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## Dialectic as Socratic Elenchus in Plato's *Gorgias*

### The Sophists' Paradox on the Teaching of Political Virtue (519c–520e)

**ABSTRACT:** This study is an attempt at a logical analysis of Plato's *Gorgias*, 519c–520e, on the teaching of political virtue by the Sophists. The logical construction of Plato's argument is demonstrated on the basis of an earlier article of mine, in which my translation of the excerpt in question differs in three main points from the generally accepted rendition. Based on my suggested interpretation, I analyse the paradox posed by the statement that the Sophists' pupils are just if they act unjustly towards themselves. I continue with a step-by-step examination of Plato's syllogisms, proving that the Sophists are wrong to accuse their pupils of wickedness. In fact, it is the Sophists themselves who are wicked, falsely promising to teach the pupils virtue and make them good and well-living men. This is a deception, since Plato has proven that virtue cannot be taught. In order to confute the Sophists' claims, he uses dialectic and, more specifically, the method of hypothesis. This refutation of the Sophists' claims is similar to Socratic elenchus, by means of which incorrect positions are disproved and the truth is confirmed. Socrates made only one discovery, namely that he knew he knew nothing. His line of argument serves to encourage the interlocutor to strive on towards the truth, and such efforts are typically open-ended.

**KEY WORDS:** Sophists • dialectic • paradox • pragmatic and logical contradiction • analytic philosophy

#### I

This study\* is a presentation of Plato's arguments for confutation of the Sophists' standpoint on the teaching of virtue. His argument is a Socratic

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elenchus through application of the dialectic method. Here it must be made clear that Socrates did not invent dialectic in the strictest sense of the word, namely that of the evidential process conducted with the use of syllogisms. That was the exclusive invention of Plato. Aristotle credits Socrates with inductive reasoning (ἐπακτικὸί λόγοι), i.e. the inductive method, and general definitions (ὀρίζεσθαι καθόλου) (*Metaph.*, XII 4, 1078b). A common element of inductive reasoning and general definitions is the concept of the similar (ὅμοιον) (*Top.*, I 18, 108b 7). Universal definitions are arrived at once the common characteristics of the parts have been discovered (logical analysis). Thus in both cases we have inductive rather than deductive reasoning, i.e. reasoning in itself. This is why Aristotle considers reason, that is syllogism, to be the opposite of induction (*Rh.*, I 2, 1356b 1-2). It should of course be noted that definitions can also be created by way of division or dieresis, as Plato does in his later dialogues and in *Politicus* in particular (material analysis). However, dialectic, which is composed of deduction (παράγωγη) and induction (ἐπαγωγή), i.e. the path to and from the first principles, is purely Plato's achievement. Nevertheless, it should also be regarded as a perfected extension of the Socratic method. My translation diverges from and contradicts the currently prevalent interpretation in important points. I also provide a detailed analysis of Plato's previously obscure syllogisms, as, in my opinion, important parts of the text have been misinterpreted.

Briefly, the difference between my interpretation and the generally held view, which I attempted in my last study, lies in the following three basic points. According to the explanation generally accepted: 1) the students are unjust to their teachers, 2) the subject of the verb telling (ἔλεγον) in the phrase "if they were telling the truth" (εἴπερ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον) is the *Sophists*, and 3) in order for a teacher who teaches anything other than virtue – for example the trainer (παιδοτρίβης) – to be treated unjustly, it is necessary that he must not have agreed with his pupils on the amount of fees. Given that the teacher is in opposition to the pupil – the first one gives while the other takes – as are Plato and the former representing philosophy and dialectic while the latter stand for the antithetical aims and methods of Sophistic and eristic debate, it is natural and reasonable that the two versions should oppose each other.

This opposition is apparent in another way. Specifically, the following two alternatives are possible: in the first extract the pupils are unjust either to their teachers or to themselves or to both, while in the second the subject of the verb telling is either I or the *Sophists*. In both cases, however, there is an antithetical relationship between I and the other, as the other may be anyone other than myself. Finally, in the third extract the contradiction

is obvious, since, according to the different readings, the trainer has either made an agreement with his pupil or not. Thus, at the same points in the translation it is my belief that: 1) the pupils are unjust to themselves, 2) the subject of telling is *T*, i.e. Plato, and 3) it is a necessary condition, in order for the trainer to be treated unjustly, that he should have made an agreement with his pupils. It is obviously impossible for contradictory interpretations to reflect the true meaning of Plato's words, as the most basic law of logic, non-contradiction, is broken. As it may appear during the course of this analysis, existing explanations twist the philosopher's true meaning. As a result, not only do we lose sight of dialectic, the quintessence of philosophy; we are also given a false picture of this great thinker.

The question here, therefore, is to what extent we can be certain of the soundness of interpretation of a philosophical text in general and of Plato in particular. The main object of this study is to present his dialectic, chiefly in the form of hypothesis, which exists in a latent state. This form of hypothesis is used to confirm or refute proposals.

The extract poses the following problem:

1. The Sophists, who claim to be teachers of virtue, often accuse their pupils of acting unjustly towards themselves by depriving their teachers of their fee and not returning other services done to them, in spite of having benefited from these services.

This accusation arises from the following, more general formulations:

2. If the pupil has benefited from his teacher's services, by becoming virtuous, he must return the service. If he does not do so, by depriving his teacher of the fee and being ungrateful towards him, he essentially acts unjustly towards himself, since he has behaved wickedly to his teacher.

The following statements are simpler and more general:

3. If one is benefited, one should return the benefit. Otherwise one acts unjustly. Plato does not question this allegation. What is uncertain, however, is when one returns the benefit and, in the final analysis, when one can be said to benefit another person. The question, therefore, is under what circumstances the action of benefaction takes place and when one is ungrateful. A similarly structured question was raised in *Meno* (89d), where Plato disputes whether virtue is knowledge. He does not, however, question the validity of the hypothesis: "If virtue is a science, that is knowledge, it could be taught". If the Sophists' claim is accepted, the following paradox results:

4. The pupils are just if, in this case, they are unjust to themselves. Therefore, in this case, in order for the pupils to be just, it is necessary that they should be unjust to themselves. Thus the first contrariety emerges. The Platonic text in question could be interpreted as follows. The Sophists accuse

their pupils of, in effect, acting unjustly towards themselves by depriving the former of their fee. This further means that the pupils – although they have become virtuous through the Sophists’ teaching – give the impression by this thoughtless, rash behaviour that they are not just and virtuous, which they in fact are. Thus they present a false picture of themselves.

