



KRZYSZTOF SOŁODUCHA

Generic Concept of Meaning and Hermeneutical Logic by Hans Lipps

The task of logic is to discover the laws of truth

Gottlob Frege

ABSTRACT: The linguistic turn in philosophy of the 19th and 20th century added to the classical question about the constitution of being, the question of language and its role in this process. It also posed a new metaphilosophical question concerning the very status of philosophy and the results of its deliberations, facing the discovery that the linguistic nature of knowledge is its basic exoteric property. In Hans Lipps' philosophy there is a characteristic and symptomatic connection between the conclusions drawn from the linguistic revolution in philosophy, and anthropological, biological and pragmatic threads. The task of this paper, referring to Lipps' considerations, will be to indicate the programme and consequences of such an approach to the theory of language. According to Lipps the judgement is not an exemplification of the state of things. It is the states of things, their properties and their relations that are the product of self-explanatory existence which builds their meanings, thanks to the power of language manifesting itself in the "Konzeption" – the teleological power of language.

KEY WORDS: hermeneutical logic • hermeneutical philosophy • Göttinger Group of Logic • phenomenology

Introduction. Regressive philosophy and theory

The background for our deliberations is going to be a statement on the state of philosophy and humanities at the beginning of 21st century, which is not very encouraging. It reminds us of the situation that Roman Ingarden spoke about in his Norwegian Lectures, when he characterised the motives which guided the creators of the phenomenological movement in philosophy:

First of all, the science of philosophy developed at that time and a regressive philosophy slowly developed, consisting in thinking with the help of other people's thoughts and conceptual apparatus, as well

as their constant processing and supplementing carried out at a great distance from reality and at a certain blindness to its concrete visual form¹.

This dominance of cultivating philosophy through references to tradition and the use of philological methods of interpreting texts still dominates the mainstream of academic philosophy today. As a result, it is becoming the so-called *second culture* – its subject is not a direct experience, but rather the experience of reading, and its problems arise, in fact, exclusively from theoretical tradition and disputes within philosophical schools. This often restricts the flow of new thoughts and ideas to the philosophy practiced on academic campuses and makes it mainly a repository of theoretical tradition. Reality – facts – are interpreted in the classical top-down process, from theory to facts. Theories, in turn, are locked in technically, institutionally and ideologically motivated deliberations.

From the metaphilosophical level, the question of what is really the subject of philosophy remains a problem. Philosophical questions are often considered to be the eternal enigmas of humanity. They have an open and generationally repetitive status, as successive generations enter life and adulthood with the same problems on their lips, in relation to their time. These questions must therefore be answered each time within the context of individual experience of these generations, often outside academic campuses, conservative in nature and submitted to technical and administrative procedures.

However, after the anti-positivist turn in epistemology, we know that there is nothing to be condemned in the world of theory, because the programme of deriving theoretical sentences directly from experience turned out to be a utopia. This is confirmed both by Quine's criticism of neopositivism (especially Carnap), as well as the rationalist (Popper) and the anarchist theory of knowledge (Feyerabend and Kuhn)². According to the real processes of scientific development, understanding experience without theory is impossible. Data is not and cannot be a source of theory, it comes from elsewhere. It appears in the context of discovery, as Popper wrote, and is presented in the context of justification, in a rationalised manner, adapted to scientific procedures.

Creative reference to theoretical tradition and the search for impulses for the development of theory is therefore the only way to practice the abs-

¹ R. Ingarden, *Wstęp do fenomenologii Husserla*, *Wykłady wygłoszone na Uniwersytecie w Oslo* (15 września – 17 listopada 1967), przeł. A. Póltawski, Warszawa 1974, p. 13.

² W. V. Quine, *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*, „The Philosophical Review” 1951, vol. 60, p. 20–43.

tract fields of knowledge. It is much more important to practice theory than to talk about doing it, and it will be revealed from the very work on theory whether the efforts put into its production have been fruitful, or whether it has sufficient exploratory power and will be used as a tool for understanding the data. The fruits of this spontaneous intellectual practice, which in fact are not subject to any rules, are therefore subject to epistemological evaluation, primarily through social criteria, mainly through the impact factor.

Contemporary, measurable academic metrics refer to this conclusion. This often has unexpected consequences. The process of socialising and marketing of ideas often substitutes their production, motivating thinkers to join fashionable trends rather than to undertake risky innovations – difficult to propagate and accept. Another aspect of this statement is the sense of imprisonment in the institutional framework, technical tradition and artificial promotion criteria, which accompany life in campus ghettos. It is sometimes difficult to talk believably about time-updated philosophical problems while living our life as scientists imprisoned in academic discourse and its technical boundaries.

Literature and discovery of constitutional processes

These motives, quite common in the 20th century, were at the basis of actions for affirmation of literature (and generally art) as a discourse alternative to the academic one. Martin Heidegger, for example, did this in the last phase of his work. Heidegger, using the example of Hölderlin, regarded poets as “shepherds of existence” who, thanks to their uncontaminated technical, pragmatic approach, characteristic of both academic and technical life, realise the ideal of *Gelassenheit*, outlined in the 1940s – uncontaminated by will, with a fully passive attitude towards experience, which is to unite with existence without academic or technical symbolic violence and excessive share of will, which bends the object to known categories³. This is probably also influenced by the history of hermeneutics, one of the dreams of which was to achieve a *verbum interius* – full devotion to linguistic baggage of the presumptions we create in the world of everyday life, which cannot be fully unveiled without the use of artistic means. Literature, as a tool for penetrating the social unconscious and reaching out to what is a social taboo, was supposed to be a presentation of the foundations of this unconscious constitution. This idea is a result of the spread of the so-called historical awareness

³ See: M. Heidegger, *Was heißt denken?*, Tübingen 1954.

in the 19th century and the conviction about the influence of socialisation on the categorisation processes.

The rise in the rank of literature and history in philosophy was also due to the career which psychoanalysis made in the 20th and 21st century philosophy. It was, especially in its linguistic version of Lacan, to become a method for discovering social *a priori*. Another way of affirmation of non-discursive tools used to reach the social *a priori* is the so-called apophatic anthropology, which makes language expression a tool of self-knowledge of man. It also promotes the role of artistic means of expression in uncovering anthropological structures through nondiscursive epiphenomena, indirectly pointing to hidden human features, which are not available in direct introspection and reflection⁴.

But is this assumption really correct? Does philosophy really gain an important ally in art? Can artistic tools bring a philosophy of explorative methods which it cannot produce on its own?

