bias from the perspective of the present in mapping the evolution of the Polish citizenship model. This regulation of bias was particularly important given that the contemporary reading of Polish history of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (a key period in terms of the formation of the contemporary citizenship model) is strongly informed by the intelligentsia's presentism approach. The political and indeed cultural victory of the intelligentsia at the turn of twentieth century over the gentry, the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, according to Smoczyński and Zarycki, is now generally regarded as an obvious and inevitable fact. However, as they asserted, a closer analysis of the political life of the period shows that the prospect of reading the history of the Polish citizenship model marked by a post-gentry intelligentsia ethos was not so obvious.

They suggested that the analysis of political disputes held both in Poland and abroad until the end of the First World War does not support an assumption of the inevitability of a decisive victory of the intelligentsia. Interestingly, these significant political tensions are often marginalized or even ignored, hence the authors emphasized the benefit of studying the evolution of the Polish citizenship model, while avoiding the tendency to take for granted the demise of non-intelligentsia oriented factions (mainly bourgeois and land-owning groups, including those which were more or less “friendly oriented” towards Russia, Prussia and Austria) as historically necessary. Their paper focused mainly on the group of liberal politicians and social activists led by Alexander Lednicki, a Polish lawyer, social and political activist and deputy to the Russian Duma who lived and worked in Moscow before the Bolshevik revolution. This group, besides Lednicki, included among

others Franciszek Drucki-Lubecki, Leon Petrażycki, Alexander Babiański and Kazimierz Natanson. The authors placed this group within a broader comparative context of Polish political organizations at the beginning of the twentieth century in Russia. These groups were, firstly, the old Polish immigration, both liberal-leftist and conservative. A significant part of the representatives led by Alexander Lednicki showed a tendency to cooperate with the liberal, bourgeois Russian opposition, in particular Kadets, Esers and sometimes even Mensheviks. There was also a “Realist” faction which perceived Tsarist authority as the only credible political partner in Russia (National Democracy). The third orientation consisted of the representatives of the independence-seeking Left (Polish Socialist Party). In the aftermath of the October Revolution all these factions survived, except the group led by Alexander Lednicki. Having previously exerted a significant impact on the shape of Polish political culture, Lednicki’s group lost the crucial context of the Russian political system and, above all else, a context guaranteed by Russian state economic capital. In addition, as Smoczyński and Zarycki noted, they had not found a political and material base in the Second Republic of Poland and the memory of their legacy virtually vanished. This vibrant, diverse and rich political milieu, representing an emergent bourgeois and established aristocratic interest, proved to be a Polish Atlantis. The authors also identified another similarly forgotten society which represented mainly aristocratic circles and which functioned in Austrian political culture (“Podolacy” – Witold Czartoryski, Leon Bilinski, Agenor Goluchowski, Andrzej Lubomirski, Dawid Abrahamowicz, Włodzimierz Kozłowski-Bolesta). This group has been also conventionally depicted from the intelligentsia’s presentism perspective as “pernicious realists” who opted for peaceful cooperation with the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Smoczyński and Zarycki’s presentation concluded by noting that after 1918 the victorious intelligentsia factions introduced a canonical Polish model of citizenship, which has lasted up to the present day. However, the authors added that while we often forget that this was shaped in clashes with bourgeois and aristocratic opponents who left the stage long ago, nonetheless, they also had a significant impact on determining the position of their post-gentry intelligentsia opponents. The authors argued that the classical Left-Right cleavage, in the Polish historical context (embodied by the figures of Pilsudski and Dmowski) was not the only axis of political dispute which gave rise to the modern understanding of Polishness. Similarly, these disputes were not concerned merely with the repertoire of cultural politics, which was typical for the post-gentry oriented intelligentsia mind-set (e.g., national issues, the role of the Catholic Church or ethnic minorities). They

were also concerned with what is less appreciated: the emerging model of Polish citizenship, informed by bourgeois and aristocratic interests focusing on issues beyond the cultural politics.

Conclusion

The output of the interim workshop of the Polish-Hungarian research team (reinforced by a Slovakian scholar) “The Impact of the Noble Legacy in Shaping Citizenship in Central Europe” underpinned our starting hypothesis of the paramount importance of gentry heritage for the mapping of some patterns of contemporary Central European frame of mind. The papers of the workshop grasped the main features of Polish and Hungarian gentry ethos, mentality, political culture and their underlying vocabulary not as a ready-made set of values but in their defensive dynamics against challenges posed by Western political culture, by the exigencies of modern nation-building as well as by their inherent ethnic and social limitations, or by the decline of the Old Europe after WWI. Further research has to decide to what extent its lasting exposure to social challenges contributed to the survival and continual revitalization of gentry ethos in Central Europe. 