The Sophists use this argument in an attempt to defend themselves and consolidate their position. In spite of this, Plato considers it groundless and untenable; he goes on to refute it, thus revealing the deception being practised on Athenian society. The philosopher considers this deception the responsibility not so much of the Sophists but of a) the young who pay their fees, b) their parents and guardians, who allegedly permit unsuitable people to teach the young virtue, and c) above all, the city authorities, who allow the Sophists in when they should chase them out (*Men.*, 92a-b). Thus, the greatest responsibility is that of the cities, since when they are injured, the injury is spread onto all their citizens (*Lg.*, VI 768a). Therefore, the pupils are not unjust to their teachers, but vice versa. This dispute highlights not only the difference but also the diametrical opposition of platonic and sophistic philosophies, appearance (φαίνεσθαι) and being (εἶναι), true opinion (ἀληθῆς δόξα) and knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). According to Aristotle, sophistry is apparent wisdom as opposed to philosophy, which is the actual wisdom. (*Metaph.*, III 2, 1004b 17-27, *Rh.*, I 1, 1355a 9). This means that their thinking moves on two different levels in different or opposite directions.

The above paradox is very similar to that of the “liar”, a popular subject in ancient Greek thought (Eubulides of the School of Megara, Plato *etc.*). It is analysed by Aristotle in the *Sophistical Refutations* (A 25, 180b 2–8), where he says that one cannot tell the truth and lie about the same subject simultaneously. When one is said to tell the truth and lie at the same time, it is difficult to distinguish when one is telling the truth or lying in general. There is nothing therefore to stop someone’s words being lies in general but true in a specific sense, although the speaker is not generally truthful. Modern researchers who have studied this paradox include B. Russell and W. Quine.

Plato, however, who does not accept the truth of the Sophists’ claim, focuses on the fact that the pupils act unjustly towards their teachers by withholding their fee and being ungrateful. However, the fact remains that, in this case, a necessary requirement for the pupils to be unjust to themselves is for them to be unjust to their teachers. According to popular opinion, the reverse does not apply; it is not necessary for someone to act unjustly towards himself in order to be unjust towards his teachers. In order for this to happen, the man who has acted unjustly must be admittedly just and good. In every case, however, the pupils who act unjustly must therefore have injustice

within them. This is why Plato speaks of “unreasonable reasoning” (λόγον ἀλογώτατον), and formulates the following paradox through this oxymoron:

5. “Now, what can be more unreasonable than this plea? That men, after they have supposedly been made good and just, after all their injustice has been rooted out by their teachers and replaced by justice, should be unjust through something they have not?”

This phrase is equivalent to the following hypothesis:

6. It would be a most unreasonable thing for men, and specifically for the Sophists' pupils, if they were unjust through something they have not, given that they have become just and good, having had injustice rooted out with the help of their teacher and replaced by justice.

The following phrases are logically equivalent:

- a) The Sophists' pupils have become good and just.
- b) The Sophists' pupils have discarded injustice and gained justice.

7. This hypothesis leads to the following syllogism:

If people are just, they are unjust neither towards themselves nor others.

a) The pupils have become just, because with the help of the Sophists' teaching they have rejected injustice and acquired justice.

b) Therefore the pupils have nowise been unjust to either their teachers or themselves, and are therefore not wicked.

8. If they are nevertheless unjust, this means that they have not become just. This is proven by the following syllogism:

a) If the pupils have become and remain just and virtuous, they have not been unjust.

b) But the pupils have been unjust to their teachers by depriving them of their fee.

c) Therefore the pupils neither were nor are just and virtuous, but wicked.

Plato wishes to show that, if the Sophists' claim – that their pupils have become just and virtuous – is true, then they are unjustly accusing the latter of wickedness; this would be self-contradictory, since a virtuous (ἀγαθός) and just person is good rather than wicked, evil or unjust. Thus, according to the Sophists, in this case their pupils are both just and unjust. They are just if they are unjust towards themselves, and unjust if they are not. The following paradox has arisen:

a) If the Sophists' claim that their pupils are just is true, then the latter must necessarily be unjust towards themselves;

b) If the opposite claim – that their pupils are wicked and therefore evil and unjust – is true, then the latter must necessarily not be unjust towards themselves.

This position may be summarised as follows:

- a) The pupils are just, if they are unjust towards themselves, and
- b) The pupils are not just or are unjust, if they are not unjust towards themselves.

However, this further means that:

- a) If the pupils are unjust towards themselves, they are just.
- b) If the pupils are just, they are unjust towards themselves.

Here we see that the above hypotheses can be reversed and are therefore materially equivalent. Thus the paradox they constitute can take this final form:

9. The Sophists' pupils are just if and only if they are unjust towards themselves. This paradox violates the basic principle of intellection, which Aristotle called 'most certain' (βεβαισιτάτη) (*Metaph.*, III 3, 1005b 17-24). Plato justifiably points out this obvious violation and consequently considers the Sophists' claims to be false. According to him, contradictory facts on the same subject seen from the same viewpoint cannot co-exist (*R.*, IV 436b, 439b). The following example is also an eloquent one (*R.*, III 408c): ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὰ προειρημένα οὐ πεισόμεθα αὐτοῖς ἀμφοτέρω, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θεοῦ ἦν, οὐκ ἦν, φήσομεν, αἰσχροκερδῆς· εἰ δ' αἰσχροκερδῆς, οὐκ ἦν θεοῦ. Here the Athenian philosopher says that, after what has been said before, we cannot believe both their tales; if Asclepius was the son of a god, we shall maintain that he was not covetous; if he was covetous, he was no son of a god. Here it is implied that covetousness is inconsistent with the concept of godhood; therefore only one of the two can hold true. This argument is similar to that in the excerpt under discussion. "Just" and "unjust" are not complementary.

10. Plato's paradox finally takes the following form:

"Does it not seem unreasonable to you for a man, if professing himself to have made another good, to blame him for being wicked in spite of having become and remaining good?" The Sophists' phrase that their pupils remain good and just, arises from their claim that their pupils act unjustly towards themselves, since this is the one condition which has to be fulfilled in order for them to remain good. The fact that the Sophists demanded money from their pupils is "confirmed" by their view that they made their pupils good. Otherwise they would not have made that claim. A few lines further on, Plato draws the conclusion, that, according to the Sophists' claims, their pupils have not only become good due to them, but they also remain so (519e 4-5). The fact that the Sophists have not abandoned that claim is proven by the fact that their pupils are accused of not paying their fees. This again presupposes that they made an agreement to be paid by their pupils almost simultaneously with the "delivery" of virtue, that is, after making the pupils good and just – if

we draw an analogy with what is said about teaching things other than virtue (520c). The fact that the Sophists believe their pupils to have become virtuous arises from their claim to have benefited the latter. This is also demonstrated by the participles “depriving” (ἀποστεροῦντες) and “not rendering” (οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες), meaning depriving others of what was promised and not rendering what is owed.