There are serious doubts about this (of course skipping the aspect of simply translating philosophy in a nondiscursive way, as in the case of Camus or Lucretius). Art, even poetry, is subject to a very strong pressure of being enjoyed; the form is often more important than the content, and the test of success is the viewer's impression, with the emotions aroused by the work of art, artistic experience, contemplation, pleasure, and imagination being the subject of considerations of the philosophy of art and aesthetics.

However, from the point of view of our goals, the idea of interestlessness and the exclusion of the intellect by contemplation, which appeared closer to us both in Kant and in the theories of Ingarden is confronted with views of Plato, according to which literature and art do not provide any interesting impulses to philosophy and the need to enjoy them ultimately kills the hope of exposing the important cognitive topics. Attractiveness kills the truth in them.

The key role of meaning

The issues outlined above are at the background of Hans Lipps' reflections on meaning. His considerations may create a theoretical framework to help answer the above-mentioned questions.

According to Jaakko Hintikka, contemporary language concepts are divided into two camps. One group of theoreticians treat language as a uni-

⁴ See: E. Paczkowska-Łagowska, *O historyczności człowieka. Studia filozoficzne*, Gdańsk 2012.

versal medium, and for the second camp it is a reinterpretable calculation.⁵ In Hintikka's opinion the first group is represented by Ludwik Wittgenstein, Hans Georg Gadamer, Gottlob Frege and Martin Heidegger.

The second group includes viewpoints of theoreticians such as Ernst Schröder, Leopold Löwenheim and George Boole. According to Hintikka, they are supporters of the classical, correspondence theory of truth.

According to theoreticians treating language as a universal medium, one cannot look at it from the outside, because one always has to rely on a given network of meanings occurring between the language and the world. The meanings cannot be caught linguistically, as they always have to be assumed when talking about them. This thesis leads to the conclusion that semantics is inexpressible, so the relation between the world and the language is impossible to capture, and there is no possibility of creating the necessary metalanguage for this. As in Wittgenstein's famous sentence, everyone is closed in their own linguistic niche, and supporters of such a view must say goodbye to the classic concept of truth. They must accept other concepts of truth, such as social or conventional ones, which can lead to cognitive relativism.

On the other hand, supporters of the theory of language as a reinterpretable calculus assume that one can look at semantic relations from the outside. Breaking relativism is possible thanks to the idea of a metalanguage, and with the use of it is possible to compare the judgement with its object.

The theory of meaning by Edmund Husserl formulated in *Logical Investigations*, which is the point of reference of Lipps' deliberations, also moves within this framework.

Generic concept of meaning in *Logical Investigations*

One of Edmund Husserl's greatest theoretical achievements from the period of *Logical Investigations*, which also helped him to deal with psychologism, is his theory of meaning correlated with the theory of the judgement. According to Husserl, psychologism is supposed to be based on the equation of the judgement with the psychological act of judgement, which results in relativism, i.e. the equation of cognitive processes with a certain casual construction of psychological acts which constitute the basis for them. This psychological belief appears in the philosophical tradition as the so-called naturalistic concept of logic, according to which the laws of this field describe the regularities governing the course of psychological processes. In the

⁵ M. Kusch, *Language as Calculus vs Language as Universal Medium. A Study in Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer*, Dordrecht–Boston–London 1989, p. 3.

work prior to the publication of *Logical Investigations*, in *The Philosophy of Arithmetic*, Husserl formulated a mature programme of psychologism. He did so, first of all, by making the number an immanent object, based on the concept of representation and detaching it from any real sphere, i.e. by blurring the boundary between the subjective and the objective.

These decisions by Husserl were severely attacked by Gottlob Frege, which resulted in the withdrawal of the psychological position and the formulation of a series of antipsychological arguments in *Logical Investigations*.

They are based on the distinction between two types of relationship between representation and object: logical and psychological. The logical relationship is true and requires a strict distinction between the judgement itself, the representation and what the judgement refers to – the state of things⁶. The importance of this distinction is particularly evident in Husserl's deliberations on the modalities of the judgement. According to Husserl, predictions such as "necessity" or "possibility" cannot refer to acts of will, but to the objects themselves, i.e. to the objective states of being. We cannot, as psychologism desires, use subjective psychological processes without a true value.

As written above, the battle against relativism is only possible when we assume that access to the sphere of meanings guarantees access to semantics. We must therefore assume, and this is a transcendental element in Husserl's thinking, that the meanings are ontologically stable entities, and as such they are constant species – genres, to which we refer in every act of issuing a judgement. In Husserl's opinion, meanings are directly accessible thanks to the fact that they can become an object of cognition in the act of categorical visuality – ideation. They are completely language-independent and give logical value to entities of language, graphic and phonetic symbols – creating expressions (*Ausdrücke*), giving them a logical meaning through a special intentional relationship. To mean, in this sense, is to refer to the supposed object through a special type of relationship, a relationship of meaningful intention.

Such an intentional act always refers to generality and thus becomes an exemplification of ideal species. Husserl shows in his research from the period of *Logical Investigations* that intentionality is practically realised on the basis of the conviction that meanings are primary to language, that being

⁶ It should be added that the question of the theory of the Husserl judgement has not yet been closed. New Husserlian is constantly appearing. Volume XL is devoted to the theory of the judgement, and its editor is Robin D. Rollinger.

considered or expressed is something adventurous and accidental for them. Therefore, there are meanings which have never obtained their exemplification and have yet to find their exponent – the discoverer⁷.

For Husserl, the issue of exemplification as a special kind of relationship between meaning and judgement, is of a great importance, as it allows him to avoid the so-called third person problem (indications as to where the idea of similarity comes from, and thus how to define the original notions of the theory of the identity of meaning). However, the commentators' doubts are raised by the ontological status of meanings in his beliefs from the *Logical Investigations* period.

According to some interpreters, Husserl's position can be summarised as the following – types (and thus meanings) exist even when there is no possibility of their exemplification, but they are not of an ideal character, which would show that the theory of meaning from the *Logical Investigations* period is closer to realism rather than Platonism. But if so, if one insists on realism, then the generality must be based on the idea of similarity, which allows for building classes of abstraction on the basis of abstraction operation, but it is not known where this idea of similarity is to come from, and Husserl does not explain this in his *Logical Investigations*. And, since it is necessary to explain the relationship between generality and individuality based on abstraction, there appears automatically an unwanted child of realism understood in such a way – a regression into infinity. In order to avoid theoretical problems, it is better to assume that it is a relation of exemplification of generality based on the so-called idea of the third kingdom, i.e. the conviction that outside the sphere of the body and psyche there exists the so-called third world of meanings and senses. Moreover, in order to avoid the above-mentioned problem of the third person, the exemplification refers to a specific cognitive act, which is an act of ideation, distinguished from abstraction and induction. Abstraction would have to refer to the otherwise taken relationship of similarity, and as we have shown above, such reasoning would lead to regression to infinity. Induction laws, in turn, have a questionable epistemological status, and the results of inductive procedures have only the status of probability, which in turn creates problems with the notion of truth, for which Husserl fiercely fought under Frege's influence. The same can be said for abduction procedures.