TIBOR PICHLER – profesor i dyrektor w Instytucie Filozofii Słowackiej Akademii Nauk. Obszary zainteresowań: historia idei w Europie centralnej, nacjonalizm i słowacka myśl polityczna.

TIBOR PICHLER – professor and director of the Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. Fields of interest: history of ideas in Central Europe, nationalism and Slovak political thought.

FERENC HÖRCHER – doktor filozofii, doktor nauk, filozof polityki i sztuki. Studiował w Budapeszcie, Oxfordzie i Lueven. Jest profesorem filozofii na Katolickim Uniwersytecie Pétera Pázmány'ego oraz dyrektorem Instytutu Filozofii Węgierskiej Akademii Nauk. Prowadził badania w Getyndze, Wassenaar, Cambridge, Edynburgu i na Uniwersytecie Notre Dame w USA.

FERENC HÖRCHER – PhD, DSc, is a political philosopher and philosopher of art. He studied in Budapest, Oxford and Brussels-Leuven. He is professor of Philosophy at Pázmány Péter Catholic University and director of the Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Science. He researched in Göttingen, Wassenaar, Cambridge, Edinburgh and at Notre Dame University, USA.

GÁBOR KOVÁCS – dr, historyk filozofii, pracownik naukowy (senior research fellow) w Instytucie Filozofii Węgierskiej Akademii Nauk. Prowadzi badania w zakresie historii filozofii polityki, nowożytnej krytyki kultury i zielonej myśli politycznej (ekologizmu). Studiował w Budapeszcie.

GÁBOR KOVÁCS – PhD, is a historian of philosophy. He is senior research fellow of the Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. His fields of research are the

G. GÁNGÓ, F. HÖRCHER, G. KOVÁCS, B. MESTER, T. PICHLER, R. SMO CZYŃSKI, T. ZARYCKI

history of political philosophy, modern cultural criticism, and green political thought. He studied in Budapest.

GÁBOR GÁNGÓ – filozof i historyk idei. Profesor w Katolickim Uniwersytecie Pétera Pázmány’ego w Budapeszcie i doradca naukowy. Od 2016 roku jest współpracownikiem Kolegium Maxa Webera Uniwersytetu w Erfurcie.

GÁBOR GÁNGÓ – is a philosopher and a historian of ideas. He is professor at Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Budapest, and scientific advisor at the Institute of Philosophy, HAS, Budapest. Since 2016, he is Fellow at Max-Weber-Kolleg of the University of Erfurt.

BÉLA MESTER – dr, historyk filozofii. Prowadzi badania w zakresie historii myśli politycznej i filozofii węgierskiej. Studiował w Budapeszcie (Węgry) oraz w Cluj ((Rumunia).

BÉLA MESTER – PhD, is a historian of philosophy. His fields of research are the history of political philosophy and Hungarian philosophy. He studied in Budapest, Hungary, and in Cluj, Romania.

TOMASZ ZARYCKI – profesor nadzwyczajny w Instytucie Studiów Społecznych im. Profesora Roberta B. Zajonca (Uniwersytet Warszawski). Prowadzi badania w zakresie socjologii polityki, socjologii kultury, socjologii wiedzy, socjologii krytycznej oraz analizy dyskursu ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem Polski i krajów wschodnioeuropejskich. Ostatnia książka: *Ideologies of Eastness in Central and Eastern Europe* (Routledge, 2014).

TOMASZ ZARYCKI – is Associate Professor and Director of the Robert B. Zajonc Institute for Social Studies at the University of Warsaw, Poland. His research focuses on sociology of politics, sociology of culture, sociology of knowledge, critical sociology and discourse analysis with particular focus on Polish and Eastern European societies. His latest book is *Ideologies of Eastness in Central and Eastern Europe* (Routledge, 2014).

RAFAL SMO CZYŃSKI – dr hab., socjolog z Instytutu Filozofii i Socjologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk jego zainteresowania badawcze oscylują wokół filozofii polityki, teorii dyskursu, socjologii historycznej i normatywnej infrastruktury ekonomii rynkowej.

RAFAL SMO CZYŃSKI – PhD, is a sociologist from Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences. His interest revolves around political philosophy, discourse theory, historical sociology and normative infrastructure of market economy.