At this point (*Grg.*, 464b), Plato feels compelled to define the relationship between sophistic and rhetoric more clearly, as he considers these to be interrelated and similar subjects. He juxtaposes them within the wider framework of the two basic arts concerning the healing of body and soul respectively. He does not have a general name to hand for the former, but the latter is called politics, and is subdivided into sophistic, rhetoric, legislation and judicature (σοφιστική, ῥητορική, νομοθετική, δικαστική). The first art, the one concerning the body, is subdivided into gymnastics, medicine, self-adornment and cookery (γυμναστική, ἰατρική, κομμωτική, ὄψοποιική). Plato uses geometrical analogies directly connected to dialectic, since this makes them all one. However, that whole, i.e. the one, is the Good (ἀγαθόν), which Plato calls the end (τέλος) of dialectic (*R.*, VII 532a-b, e, 540a). I will now go on to interpolate this *exkursus* from Plato's usual train of thought.

Plato considers the orators to be very close to the Sophists. What the Sophists do regarding their pupils, the orators do to a far greater extent, since they declaim demagogically through the whole city. Orators and Sophists differ as to their nature, but due to their many similarities and contiguous qualities they are wrongly considered to be one and the same (*Grg.*, 465c, 520a). A parallel is also drawn between the behaviour and work of the Sophists and that of the orators who, although they claim to guard the city and care for it in order to make it perfect, accuse it of being utterly wicked. Plato therefore feels the need to define the relationship of sophistic to rhetoric more precisely, determining the ratio of one to the other both within the framework of personal and social life, and in relation to the care of body and soul.

In order to achieve this, Plato uses gymnastics and medicine for the care of the body, and judicature and legislation for that of – particularly the political – soul. He asserts, without clear justification, that sophistic is better than rhetoric. The reason for this may easily be found in the context. Both sophistic and rhetoric harm the city, and their disciples are therefore wicked. However, the orators cause more damage because they corrupt the whole city, while the Sophists only corrupt individuals. The lesser of two evils is thus, relatively speaking, good, as Aristotle maintains: “the lesser evil is good” (τὸ μείον κακὸν ἀγαθόν πως εἶναι, *EN.*, V 1, 1129b 3). Plato gives the following equality of ratios: any relationship between sophistic and rhetoric will

also exist between judicature and legislation, and between gymnastics and medicine, because they have the same ratio.

This equality of ratios is expressed as follows:

$$\frac{\text{sophistic}}{\text{rhetoric}} = \frac{\text{judicature}}{\text{legislation}} = \frac{\text{gymnastics}}{\text{medicine}}$$

This representation poses an apparent problem which should be clarified. A few pages earlier in the same dialogue (465c) different terms were used: sophistic was compared to legislation rather than rhetoric, while rhetoric was compared to justice, which is another name for judicature. The relationship of gymnastics to medicine is also presented differently. In this earlier passage Plato formulates these two analogies:

$$\frac{\text{self-adornment}}{\text{gymnastics}} = \frac{\text{sophistic}}{\text{legislation}} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\text{cookery}}{\text{medicine}} = \frac{\text{rhetoric}}{\text{justice}}$$

However, a closer examination of this mathematical equation shows that Plato, as an excellent geometrician, is in fact saying the same thing in a different way. Based on a fundamental quality, the four terms of an equation are interchangeable, as Aristotle says (*EN.*, 1131b 5-7). The relation between self-adornment and cookery is omitted in the first equality of ratios.

If it is added, we have the following equation:

$$\frac{\text{sophistic}}{\text{rhetoric}} = \frac{\text{legislation}}{\text{judicature}} = \frac{\text{gymnastics}}{\text{medicine}} = \frac{\text{self-adornment}}{\text{cookery}}$$

This is equivalent to the previous equation due to the fact that the terms in all four equations are interchangeable. These four terms can also be put into pairs to become two analogies. An additional proof of the equivalence of this logical equation is supplied by Plato's suggestion that gymnastics is the counterpart of (*ἀντίστροφον*), or corresponds to legislation, medicine to justice and rhetoric to cookery (*Grg.*, 464b, 465e). From this we conclude that sophistic corresponds to self-adornment, since these are the only terms omitted. Therefore, Plato is saying the same thing in a different way.

If we use their initials to represent these eight functions of body and soul, the mathematical equations will become clearer:

S = sophistic, R = rhetoric, L = legislation, J = judicature, G = gymnastics, M = medicine, C = cookery, A = self-adornment.



According to 465c, we have:

$$\frac{A}{G} = \frac{S}{L} \text{ and } \frac{C}{M} = \frac{R}{J}$$

According to 520b,

$$\frac{S}{R} = \frac{L}{J} = \frac{G}{M}$$

in which  $S > R$ ,  $L > J$ ,  $G > M$ , as, for example, sophistic is better than rhetoric. This difference is greater than one  $>1$ .

From this triple equality of ratios we take the first two pairs and form the following equation:

$$\frac{S}{R} = \frac{L}{J}$$

Reversing the terms, we have:

$$\frac{S}{L} = \frac{R}{J}$$

Since, according to Plato,

Thus there is an equality of four ratios:

$$\frac{A}{G} = \frac{S}{L} \text{ and } \frac{C}{M} = \frac{R}{J}, \text{ then } \frac{A}{G} = \frac{C}{M} \quad \frac{A}{G} = \frac{S}{L} = \frac{R}{J} = \frac{C}{M}$$

It is worth noting that Plato uses the form of analogy which he calls the “best of bonds” (κάλλιστος δεσμός), which makes itself one with the things it connects (*Ti.*, 31c-32a). The one (έν) is the Good (άγαθόν), and most probably dialectic itself. However, good is the unhypothetical principle, the άρχή άνυπόθετος, an essential element of dialectic, since it is the basic reference point on the road of dialectic (*R.*, VI 511b-c). Subsequently, dialectic is visible when using the method of synthesis and diaeresis, since this reciprocal movement is observed in the analogy. With this digression on rhetoric on the one hand and dialectic as synthesis and diaeresis on the other, we return to the Sophists and the other form of dialectic, namely hypothesis.

The original question as to whether one can justifiably claim to have benefited another when one is proven ungrateful, is examined though the following hypotheses:

11. “I have always regarded public speakers and Sophists as the only people who have no call to accuse the people that they themselves educate of being wicked; as otherwise they must, in the same words, be also charging themselves with having been of no use to those whom they say they benefit”.