This reasoning reveals a clear motive of transcendental philosophy, characteristic for Husserl, which makes his later closeness with Kant seem natural. He assumes that in order to defend certain facts or values, it is ne-

⁷ E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, Vol. II, London 2001, "Fifth Investigation", pp. 77–177.

cessary to make assumptions which justify those values or facts, and which do not necessarily have confirmation in direct experience, even in the broadest sense. This is the case, among other things, with the specific cognitive act already mentioned above – ideation, which Husserl adopted as a crucial assumption necessary in his confrontation with psychologism, and which protects his theory from the above-mentioned problems with the notion of similarity used in the abstract act, which is important for realism. This is also the case with the species and the relation of exemplification.

Therefore, according to Husserl's position described above, there is a relation of exemplification between species and real objects. The meanings are within the judgements themselves, not in the perceptions to which they relate. The subject of the knowledge act – the judgement – is the state of things (current or potential). So, there is an immanent relationship here, and for this reason Husserl needed no transcendent reference to reality. The relation of exemplification is called the generic relation, and this is why Husserl's theory of meaning from the *Logical Investigations* period is called the generic theory, because meanings seem to generate their own exemplifications. This generation is based on turning the general potential of species into the presence of an individual act of judgement – this is a top-down process – individual acts of judgement exemplify meanings suspended somewhere in the third kingdom of potential meanings with an unclear ontological status. In his investigations, Husserl declares that, thanks to his generic theory of meaning, he remains in the immanent sphere, while at the same time building a theory which allows him to deal with psychologism. The question of how semantics is ensured in this project is obvious – in accordance with the request for language as an account. According to Husserl, it does not occur between a cognitive act – a meaning – and a designate object, but between the act, the judgement and the object of that judgement, i.e. the states of things.

The aim of *Logical investigations* and the problem of immanence

The whole concept of the struggle against psychologism, and thus also against Frege's claimed relativism, which was taken up by Husserl, is based on a certain concept of meaning and object of cognition. So, what does Husserl really defend in *Logical Investigations*? In order to answer this question, we have to consider the book itself. *Logical Investigations* is a continuation of deliberations carried out by Husserl in his earlier works, such as *On the Concept of Number* and *The Philosophy of Arithmetic*. As it has already been written, experts on Husserl try to point out that that turn could have

been the result of a devastating review, by Frege, of his book *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, published in 1894. Husserl's antipsychological turn, which dates back to 1894–1896, is temporarily correlated with this paper⁸. At that time he moved from descriptive psychology to descriptive eidetic psychology.

What Husserl postulates in the first part of *Logical Investigations* is the idea of pure logic, which, in his opinion, should be a cure for the problem of relativism he diagnosed as a fundamental issue of both psychologism and empiriocriticism. According to Husserl, science deserves to be called “science” only if it is built on an objective or an ideal relationship which provides a unified objective reference and, in this uniformity, also ideal validity. The basis for this conviction is the unity of the relationship of truths and the relationship of objects which, as Husserl claims, is given *a priori*. This unity is given in a judgement identified with cognition. Thus, in Husserl's opinion, cognition consists of issuing judgements, the objective equivalent of which must be the state of things – features and their relations – without asking about the ontological basis of these features and their relations. In the hierarchy of concepts, which form the basis for categorisation of the cognition process understood in this way, the basic role is played by pure logic, which, in the most general way, covers the ideal conditions for science in general. Hence, the problem of cognition in Husserl's theory lies in the examination of what a judgement means as an effect of a certain cognitive attitude of a logical, and therefore true nature. This is Husserl's commitment to the tradition of the so-called apophatic logic, according to which it is the judgement that is distinguished from cognitive activities by the status of having the logical value of truth or falsity. All the other activities are only an emotional attitude towards the state of things. This is the common use of the term “logic”, both in Husserl's and Lipps deliberations, as well as those of other personalities from this period, such as Gottlob Frege.

Generally saying, in tradition we can identify at least three concepts of logic. Gottfried Gabriel distinguishes between traditional logic – understood as the syllogistic of Aristotle, modern logic, i.e. the account of sets and predicates, founded by Gottlob Frege, and transcendental logic, introduced into tradition by Kant⁹. The modern logic differs from the traditional logic in that it has a completely different logical structure (logical syntax), where in place of the traditional structure a subject/predicate structure or an argu-

⁸ A. Lubomirski, *Dwa antypsychologizmy. Husserl i Frege*, „Archiwum Historii Filozofii i Myśli Społecznej”, t. 34, 1989, pp. 299–310.

⁹ G. Gabriel, *Logik und Leben. Georg Mischs Auseinandersetzung mit der traditionellen Logik*, “Dilthey Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften”, Band 11, 1997–1998, p. 31.

ment/functional structure appears. The second distinguishing feature of modern logic is functional interpretation of the quality of individual and general judgements, according to which quantifications are functions of the second level¹⁰. This opposition of traditional and modern logic is enriched by the Kantian division, which distinguishes the logical theory of elements from the logical methodology. The theory of elements is divided into the theory of concept, the theory of judgement and the theory of reasoning¹¹. These divisions are enriched, as written above, by the distinction between formal and transcendental logic.

The starting point of hermeneutical logic is the theory of judgement, understood as the core of traditional apophatic logic, recognising only the judgment as the place of truth. A characteristic element of this logic is to put the judgement before the notion, as a result of its generally pragmatic character. This is related to the notion of judgement in the western philosophical tradition, and leads to an even more general question of rationalism, for which, since the times of Plato and Aristotle, the seat of truth has been the judgement, and its linguistic form is the declarative sentence. As Gottfried Gabriel points out, both traditional and modern logic are linked by the fact that they use the judgemental concept of truth and thus refer to the ancient tradition of apophatic logic¹².