This extract is equivalent to the following hypothesis:

12. If Sophists, who claim to be the only teachers of virtue, accuse their pupils of being wicked, they should, following the same reasoning, accuse themselves too, as they have not benefited those whom they say they benefit. The phrase “Sophists are the only people who claim to be teachers of virtue”, is changed into “If certain people claim to be teachers of virtue, they are the Sophists”, which in turn means: “All those who claim to be teachers of virtue are Sophists”.

The above reasoning leads to this:

13. If the Sophists do not accuse themselves, they cannot accuse their pupils.

In other words, the Sophists should also accuse themselves of wickedness. The fact that they are wicked, as Plato says in *Meno* (96a), emerges from the Sophists’ own words, if their pupils reverse these according to the model provided by Corax and Teisias, or by Protagoras and Euathlos. These are the famous reciprocal arguments (*argumenta reciproca*). The Sophists’ accusation that their pupils are wicked because they deprive them of their fee can be reversed; the pupils may call their teachers wicked because the teachers are acting unjustly towards them.

The pupils could speak as follows:

14. If we do not pay the fees, it is certain that you have been wicked and unjust to us, for the following reasons:

a) You have not made us virtuous and just, as you promised. Otherwise we would pay you. The fact that we refuse to pay you proves that you have not made us virtuous. Thus, you are acting unjustly towards us in demanding a fee from us and accusing us of being unjust to you. Consequently, you are wicked.

b) If you have made us virtuous and just, as you claim, you wrong us again when you accuse us of being unjust to ourselves; a just man does not act unjustly either towards himself or others.

Plato continues with the following hypothesis:

15. If the above reasoning were cogent, that the Sophists cannot accuse their pupils of wickedness without applying the same accusation to themselves, it is obvious that only the Sophists would be allowed to confer the benefit on their pupils without payment. This section, where we have probability (εἰκόζ) – just as below where we have a sign (σημείον) – is a brief syllogism or enthymeme (ἐνθύμημα); according to Aristotle these words form a brief syllogism (*Apr.*, II 27, 70a 3–11; *Rh.*, II 24).

16. The above hypothesis leads to this syllogism:

a) If I were telling the truth – that only the Sophists cannot accuse their pupils of wickedness without applying the same accusation to themselves,

then only the Sophists would be allowed to confer the benefit on their pupils without payment.

b) But I was telling the truth.

c) Thus it is obvious that only the Sophists are allowed to confer the benefit without payment.

17. The fact that I was telling the truth arises from the following syllogism:

a) If the Sophists promise to benefit their pupils for payment and, specifically, to make the latter just and virtuous, and then demand a fee without having kept their promise – i.e. without having benefited them – then they should also accuse themselves of being partly responsible.

b) The promise has not been kept, since the pupils have not become virtuous. This is proven by their refusal to pay the fees.

c) Therefore, the Sophists should also accuse themselves.

This means that, in order to escape the impasse they reached, the Sophists should teach without payment. This option was open only to them, as they alone claimed to teach virtue; no one else claimed to do so. In this case, since material gain and profit would be absent, the question of injustice versus justice would not arise. Plato goes on to refer to those who teach anything other than virtue, and sets forth the following hypotheses:

18. If teachers who taught anything other than virtue offered their services to their pupils (e.g. by making them fast runners) without receiving payment almost at the moment of rendering the service, although they had agreed on the fees, then the pupils could only deprive them of their benefit on condition that they were unjust rather than just.

Thus the three preconditions mentioned above are necessary, but not sufficient. It does not therefore necessarily follow that, if a man does not pay his teacher for a service rendered, he deprives him of the benefit; there may be other reasons for his not paying, such as impoverishment, illness, an accident or circumstances beyond his control. In general, when there are causes independent of his volition, he does not withhold the benefit even if the above conditions are fulfilled. For this reason Plato considers withholding of the fee possible rather than certain, a fact expressed through the potential optative (ἵσως ἂν ἀποστερήσειε τὴν χάριν). The teacher will be deprived of the benefit if the pupil is unjust and receive it if he is just. In the former case the pupil proves ungrateful, while in the latter he is grateful. Withholding of the benefit, therefore, concerns any rendered service other than that of virtue. Plato's conclusion that someone who has been taught anything other than virtue may withhold the benefit is proven by the following syllogism, on which the truth of the above hypotheses is based:

19.

a) If someone is unjust, he may act unjustly.

b) If someone is taught anything other than virtue, injustice is not taken away from him (if he was unjust in the first place); only the opposite of the specific quality he has been taught is taken away. If, for instance, someone has become fast, it is not injustice (the opposite of justice) that is taken away, but *s l o w n e s s*, which is the opposite of *s p e e d*. In this case, therefore, he continues to be unjust.

c) Thus, if someone has been taught anything other than virtue, he may act unjustly (i.e. deprive his teacher of the benefit) if he originally carried injustice within himself which was not taken away; he may therefore act unjustly.

As this hypothesis provides the cause, it proves the preceding ones; their authority is derived from it, thereby revealing the causal nexus. Plato goes on to examine what happens when one teaches virtue.

20. He sets out two hypotheses which are equivalent, and therefore one:

a) If one takes away injustice from another person, one need not fear being unjustly treated.

b) If one really has the power of making people good, that benefit alone may be freely bestowed without risk.

These two hypotheses are in fact one, as there is corresponding material equivalence between the following statements, based on which the two hypotheses become one:

c) "If one removes injustice"

d) "If one really had the power of making people good"

These statements are also equivalent:

e) ... one need not fear being unjustly treated.

f) ... that benefit alone may be freely bestowed without risk.

Thus, Plato phrases the same hypothesis in two different ways, and goes on to expound the position on giving advice on both virtue and other subjects, with and without payment.

21. There is no disgrace in taking money for giving advice on subjects other than virtue, such as "building." The phrase "advice on subjects other than virtue" (*ἄλλας συμβουλίας*) means, "all advice other than that concerning virtue". This can further be translated as "no advice on virtue" and "all advice on non-virtue".

22. It is a disgrace for a man to decline to give advice on virtue except for a payment in cash, perhaps because he does not possess virtue in the first place, but only claims to have it.

23. The reason is that this – giving advice on virtue – is the only sort of service which makes the person so served desire to render one in return.

This gives rise to the final hypothesis, which proves all the previous ones; this is why it is called the “unhypothetical principle” (ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος, *Rep.*, VI 511b 6–7) and “sufficient” (ἰκανόν, *Phaed.*, 101c 1). It is the one from which all previous hypotheses derive their authority.