Hermeneutic tradition does not agree with this, starting from the pragmatic point of view that speech is much richer than just judgemental expressions, and this richness of forms also allows it to perform a true function, as derived from the communicative function. Even the first sentence in biblical tradition has the form of an imperative sentence: "Let there be light", as the creators of this tradition emphasise. For this reason, there are repeated postulates to extend the *Logos*, to enlarge it with other speech elements and include its non-apophatic elements. No wonder, therefore, that in Lipps' reflection the theory of the judgement occupies a considerable place, and his direct polemic refers to the theory of the judgement by Edmund Husserl from the period of *Logical Investigations*. However, before moving on to it, it is useful to consider again for a moment the roots of Husserl's theory, which also show us the sources of immanence category in there. The whole of Husserl's theory of judgements in *Logical Investigations* has its source in his taking over the notion of intentionality from Brentano and Twardowski.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 34.

¹¹ A. Kmieciak, *Logika ogólna i transcendentalna Immanuela Kanta*, „Filo-Sofia”, 2004, nr 1 (4), pp. 27–46.

¹² G. Gabriel, *Logik und Leben. Georg Mischs Auseinandersetzung mit der traditionellen Logik*, op. cit, p. 36.

According to this notion, an intentional relation is a “strange” relation, which does not respect the basic conditions imposed on “non-intentional” relations – the law of mutual substitutability of elements, the law of identity and the law of existential generalisation¹³. By borrowing the notion of intentionality, Husserl hoped to find a solution to the problem of distinguishing a psychological act of cognition from the object/content, and thus to find an immanent sphere which, at the same time, would not have a psychological character. In the case of Brentano, the intentional relation was based on the immanent status of the object of intention, which is aexistential, so it is not concerned with the question of existence or non-existence. It always appears as the second part of the intentional relation, but this existence, as Brentano explains, always has an immanent character. The judgement is superstructured over the performance, but this does not mean that it is in any sense related to the real sphere. The truth or falsity of the judgements is not a matter of hitting or capturing one or another object, but derives from self-evidence. In this sense, the judgement is just an “extension” of the immanent intention of its presentation or denial. The criterion of truth here is not a relation to an external object.

Kazimierz Twardowski attempted to explain the problem of the immanent subject in his dissertation: *On the Content and Subject Matter of the Representations*¹⁴. In his opinion, Brentano mixed up the matter of subject and content, using these two terms interchangeably to describe the same being. According to Twardowski, therefore, there is an immanent content of the representations, which has its object located in a specific sphere beyond being and non-being. The judgement confirms or denies the existence of the subject, and is an extension of the intentionality of the performance. Twardowski’s concept is criticised for its non-intuitive and uncritical assumption, from Brentano’s theory, of existentially indifferent representation and the judgement built over it. Husserl modified it, being inspired by the reflections of his spiritual father, Frege. While Brentano and Twardowski’s theories are called object theories, Frege’s concept is called a mediator theory.

Frege also distinguishes the representation, its content and object, but in the case of an intentional relationship between the content and object, he considers it to be an exemplification of the content of the representation. The content of the representation is a timeless, platonic existence – the meaning there is, among other things, a given way of access to the content of the ob-

¹³ Compare: A. Chrudzimski, *Od Brentano do Husserla. Ontologia intencjonalności*, „Principia” 1997, nr 18/19, p. 71.

¹⁴ K. Twardowski, *O treści i przedmiocie przedstawień*, [in:] *Psychologia w szkole Łwowsko-Warszawskiej*, red. T. Rzepa, Warszawa 1997, pp. 68–85.

ject. Sometimes different meanings can be exemplified by one object (winner from Jena and winner from Austerlitz) and, again, sometimes one meaning can be exemplified by many objects (for example, general meanings like a “horse”). There are also senses which do not have their own exemplification, such as Pegasus.

Husserl’s theory of intentionality combines Twardowski’s and Frege’s solutions. For Husserl, logic is a theory of meanings, and the meaning of an object is a species associated with the content of meaning. Husserl’s solution is considered to be a so-called content theory, in the terms of Smith and McIntyre¹⁵. Psychologism avoids Husserl by introducing the so-called content in specie, which corresponds to the concept of meaning. In Frege’s works this was a reference object called sense. Husserl’s theory from the *Logical Investigations* period is, however, criticised for being full of ambiguities in the relationship between the content of the act in specie and the object in specie, and thus has become the subject of numerous polemics¹⁶. Husserl gradually modified the theory from the *Logical Investigations* period, referring to the concept of the objective introduced by Meinong. In *The Lectures on the Theory of Meaning* from 1908 we have already established the form of the theory of *noemat* and *noesis*. There, after Meinong, he introduces an intermediate area of intention which correlates – *noemates*. All these attempts are, in fact, a struggle with the notion of existence as a predicate, and try to solve the mystery of existence by declaring what it is to declare existence, that is, to judge.

A general strategy in this area is an attempt to find an immanent sphere which would not require recourse to reality and which would make it possible to answer the question of truth as a method of making an accurate statement about existence, according to the classical concept. The solution for this problem is his theory of the state of things – *Sachverhalte*¹⁷. It allows him to hold on to the classic concept of truth without going into the so-called problem of *copula*.

In order to build it, Husserl makes a fundamental distinction between the quality of the cognitive act, the materiality and the content of the act. As it has already been written, for Husserl the relationship between judgement and the act of judgement is an exemplification. The issuing of a specific judgement is an update of the ideal units of meaning, the species to which

¹⁵ D. W. Smith, R. McIntyre, *Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language*, Dordrecht and Boston 1982, Chapter III, §1.2, pp. 93–104.

¹⁶ See: A. Chrudzinski, *Od Brentany do Husserla. Ontologia intencjonalności*, op. cit., pp. 82–83.

¹⁷ See: D. Łukasiewicz, *Stany rzeczy i prawda. Szkice filozoficzne*, Bydgoszcz 2002.

the material aspects of each cognitive act refers. If the judgement of the state of things, i.e. relations and qualities, is filled with the content of the cognitive perception, we are dealing with the true judgement, the confirmation of the state of things. If not, then the state of things established by the judgement is false. However, this statement requires a distance from the act of judgement and looking at it from the outside. This function is to be fulfilled by distinguishing the materiality of the act and the content of the act.

Adolf Reinach's concept of negative state of things and Hans Lipps' hermeneutical logic

Adolf Reinach was an important partner of Edmund Husserl, whom he assisted during his Göttingen period, leading seminars and proseminars, as well as helping in publishing and administrative work. His personal philosophical interests were focused on the philosophy of law and the philosophy of language.