24. If the benefactor receives in return a roughly equivalent service from the beneficiary, then it is a good sign that he has served the latter; otherwise it is not.

The meaning of the sign (σημείον) is surmised from Heraclitus' phrase (*Fr.* 93), that the Oracle “neither tells nor hides, but signifies” (οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει). This is an enthymeme (ἐνθύμημα), as we have seen.

This implies that return of the service is neither a necessary nor a sufficient precondition for one to claim he has benefited another. This is because there may be gifts and return services proceeding from wicked rather than honest motives. Laocoon's phrase in Virgil's *Aeneid* concerning the Trojan horse has become proverbial: “Beware of Greeks bearing gifts” (*Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*). Nor can non-return of the service be considered proof that the person has not benefited, as he is either ungrateful or unable to fulfil his commitment.

The phrase “otherwise, not” (εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ) is analysed in the following hypothesis:

25.

a) If the benefactor does not receive in return a roughly equivalent service from the beneficiary, it is not a good sign that he has benefited him.

b) The Sophists did not receive an equivalent service from the pupils they claim to have benefited.

c) Therefore, it is not a good sign – in other words it is not probable – that the Sophists have benefited their pupils.

This means that it is not only uncertain, but actively improbable that the Sophists have benefited their pupils; in other words, that they have taught them virtue and made them virtuous, eliminated their injustice and instilled justice in them. From this we conclude that the Sophists' claim to be teachers of virtue is baseless, since there is no “sufficient proof” (ἰκανόν τεκμήριον, *Gorg.*, 487d 4), i.e. no reasoned defence.

These facts result from the general rule on the criteria of benefiting referred to above. Plato's earlier remarks apply, more specifically, to the teaching of virtue: this is the only secure benefit and there is therefore no danger that the benefactor may be treated unjustly by withholding the benefit. Thus, it is certain beyond doubt that whoever teaches virtue in such a way as to

make his pupils virtuous, will be repaid by return of the benefit. Based on this reasoning the following syllogism may be constructed:

26.

a) If one teaches virtue, making one's pupils virtuous, then one will certainly not be treated unjustly; this means that the service owed will be rendered to one.

b) By deliberately depriving their sophist teachers of the fee, the pupils have not returned the service owed.

c) Therefore, the Sophists have neither taught virtue nor made their pupils virtuous.

In *Meno*, Plato uses a different syllogism to prove that the Sophists are not teachers of virtue, and that virtue cannot be taught. It is finally proven that men become virtuous by divine fate. We will refer to these syllogisms further on. In *Meno* (96a-b), Plato proves that the Sophists are not teachers of virtue for the following reasons: 1) they are not recognised as such by others, and more specifically by their pupils; 2) they do not know what virtue is, and 3) they are wicked with regard to the subject they profess to teach, i.e. virtue. These are the three preconditions which must be fulfilled in order for someone to be called a teacher of virtue. The Sophists do not meet any of these requirements; therefore they cannot be called teachers of virtue. It is worth noting here that wickedness, the characterization which the Sophists used to apply to their pupils, has now turned against themselves; they are called wicked. The hypothetical syllogism in this context could be expressed as follows:

27.

a) If one is a teacher of virtue one must: 1) be recognised as such by his pupils; 2) know what virtue is, and 3) not be wicked.

b) The Sophists, who claim to be teachers of virtue, do not meet any of these requirements.

c) Therefore, the Sophists are not teachers of virtue.

Plato goes on to prove that even those who are accepted as virtuous, good men (καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί) are not teachers of virtue. They claim that virtue can sometimes be taught and sometimes not. Consequently, based on this admission, we cannot draw the required conclusion that virtue can always be taught. Thus, good men as a whole are not teachers of virtue. It is obvious that good men fulfil only one and a half of the three conditions necessary for someone to be called a teacher of virtue. The one is that they are not wicked and the half is that they are not always accepted as teachers of virtue, but sometimes are accepted and sometimes not. As not all of the necessary conditions are fulfilled, good men cannot be called teachers of

virtue. However, only these two categories of people, the Sophists and good men, could be called teachers of virtue in part. Therefore, if these two groups of people cannot teach virtue, there is no one else who could do so. Thus Plato formulates the following hypothetical syllogism (*Men.*, 96b):

28.

a) If there are teachers of virtue, they can only be those who claim to teach it, i.e. the Sophists or good men.

b) It has, however, been proven that neither the former nor the latter are teachers of virtue as a whole.

c) Therefore, there are no other teachers of virtue.

Since there are no teachers of virtue, Plato concludes that virtue cannot be taught. Here it should be noted that if someone is a teacher of virtue, it follows that he makes his pupils "virtuous". In other words, all pupils taught virtue become virtuous without exception. If only some, and not all of them become virtuous, this means that virtue cannot be taught. (In other words, the teaching cannot be held wholly responsible for the result.) This results from the phrase "If it can sometimes be taught and sometimes not" (*Men.*, 96b), from which it may be concluded that other factors enter into the equation.

Finally, Plato proves that virtue is acquired through divine fate. He had previously tried to prove whether virtue could be taught or not with the use of a different method, but abandoned the attempt after encountering insurmountable difficulties. To be precise, he formulated the hypothesis that: "If virtue is knowledge, then it could be taught, otherwise it could not." (*Men.*, 87c). In the course of his investigation he expressed his reservations and said that he did not believe virtue to be knowledge. His distrust is expressed in the following hypothesis:

29. If there is something good, and yet separate from knowledge, possibly virtue would not be knowledge. But if there is no good which is not contained in knowledge, it is most probably knowledge (*Men.*, 87d).

This question remains unanswered and the syllogism is not completed. In spite of this, however, Plato continues to believe in the validity of the above hypothesis, namely that if virtue is knowledge, then it could be taught, otherwise it could not (*Men.*, 89d). In spite of its failure, this hypothesis indirectly has a successful outcome; it establishes that virtue is wisdom in part and not as a whole. This indicates that men are not good by nature. Thus we have the following syllogism:

30.

a) If virtue is wisdom, either in whole or in part, then men do not become good by nature (*Men.*, 89a), because wisdom is reason (*λόγος*) and intellect (*νοῦς*) (*Lg.*, XII 963e).

b) Virtue is partly wisdom, since wisdom is one of the four parts of virtue: courage, wisdom, temperance and justice (ἀνδρεία, φρόνησις, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη) (*Prt.*, 359a-b; *Phd.*, 69b-c).

c) Thus men do not become good by nature (*Men.*, 89a).

However, the major premise of this syllogism, i.e. “If virtue is wisdom either in whole or in part, men do not become good by nature”, is not self-evident, but needs to be proven.

The following hypothesis may therefore be expressed as follows:

31.

a) If wisdom is a part of something, then that thing cannot be acquired by nature.

b) Wisdom is a part of virtue.

c) Therefore, virtue is not acquired by nature.

This means that the concepts of wisdom and virtue are not co-existent but subordinate, since one is contained within the other. If, on the contrary, these concepts were coexistent, in other words, if virtue as a whole were knowledge, as Protagoras claimed (*Prt.*, 361b), then it could be taught and therefore would not be acquired by nature. Based on the question whether virtue as a whole is wisdom, Plato formulates the following hypotheses:

32.

a) If virtue can be taught, it is wisdom.

b) If virtue is wisdom, it can be taught.

These two hypotheses are not logically interchangeable, and therefore they are not logically, but only materially equivalent. On these grounds, Plato proves that men do not become good by nature. However, he has proven that men do not become good through learning, either, since virtue cannot be taught. Based on these two conclusions, Plato reaches the final conclusion, namely that virtue is acquired through divine fate. Thus he formulates the following disjunctive syllogism (*Men.*, 99e – 100a):

33.

a) If someone acquires virtue, it happens through teaching, by nature or due to divine fate.

b) It has been proven that virtue cannot be acquired either through teaching or by nature.

c) Therefore virtue is acquired due to divine fate.

Divine fate (θεία μοῖρα) here is connected in particular, according to Plato’s philosophical beliefs, with chance and good fortune. His idea is that the truth of sentences in general may be due either to chance or to human intervention (ἡγεμονία). In the former case we have a true opinion (ἀληθῆ δόξαν) while in the latter, knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). It has, however, been proven



that virtue as a whole is not knowledge; it must therefore be, in part, a true opinion. As a result, its validity or the lack thereof is also dependent on chance (*Men.*, 99a). This does not of course imply that each individual is not responsible for his actions or omissions. I believe that it would not be incorrect to translate “divine fate” as “divine grace”, since Plato is considered a forerunner of Christianity (Ivanka 2017), and it is true that he approaches monotheism.

The role of chance, on the contrary – as the subject is described in Book X of *The Republic* (617c–619c) – is limited to giving each individual his opportunity to choose freely the kind of life he wishes to lead. This decision is irreversible. He must of necessity (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) follow this path, while simultaneously bearing the burden of his responsibilities. Thus chance and necessity are related concepts. This is also demonstrated by the fact that Plato calls the three Fates, Lachesis, Clotho and Atropos, daughters of Necessity. Chance (τύχη) and necessity (εἰμαρμένη) are at the limits of freedom. Hegel and Marx express themselves in a similar way when they define freedom as the understanding of necessity. The choice of life is the individual's most important decision (κρατίστη ἄρεσις). This is why each person should neglect all other lessons and devote himself immediately and entirely to discovering the right person, who will make him a knower (i.e. a morally informed person), so that he can not only tell good life from the evil one, but can always choose the best possible option. The amount of virtue one acquires is commensurate with the degree to which one honours or dishonours it. Virtue is masterless (ἀδέσποτον), i.e. free, as it has no master (Herter 1975). This means that no one can govern it so as to give it to another person at will, in other words to teach it.

It would seem that the concept of divinity is clearly different from that of nature and chance (*Lg.*, III 682a). They are, however, closely related, because human nature can be mixed with divine power (*Lg.*, III 691e), since man shares in divine fate (*Prt.*, 322a). In *The Republic* (II 366c), it appears that Plato not only repeats but also elaborates on his views in *Meno*. Specifically, virtue cannot be gained either by nature or with the help of knowledge. Plato adds that nature and knowledge prevent a man from being unjust because they act as inhibitions, making the individual avoid injustice. In other words, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for a knowledgeable man or one gifted with divine nature to be unjust. However, these aspects do not guarantee that someone will acquire justice and become just; this is the work of divine fate alone.

It is worth noting here that virtue (i.e. good) and dialectic have the concept of the middle way (μεσότης) in common. A perfect life is neither healthy (ὕγιεινός), nor unhealthy (νοσώδης), neither rich nor poor, but the mean thereof (μέσος). For “the body which displays all these qualities in

intermediate degree is by far the most sober, and soundest as well, for the one sort makes men's souls vain and overbearing, the other tame and abject." (*R.*, I 619a, *Lg.*, V 728e). This golden mean is also the chief characteristic of dialectic (*Plt.*, 262b, 265a and *Phlb.*, 17a, *Ti.*, 32b). Could this be considered as one more proof of the affinity of good for dialectic, which produces knowledge? In some sense, yes, because both are considered as being the cause of knowledge and truth (*R.*, VI 508e, VII 517c). This return of reality is the true philosophy (*R.*, 521c), which is the dialectic (*Sph.*, 253e). Thus we have assimilation of thinking to the thought (*Ti.*, 90d). Aristotle says the same thing: "It must be itself that thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking... and in the theoretical knowledge the logos, or the act of thinking is the object (*Metaph.*, XII9, 1074b 30 – 1075a 3). "As then, the thought and the object of thought are not different in the case of things that have no matter, they will be the same, i.e. the thinking will be one with the object of its thought" (*Ibid.*, 1075a 3-5. The translation is from W.D. Ross). This means that thinking (νοῦς, νόησις) and the object of thinking (νοούμενον) are identical. With this way we may say that the idea of Good and the Dialectic are the same. Dialectic is a process of thinking and ends to the Good. According to Plato we use dialectic when we attempt without perceptions of sense but only with reason to find out the very essence of each thing till we apprehend by thought itself the essence of the idea of Good. Processing in this way we arrive at the limit of the intelligible world. This is only a rest during our long journey (*Rep.* VII 332a-e), since the Idea of Good is in the region of the known world the last thing to be hardly seen (*Rep.* VII 517b-c). With this sense the journey i.e. the dialectic is the Good itself and so mean and end coincide just as in Plato's lectures *On the Good*. That the object of thinking is the mind (νοῦς) results also from Plato when he speaks of the assimilation of thinking being to the thought (*Tim.* 90d, *Theaet.*, 176b). This happens to the wise man: "But he who has been earnest in the love of knowledge and of true wisdom and has exercised his intellect more than any other part of him must have thought immortal and divine, if he attain truth" (*Tim.* 90b-c. The translation is from B. Jowett, cf. Κολφας 1997, p. 494, note 887).