One of Reinach's most famous achievements is his theory of negative judgement contained in the text titled *Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils*¹⁸, which is based on the analysis of meaning in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. It was published for the first time in a special issue of "Münchener Philosophische Abhandlungen" from 1911, and dedicated to Reinach's teacher, Theodor Lipps, then reprinted in the *Collected Works* of Reinach published after his death – Reinach died on the front of World War I in 1917. Lipps refers to this theory in the excerpts devoted to his philosophy of language, particularly from the volume *Untersuchungen zur hermeneutischen Logik*.

Reinach makes fundamental conceptual decisions, which are the basis for his concept of a negative state of things and a negative judgement. As written before, the issue of the state of things is a key element of Edmund Husserl's judgement theory, which was a fundamental element in his treatise with logical psychologism, and from which the whole phenomenology was born. In the advanced theory presented in *Logical Investigations*, the state of things is a subjective correlative judgement, distinguished from the act of judgement defined as a representation.

In his paper, Reinach reconstructs this element of Husserl's phenomenology, at the same time considering a specific issue, which is the problem of the negative judgement. The state of things is, in his opinion, separated from the issue of the existence of the object as a set of features and their

¹⁸ A. Reinach, *Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils*, [in:] *idem, Gesammelte Schriften*, Halle a.d. S. 1921, pp. 56–120.

relationship, which is confirmed or denied in judgement. However, what happens when we find a negative state of things? – or example, when instead of the judgement “The sun is shining”, we deny it, saying: “The sun is not shining”? What do we really say then? This is an old philosophical problem of negation, the roots of which date back to the times of Parmenides and Plato¹⁹.

Reinach’s basic question is whether there is any negative state of things behind the negation – the relevant equivalent of a judgement – or is it just a certain attitude towards a positive state of things – as with the classical approaches to this issue.

The states of things are described by Reinach as objective correlations of the judgements, which are what is confidently recognised in a judgement²⁰. At the same time, the states of things have their own properties – they may remain in the relationship of reason, consequence and modality. Reinach then provides a full definition of the state of things, taking into account the abovementioned properties. He defines them as what is credibly recognised or affirmed in judgement, what is in relation of reason and consequences, what has modal forms and what is in a contradictory relation of positiveness and negativity²¹.

According to Reinach, states of things are perceived or recognised. They are built up over things. Objects which are elements of states of things are perceived, seen, heard or categorised. And on the basis of these “representations”, the states of things themselves are identified in specific new acts²².

Reinach calls this cognitive act, after Husserl, a “categorical eyewitness”. Cognition, or “understanding” is built upon this presence. On the basis of this cognition a belief is built. This statement and belief are called a judgement in Reinach’s deliberations. The state of things is described as an intentional correlate correlation of the judgement. Judgements can be divided into those in which there are relations and those in which there are no relations.

After these preliminaries, Reinach states very clearly that negative states of things happen in exactly the same way as positive states of things²³. In order to define them, there is no need for subjectivisation, as in the case of the interpretation of this issue by classical philosophical concepts. A negative judgement may therefore be regarded as a negative representation

¹⁹ See: A. Toruń, *O negacji*, „Czasopismo Filozoficzne”, lipiec 2007, nr 2, pp. 75–85.

²⁰ A. Reinach, *Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils*, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 69.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 73.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 76.

of a positive state of things, a positive representation of a negative state of things, or a negative representation of a negative state of things. The foundation of a negative judgement in the first case is to take an intellectual attitude towards the state of things, then to get to know the state of things which is not compliant with it, and to capture this inconsistency. In the case of positive perception of a negative state of things, the basis is the necessary connection with a different, positive state of things. As for negative perception of a negative state of things, we are confronted with the build-up of the perception of a positive state of things, and the negative state of things is combined with the positive state of things in a perception of contradictions.

Reinach's deliberations obviously have the theory of Husserl's judgement in the background, and are based on rational assumptions of his phenomenology. That's why it is so easy for him to speak, for example, about positive and negative states of things, on which the judgements about the negative state of things are based.

The states of things in this interpretation by Reinach are, therefore, Meinong objects, so they happen (they do not exist, because we are dealing here with an immanent sphere) independently of the current intention, and in cognitive acts of judgement they are only exemplified or not. Acts of judgement are therefore only an accidental way of capturing features and their relations, independently happening in the so-called third world.

This aspect of judgement theory actually concerns Lipps' criticism and clearly shows the differences between the theory of meaning built within the framework of eidetic phenomenology in the *Logical Investigations* period, and the approach to these issues by thinkers from the circle of hermeneutical logic.

Lipps' critique can be found in the volume of his works entitled *Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis*. First of all, Lipps protests against the recognition of the existence of states of things as independent objects (for example, in the sense of Meinong). According to Lipps, a judgement on something is always based on certain pretences anticipating the language expressions. As a result, Lipps considers, there are no positive or negative states of things, there are only confirmations or negations. In this sense, the language generates its objective correlates, directing the intention to various forms of fulfilment. The movement of language is guided by the concept acquired in the process of immersion of the body in the world (the conception's form is a diagram of forces which affect the body).

There are therefore negative or positive judgements, but there are no positive or negative states of things as belonging to the third kingdom, and their way of existence differentiates from the way in which mental acts

of judgement exist, and from the unspecified, transcendent way in which objects exist in their very own right. It is the morphology of judgements that answers the question concerning the problem of a negative state of things. It is the language that creates objectivity and, from this point of view, the existence of things in itself is only a prejudice, as the difference between analytical and synthetic judgements is (Quine). Lipps' reasoning with regard to states of things is based on Ockham's razor principle.

Why multiply beings unnecessarily and bring to life the immanent sphere of an unreal state of things, since one can refer to the sphere of the unquestionable – existence, language, body and the teleological nature of the processes taking place there. In this sense, Lipps' philosophy is a part of a broader tendency to change the approach to basic epistemological problems, described as a linguistic-communication breakthrough, using the basic thesis about the performative-propositional structure of language²⁴.

Make the mind reasonable

Lipps does not fundamentally reject the cognitive value of the judgement. However, he adds an important definition which distinguishes his judgement theory from the so-called apophatic logic. "Every judgement is a decision"²⁵ says Lipps. Through the judgement, in his opinion, the truth of existence transcends, and it is the fundamental factor in the foundation of the objective reference of all the language.

In Lipps' epistemological deliberations, the basis of every linguistic statement is not an objective state of things, of which it is or is not an exemplification, but a situation understood as an existential situation. This means no less than that the world (*Weltlichkeit*) is not being discovered, as Husserl says, but designed – created linguistically, thanks to the teleological power of the *Konzeption*, as it is called in Lipps' specific language. It is pragmatically optimised by embedding the body in the world, the teleological force guiding the movement of the language. *Konzeption* forms the judgement. This statement, of course, refers to many other ideas and the ideas fundamental for the 20th century philosophy, the most important of which is the decomposition of traditionally understood epistemological subjectivity, which is also related to the history of phenomenological movement. Lipps' theory can be treated as a part of this process, and it is not so far away from Husserl's intentions, contrary to appearances. Husserl, however, as a result of his investigations,

²⁴ See: B. Sierocka, *Krytyka i dyskurs. O transcendentalno-pragmatycznym uprawomocnieniu krytyki filozoficznej*, Kraków 2003.

²⁵ H. Lipps, *Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis*. Frankfurt 1977, p. 39.

comes to his generic and then genetic theory of meaning, referring to the concept of *Lebenswelt*, and Lipps comes to morphology, which has obvious theoretical reasons.

Phenomenology in its programme layer is often interpreted as an affirmation of reason. Husserl wrote about it in *Logical Investigations* and in lectures on logic as a philosophical science of cognition in the years 1910–1911. The investigation of reason should be a study of how we get to know the world, and this is only a condition for getting to know the world itself. The tool to achieve this goal is logic which, according to Husserl, is a normative science leading to good knowledge. Reason is a cognitive power using explicated, supra-individual norms. It was this programme that led Husserl to construct a transcendental reduction procedure as a tool used to focus on methods of immanent description. The epistemological and logical background of these decisions has been described above.

Finally, reason should be pure, idealising watching, passive concentration on the essence without any theorisation or unnecessary speculation. This is the slogan of return to the things themselves, and Husserl's theoretical path later led him to build a programme of "real rationalism", distinguished from the "technical rationalism" of applied science used to build technical devices. One could even say, with a certain risk, that the aim of his late work is to achieve a "real rationalism", renewed because of the visible effects of the "old" technical rationalism, which is becoming unreasonable.

In practice, it is a question of how to go beyond the method of mathematical natural science and speculative philosophy, inspired by the mathematical method. These ideas were to be realised thanks to the idea of an uninvolved description which, in Husserl's intention, was to allow the presentation of qualitative multi-aspects of the world. Over time, however, it turned out that a description is not possible without examination of the very process of the constitution, i.e. how the very objectivity found in the world of life is shaped over time. At the end of his career, Husserl even attempted to build a phenomenological genetic morphology – transcendental logic, i.e. a programme of research on shaping of the consciousness of objects in time. This postulate is very much in line with the programmes of morphology in the hermeneutical version, in which, instead of genesis, the search for an interpretation takes place in the natural medium of cognition, which is language. The decision behind the linguistic expression requires a hermeneutical procedure.

Morphological hermeneutics and genetic method

At the core of Lipps' reflections is the question of the subject-object relationship, which is not natural. It arises from a natural cognitive attitude, as a result of the discovery of *Verschränkung*, as written by Lipps, i.e. finiteness, limitation, timeliness. This discovery is for him a source of natural reflection and motivation to go beyond the world of everyday life and distance oneself from it. But this reflectivity does not lead to pure Self phenomenology, but to language as a reservoir of meanings, which allows the subject who discovers finality to design the world himself. This is done in the process of identifying the subject-object relationship. Heidegger's motifs are clearly a breakthrough in these considerations.

This discovery is made, according to Lipps, thanks to the reference to the pre-reflective whole from which it grows, and which gives the interpretive context of the project. The subject's finality is identifiable only from the point of view of the whole pre-reflective reference, for which the natural medium of manifestation is language as its immanent sphere. Language is here an immanent tool for getting out of the pre-reflective "sticking" with the environment, a life niche built on the basis of homeostasis processes and adaptations referring to evolutionary patterns. For Lipps, an individual existence manifesting itself in language constitutes natural background for the ongoing process of interpretation, thanks to the fact that it allows for the creation of the most important element of the teleological structure of language, i.e. the conception. The subject-object relationship is needed to define a pre-reflective whole, but this relationship cannot be created without the teleological imagination, or conception, which precedes it as a source of the power of cognition. We are facing a hermeneutical circle of complementary elements – a pre-reflective life niche which provides cognitive energy and a language based on an object-subject relationship²⁶. For Lipps, things are what they mean²⁷.

All the language is a reservoir of meanings and, in its mechanics, it refers to the world – the language is *logos semantikos*, writes Lipps, and as such it always refers to something; through its meanings, the identity of objects is built up²⁸. To combine sensuality and intellect is for him the condition for the possibility of meaning without the risk of hypostasis.

In Ogden's triangle, Lipps gives priority to the word, which always refers to a certain, unspoken, preceding intuition – a conception which, as

²⁶ *Idem*, *Untersuchungen zu einer hermeneutischen Logik*, Frankfurt 1977, p. 65.

²⁷ *Idem*, *Die menschliche Natur*, Frankfurt 1977, vol. II, s. 69.

²⁸ *Idem*, *Untersuchungen zur hermeneutischen Logik*, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

energy, demands precision and expression and has a meaningful effect on the horizon in which the expression is moving. The inexhaustibility of this relation between the whole and part is the source of inexhaustible energy of language; it is the source of its infinite power that creates ontologies. Language creates here the anthropological sphere/niche. The meaning becomes in motion and brings to light what becomes a substance (“an den Tag bringen was man *ousia* sein laßt”)²⁹.

The identity of things has its basis only in the identity of existence, which is in constant movement, and is captured only through its manifestations, and indirectly through objectification – including linguistic ones, which are the explication of the conception.

Existence without explication is therefore pure negativity, lack that needs to be completed by language activity. In this sense, existence is not sense, but it becomes permanent³⁰. The philosophy of Lipps is therefore also appealing here, as he calls for the development of existence through the development of the inner word (*verbum interius*)³¹. Lipps even refers here to the Christian tradition, according to which the Bible can only be interpreted without the use of external, distorting factors, since it is structurally clear in itself.

The problem of the example

The issues of language, truth and things in themselves are best illustrated in Lipps' philosophy by two detailed aspects of his deliberations – reflections on the scope of application of the example, and classical ontological reflections on the example of a hundred thalers from Kant's philosophy. Since Lipps somewhat annuls the existence of an objective state of things as unreal objects of the judgement, the question of the example as the exemplification of the thesis occupies a very important place in its deliberations. This topic is discussed by Lipps in the text titled: *Bispiel, Exempel, Fall und das Verhältnis des Rechtfalles zum Gesetz*³².