However, all the statements concerning virtue made above apply on condition that we know its substance; their truth depends on our knowledge of its definition (*Men.*, 100b, *Prt.*, 361a). This view is based on the following considerations:

34. If we attempt to examine what virtue is, then it will become obvious to what extent it may be taught or not. This is on condition that, in order for one to know the quality of a thing, one must first know what that thing is (*Phdr.*,

237b-c). This requires knowledge of dialectic, which serves as an instrument of learning (*R.*, VII 518c). Dialectic, i.e. the logical arrangement of arguments, presupposes in its turn the existence of ideas (*R.*, VI 520e–511e, *Prm.*, 129e). However, it is not at all certain whether ideas exist or not, since their existence was not proven in the early dialogues, but simply assumed (*Phd.*, 100b). The assumption of the substance of ideas is the primary hypothesis, and perhaps the “unassumed principle” (ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος), on which depends the truth of all the other hypotheses on which our knowledge is based; consequently, our knowledge cannot be certain. Later, in *Timaeus* (51d-e), Plato proves the existence of ideas with the following hypothetical syllogism:

35.

a) If reason (νοῦς), whose peak is knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), differs from a true opinion, forming two distinct kinds, then there exist forms (εἶδη), that is beings in themselves (ὄντα καθ' αὐτά), which can only be apprehended through reason; otherwise the things we perceive using our bodily senses would be most stable (βεβαιότατα).

b) However, it is true that these are two different things, since they differ as to origin and behaviour.

c) Therefore ideas exist.

The fact that a true opinion differs from knowledge has been developed in detail in at least three platonic dialogues, specifically in *Meno* (98a–99a), *Theaetetus* (201c) and *The Republic* (V 477a-d, VII 534a). The definition of knowledge as a true opinion with reason (δόξαν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου), finally proves insufficient and the proof is circular. This is because the “taking of reason” (λόγον λαμβάνειν), i.e. dialectic, means that the difference between one thing and another must be discovered, for only then does one become knowledgeable. Thus reason is the knowledge of difference (ἐρμηνεία τῆς διαφορότητος) (*Tht.*, 208e–209a). Subsequently, in order to understand the difference between two things, knowledge or science is a prerequisite. The answer to the question “what is knowledge” would be as follows: “true belief with knowledge of difference” (δόξα ὀρθὴ μετὰ ἐπιστήμης διαφορότητος, *Tht.*, 210a). This means that knowledge is a true opinion with the addition of knowledge of difference, a circular definition. Thus we fall into the logical fallacy of *petitio principii* (*Ph.*, 242b 20; *AnPr.*, I 23, 41a 24, 34, 40b 32); our conclusion is taken for granted. This is why Plato himself calls this definition of knowledge “utterly silly” (παντάπασιν εὐηθές, *Tht.*, 210a 7). Here, in other words, we have reached the limits of human understanding. Thus we have come to the knowledge of ignorance, the enquiry of Socratic refutation. This is the nature of dialectic enquiry, introduced by Socrates and perfected by Plato, used as a method. Socrates himself, faithful to his conviction that he knows

only one thing, i.e. that he knows nothing, never discovered any definition of meaning. However, the discovery and refutation of falsity is de facto a proof of truth. The words “elencho” and “elenchus” denote the search for truth as much as for falsity. This means that we are trying to learn if something is true or false (*Ep.*, VII 344b, *Tht.*, 150b).

It should finally be noted that dialectic is also brought to light in another way: specifically, by synthesis and diaeresis (collection and division). Apart from synthesis and diaeresis of the hypotheses themselves, Plato attempts to do the same with the arts. When we examined them, we saw that they form equivalences, which are an expression of dialectic. These equivalences are closely connected to the synthesis and diaeresis of the arts, that is, dialectic (*Phdr.*, 266b). Thus, Plato divides the arts into two categories: those relating to the healing of a) the body, and of b) the soul. He calls the latter political arts. Each of these categories is subdivided into a) genuine and b) flattering arts, i.e. those whose object is images. The genuine political arts are legislation and judicature, while the false ones are sophistic and rhetoric. The true arts of the body are gymnastics and medicine, while the false ones are self-adornment and cookery. This division is apparent in the following table, in the horizontal and vertical sections:

ARTS

Body	Soul (political)	therapy
Gymnastics	Legislation	
Medicine	Judicature	true
Self-adornment	Sophistic	
Cookery	Rhetoric	flattering (false)

Τέχναι

σάματος	ψυχῆς (πολιτικά)	θεραπεία
γυμναστική	νομοθετική	γνήσιαι
ιατρική	δικαστική	
κομμωτική	σοφιστική	κολακευτικά
ὀψοποιία	ῥητορική	(νόθαι)

Διαίρεσις τῆς διδασκαλίας, τῆς ἀγωγῆς, τῆς ἀρετῆς,  
τῆς ἐνδείξεως καὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἰς ἐναντιότητα

**A. Διδασκαλία ὡς εὐεργεσία (χάρις)**

οὐκ ἀρετὴ	ἀρετὴ	<i>ἀντικείμενον διδ. αξιολόγησις μετάδοσις δίδακτρα πότε; (χρόνος) συμβόλαιον</i>
οὐκ αἰσχρόν	αἰσχρόν	
συμβουλευεῖν	μὴ συμβουλευεῖν	
εἰ λαμβάνοι ἀργύριον	εἰ μὴ λαμβάνοι ἀργύριον	
ἅμα	μὴ ἅμα	
συνθέμενος μισθόν	ἄνευ μισθοῦ	

**B. Ἀγωγή (τροφή)**

γυμναστική (σώματος)		μουσική (ψυχῆς)		<i>Πρὸς ἀρετήν παιδεία ἀγωνία</i>
πάλη	ὄρχησις	λόγος-μῦθος	ὠδὴ-μέλος	
γυμνικοί-ίππικοί		μουσικοί		

**Γ. Ἀρετὴ: 1. Εἶδη ἀρετῆς**

πολλοί (ἀνθρωπίνη)	ὀλίγοι (θεία)	<i>ποσότης-ποιότης πόλις (δημοσία) οἰκία (ιδία)</i>
ἄρρενες	φύλακες (οἱ φιλόσοφοι)	
θήλεις	φυλακίδες (αἱ φιλόσοφοι)	

**2. Μετάδοσις τῆς ἀρετῆς**

σοφιστής, ρήτωρ	φιλόσοφος	<i>διδάσκαλος οἰκείωσις διάρκεια ὄφελος τρόπος βίος</i>
παραδίδειν	προτρέπειν, παράδειγμα	
τάχιστα	διὰ μακρῶν	
ἀργύριον	φιλία	
εἰκῆ (τυχαίως)	τάξει, ὀρθότητι, τέχνῃ	
πονηροί καὶ ἄθλιοι	ἀγαθοί καὶ εὐδαίμονες	