Lipps' basic question is whether, in a crime with which a lawyer is dealing, there is only an individualisation of the law, a general truth arising from the code regulation, or something which cannot be interpreted (*erläutern*) *in abstracto*, in general.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 124.

³⁰ *Idem*, *Die Wirklichkeit des Menschen*, Frankfurt 1977, p. 57.

³¹ This is underlined by Ludwik Landgrebe in his text: *Das Problem der ursprünglichen Erfahrung in Werke von Hans Lipps*, „Philosophische Rundschau“, vol. 3/4 (1956), p. 66 and following.

³² H. Lipps, *Die Verbindlichkeit der Sprache*, Werke 4, Frankfurt 1977, pp. 39–66.

At the beginning of his deliberations Lipps distinguishes between an example (*Beispiel*), good practice (*Exempel*) and individual events (*Fall*). Examples are used to explain a general thesis. They are educational in nature, and from this point of view it can be said that they were chosen, correctly or not. An example concretises a notion, sets the notion in a specific situation and in this way gives it substance. What's more, there are many examples to illustrate a previous generality, as Lipps writes³³. In the example, the meaning acquires its empiric representation. The example also shows certain aspects of the notion, which are not given in the actual meaning, without an example. These elements of the notion are called modalities (*Modalitäten des Befragens der Dinge*).

In addition, good practice (*Exempel*) is an event whence one can take a pattern from which one can learn something, which will allow for building of a rule leading to the construction of a practical principle which makes it possible to achieve efficiency of action (*Tunlichkeit*). For example, children learn certain behaviours by being told fairy tales. The role of fairy tales is to provide educational material, which is absorbed by the listeners in the form of a story.

In an individual event (*Fall*), in turn, something is exposed that can be repeated, something that can happen anew at any time. There is a unified directness of experience (*Anschauung*) and interpretation (*Auslegung*)³⁴. This directness resembles, according to Lipps, the problem of the hierarchy of what is primary and secondary. In the cognition considered from the existential perspective, it is defined as a manifestation of the whole. What does manifestation within the horizon of existential cognition mean? It means only as much as to be known (*Sich-zu-erkennen-Geben*), uncovered (*ein-Sich-erschließen*), to show the basic sense of existence. Within the framework of the manifestation of meaning, the sense of existence is re-established, while the expression itself causes its meaning to be reinterpreted and changed through expression. Expression of the singularity of an event gives two possibilities – on the one hand, a word, and on the other hand, reinterpretation based on that word.

Discussions on an individual event show a mutual relationship between language, conception and existence. The diversity of life is reflected in it. As in the lens, the whole of its generality is manifested in the singularity of the event. At the same time, this generality is captured from bottom to top, and presented in a completely different, direct way, making it possible

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 41.

³⁴ Here Lipps fully agrees with Kant. See: *ibidem*, p. 39.

to avoid empty, theoretical notions. Existence is not fully included in the notion; there is no reference in the notion to the decisions taken by existence, which indirectly shows their background, the conceptions behind them, and the general beliefs which determine the direction in which these decisions are heading. This is an important element of an activity performed by a lawyer who, in the analysis of individual behaviours and actions, comes to the motives and beliefs behind the act, and may decide about that and no other legal qualification of the act. The same applies to the work of a doctor who, on the basis of symptoms, which are often very vague or do not directly indicate a given disease, must make a diagnosis.

An individual event is considered here in the process from bottom to top (*auf dem Begriff zu*) and not from top to bottom (*vom dem Begriff her*). Thanks to this, in an individual event you can see what is typical of it and what is singular, what is the rule and what is the exception. Lipps considered an example of such proceedings to be worthy of analysis – a court case where there are defendants, prosecutors and judges. Judgements are given in the course of the proceedings, the purpose of which is to link law rules with the individual case. Its goal is not to determine what happened, but rather to reconstruct the individual event on the basis of evidence and testimonies. The trial is therefore an *ex post* procedure, the central figure of which is the judge. Each party in the proceedings presents its own version of the events and, on the basis of the evidence, subsumes the legal record, thus establishing its own version, making the interpretation of the data unambiguous.

Depending on the interpretation of the case and the underlying decisions and motives, the same act may be attributed to different legal systems and to different generalities. This procedure of finding what is general in what is individual does not follow codified rules. Attempts to create them were made within the hermeneutical tradition, but unambiguous rules similar to mathematical rules have never been found.

Elimination of the difference between analytical and synthetic judgements

Thus Lipps reaches his own view, completely different from Husserl's, the theory of judgement. Lipps' reflections on this topic are focused around Kant's famous case of 100 imaginary thalers and 100 real thalers³⁵. Kant uses this example to show that existence is not, in any case, a real predicate. This

³⁵ See: *idem, Untersuchungen zu einer hermeneutischen Logik, op. cit.*, p. 61.

solution to the problem of existence comes from a pre-critical period, from a 1763 letter on the possible proof of God's existence, in which he criticises the classical ontological proof created by St Anselm.

For Kant, existence is a way of synthetically connecting terms in judgement; it is a kind of functor – *copula* – and only such status can be given to it. Therefore, it does not concern the object itself, but the judgements pronounced, and from this point of view these judgements can be divided into apodictic, assertory and problematic ones³⁶. This modal classification of judgements is additional to the classic classification, in terms of content, into analytical and synthetic judgements.

Lipps refers to Kant's deliberations in many places³⁷. In his *Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis*, he critically points out that reducing existence to modality does not allow for the difference between reality and the possibility of individualising a hundred real thalers to be explained. They can have scratches, fractures, cracks – properties which cannot be derived from the notion. Since there is no access to the things themselves, the individualisation of the object can only be achieved through the assumption of the mechanism predicted by Leibniz's monadology, the mysterious parallelism of events activated by the great watchmaker. This criticism concerns both Kant and Husserl, since both assume the immanence of the phenomenal sphere and argue in favour of an ontologically neutral sphere of phenomena.

Individualisation requires the use of experience, but how to do it if the notion cannot draw revitalising juices from the sphere of things in itself? This is only possible by remaining at the level of the language, which refers to an individual conception based on the body. Lipps even calls it a conceptualisation movement, taking place in the process of everyday contact with things. "Something" emerges from existence and within this existence acquires meaning, an identity which is the result of a teleological process. "Something" does not derive its identity from a notion or an idea, but from a conception³⁸.

What happens at this level is the crystallisation of meaning. "Things don't become what they are by their own power" – says Lipps³⁹.