**Δ. Ένδειξις: 1. Εἶδη ἐνδείξεως**

ἔναρθρος, δήλωσις (δόξα)		ἐνδιάθετος, ἀλήθεια (νόησις)	
γραπτός	προφορικός	μάθημα, ἔριστικός	διαλεκτικός
εἰκασία	πίστις	διάνοια	ἐπιστήμη
παιδιά(μῦθος)		προπαιδεία	παιδεία

λόγος  
τελειότης  
εἰκόνες

δυνάμεις ψυχῆς  
πορεία λόγου

**2. Λόγω διαμάχεσθαι**

ἔριστική (σοφιστική, ρητορική)	διαλεκτική (Σωκρατικός ἔλεγχος)
εἰκὴ φύρειν	συγκρίνειν-διακρίνειν
εἰκός, πιθανόν	ἀληθές, σαφές
πειθῶ	διδαχὴ (ἔμφρων πειθῶ)
ἄλογον	μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς
μεταπειστόν	ἀκίνητον πειθοῖ
ἀπό τύχης	ἀνθρωπίνη ἡγεμονία
κακόν (ἄκρα)	ἀγαθόν (μέσον)

τέχνη

ἐνέργεια  
ἐγκυρότης  
ἀποτέλεσμα  
νοῦς-σῶμα  
ἔξις  
ὀρθόν  
ἀρχή

**Ε. Διαλεκτική (εἰς ἑαυτὴν – εἰς ἄλλο): 1. ἐκφάνσεις**

παιδιά (μορφή)	σπουδὴ (περιεχόμενον)
ἐξωτερικός	ἐσωτερικός
ἐξωτερικός	ἐσωτερικός

μέθοδος  
διδασκαλία  
ἄσκησις  
(γυμνασία)

**2. Τρόποι διαλεκτικῆς**

ἀπ' ἀρχῆς (παραγωγή)	ἐπ' ἀρχὴν (ἐπαγωγή)
διαίρεσις (ἀφαιρέσεις, τομή)	συναγωγή (πρόσθεσις, δεσμός)
ὑπόθεσις (ἐπὶ τελευτήν)	ὑπόθεσις (ἀπὸ τελευτῆς)

ἀρχή  
μεταβολὴ } ἀνά  
ὑπόθεσις } λόγον

**Division of teaching, education, virtue, indication and dialectic into opposites**

**A. Teaching as a benefit (service)**

nonvirtue	virtue	<i>object of t. evaluation transmission payment when? (time) contract</i>
<b>not shameful</b>	<b>shameful</b>	
<b>advising</b>	<b>not advising</b>	
<b>if money is received</b>	<b>if money is not received</b>	
<b>simultaneously</b>	<b>not simultaneously</b>	
<b>for a fee</b>	<b>without a fee</b>	

**B. Education (nurture)**

gymnastics (of body)		music (of soul)		<i>to goodness education competitions</i>
wrestling	dancing	speech – tale	song – tune	
athletics – horse race		musical		

**C. Virtue: 1. Kinds of virtue**

many (human)	few (divine)	<i>quantity – quality city (public) home (private)</i>
<b>men</b>	<b>guardians (philosophers)</b>	
<b>women</b>	<b>guardians (philosophers)</b>	

**2. Transmission of virtue**

Sophist, orator	philosopher	<i>teacher teaching duration benefit approach life</i>
<b>handing on</b>	<b>urging, example</b>	
<b>as fast as possible</b>	<b>long-term</b>	
<b>money</b>	<b>friendship</b>	
<b>by chance</b>	<b>orderly, rightly, with art</b>	
<b>wicked and evil</b>	<b>only good and well-living men</b>	

**D. Indication:** 1. Kinds of indication

external (articulated) statement (opinion)		internal (residing in the mind) truth (noesis)		<i>logos</i> <i>perfection</i> <i>images</i> <i>spiritual strengths</i> <i>route of the reason</i>
<b>written</b>	<b>oral</b>	<b>math., eristic</b>	<b>dialectic</b>	
<b>conjecture</b>	<b>belief</b>	<b>understanding</b>	<b>knowledge</b>	
<b>playfulness (myth)</b>		<b>preliminary</b>	<b>education</b>	

2. Debate

artless, contentious (sophistic, rhetoric)	with art., dialectic (Socratic elenchus)	<i>art</i>
<b>chance guesswork</b>	<b>to combine and separate</b>	<i>action</i>
<b>surmise, possible</b>	<b>true, clear</b>	<i>validity</i>
<b>persuasion</b>	<b>teaching (wise persuasion)</b>	<i>result</i>
<b>unreasonable</b>	<b>with true reasoning</b>	<i>mind – body</i>
<b>alterable by persuasion</b>	<b>immovable by persuasion</b>	<i>habit</i>
<b>by chance</b>	<b>with human intervention</b>	<i>truth</i>
<b>evil (extremes)</b>	<b>good (mean)</b>	<i>principle</i>

**E. Dialectic (itself – other):** 1. Connotations of dialectic

playfulness (form)	seriousness (content)	<i>method</i>
<b>external</b>	<b>internal</b>	<i>teaching</i>
<b>external</b>	<b>internal</b>	<i>exercise (practice)</i>

2. Ways of dialectic

from principle (deduction)	to principle (induction)	<i>method</i>
<b>division</b> (abstraction, section)	<b>collection</b> (addition, bond)	<i>synopsis</i>
<b>hypothesis</b> (to the end)	<b>hypothesis</b> (from the end)	<i>hypothesis</i>

**proportional**



## DIALECTIC AS SOCRATIC ELENCHUS IN PLATO'S *GORGIAS*

GEORGE CHARILAOU KOUMAKIS – dr filozofii, emerytowany adiunkt na Uniwersytecie Ioannina Crete (Grecja). Prowadził również wykłady na Uniwersytecie w Atenach (Grecja). Obszar jego badań obejmuje starożytną i nowożytną filozofię grecką, wczesną i nowożytną filozofię europejską, filozofię kultury, edukacji i filozofię polityczną. Członek towarzystw filozoficznych, takich jak Greckie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne, Amerykańskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne. Jest redaktorem naczelnym *AshEse Journal of Family and Lifestyle* w Londynie. Jest autorem 13 książek filozoficznych, tłumaczeń i dziesięciu recenzji książek filozoficznych.

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