³⁶ I. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Hamburg 1998, p. 184 and followings. About history of modality notion see: G. Chiurazzi, *Modalität und Existenz*, Würzburg 2006.

³⁷ H. Lipps, *Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis*, vol. I. par. 8 i 9, t. II par. 5, *Untersuchungen zur hermeneutischen Logik, op. cit.*, p. 60 and followings.

³⁸ *Idem*, *Untersuchungen zur hermeneutischen Logik, op. cit.*, p. 105, 59 and 67.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 67.

Their identity emerges from meaning and not from object. Through things, the subject discovers itself, browses through them in a Hegelian way, and in it the identities of the discrete objects of experience are rooted. So here we are dealing with their unsubstantiated opinion, and instead of the substance Lipps speaks of their worldly character (*Welthaltigkeit*), in which it predicates the appearance within the framework of a certain worldly modality of language. In this case, the modality is reality (instead of virtuality, for example). This modality is rooted in a concept which teleologically directs its movement at the level of language, while at the level of existence it is a pure movement, a pure activity, the energy of life. It is worth noting that Lipps definitely separates it from the notion of the scheme used by Kant. In Kant's case, the scheme is a frame – a general notion or hypothesis – filled with experiences, subsumptionally pulled under the generality in the scheme, from the previous generality to the following individuality. These considerations are intended to lead Lipps to the conclusion that the basic type of meaning relationship is not the generality-singularity relationship, but the whole-part one, in which the singularity and randomness of existence are the primary data, to which the generated meaning related to a specific linguistic unit, i.e. the conception, refers each time.

Hermeneutical logic in this sense eliminates the difference between synthetic and analytical judgements. This is done by questioning the fundamentals of apophatic logic, within which only the adjudicating sentence can pretend to have a logical value. The scheme of such a judgement assumes that a subject is an empty X, which is completed by predicates. For Lipps, however, this empty X is full of meanings, which in the sentence is only uncovered, realised in the process, and established in objectivity thanks to the teleological power of the language.

X is not nothing, but it is always something. Its meaning does not come from the object through the synthesis of predicates, but is an interpretation of the conception coming from the preunderstanding revealed in the form of a conception teleologically guiding the movement of language. Therefore we are not dealing here with the search for isomorphism of language and the world, but rather with self-explaining of existence, the product of which is the world.

The judgement is not an exemplification of a state of things. The state of things, features and their relations is the product of self-explanation of existence, which builds their meaning. The pre-reflective whole is a horizon manifesting itself in every cognitive act; it is the background of these acts. Therefore, the question arises as to whether the effect of Lipps' analyses is perspectivism with all its consequences.

As some interpreters of Lipps suggest⁴⁰, the aim was to build a theory of meaning which would not introduce an idealistic factor and reject the so-called idea of the third kingdom, and on the other hand explain the problem of communication, i.e. it would not lead to cultural relativism and epistemological solipsism.

According to Lipps, cognition can never transcend the situation. Looking at this from the point of view of the basic function of the sign, which is designation, the meaning is not derived from the object and the object is not a guarantee of the meaning's identity. As in the case of Wittgenstein and Derrida, Lipps' interest is focused more on the sign and not on its derivative object in relation to the function of the designation. However, the assumption of a horizon may have a dual meaning in this case: it may be an ideological fixation or a preunderstanding. This alternative brings back the problem of cognitive attitude – the cognitive approach.

Final remarks. Restoring the myth of empiricism

Lipps rejects the concept of philosophy as the queen of thought – exploring the foundations of cognition – or practicing the art of verbal swordplay, reduced to its formal, sophistic or rhetorical dimension⁴¹.

In return, Lipps puts philosophy back on the ethical project, where truth and knowledge are the basis of good practice, and cognition should be integrated with goodness and not with power or symbolic violence related to the theory of discourse. It is not rhetorical and discursive social competences that should be the goal of philosophy, but ethics and truth, which allow for good performance and maximisation of the adaptive capacity⁴².

In order to achieve this, however, it is necessary to restore the myth of empiricism. This role is to be fulfilled in the tradition of hermeneutics by an attempt to solve the problem of *verbum interius* – an attempt to fully render the object by using a language fully open to the object – corresponding to the notion of *Gelassenheit* in Heidegger, i.e. generating the language directly from data.

It is a reverse tradition to the convictions of critics of neo-positivism, according to whom only theory provides an opportunity to understand the facts. It is created in a mysterious way, in the context of discovery, and is

⁴⁰ See: W. von der Weppen, *Die existentielle Situation und die Rede. Untersuchungen zu Logik und Sprache in der existentiellen Hermeneutik von Hans Lipps*, Würzburg 1984.

⁴¹ It has been developing rapidly since the 1950s thanks to the work of Chalm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tytec, and continues with the so-called „Amsterdam School” by Eemeren and Grootendorst using the concept of pragmadiactics.

⁴² Actually, similar reflections and motives inspired the emergence of a phenomenological movement in the philosophy.

conceptualised through the use of scientific justification procedures – the translation of the intuition into a scientific language with sentences of logical value. This shift in the development of theory to mysterious, non-transparent psychological procedures, makes this area open to manipulation and symbolic violence – this is the effect of methodological anarchism. This moves it to the alley of purely exoteric knowledge – not methodologies.

The development of modern computer science has led to the creation of a bottom-up model of a knowledge generation tool – machine learning. An interesting task is therefore to examine whether its procedures meet the postulate of the traditional ideal of hermeneutics, which is *verbum interius*.

On the other hand, the issue of teleological functioning of language is a matter of shaping the conception – the so-called Humboldt problem. Doesn't the fact of communication and translatability of content assume that there are some processes of universal optimisation in the language? How do these processes take place, and do they not remind us of evolutionary processes which are represented by genetic algorithms? In this way, pragmatics would find a tool to underline the priority over semantics and syntactics. Is the language game an evolutionary game?

The third problem is the passive synthesis itself and the issue of shaping the model of reality, which determines the assimilation of data. Such functioning of our cognitive system is suggested by the findings of the Brain programme and the theory of the so-called Bayesian model of mind. Will the concept of a neuro-machine and the automation of hidden cognitive attitudes research provide an answer to this question⁴³? 

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⁴³ K. Sołoducha, *Analysis of Facial Expression Movements and the Phenomenon of Frontal Asymmetry as the Basis for Automation of the Research of Hidden Cognitive Attitudes. Some Basic Remarks*, "Foundations of Computing and Decision Sciences" 44 (1), pp. 121–133, DOI: 10.2478/fcds-2019-0007

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