Austin and Positive Meaning of Language Criticism

Maciej Soin

 

The widespread image of the “philosophy of ordinary language” shows its intention to replace the traditional philosophical inquiry with analyses of the ways the lan­guage is used. In fact, linguistic analyses were significant, above all, both in Wittgenstein’s research and Austin’s arguments, in so far as they removed the obstacles to appropriate un­derstanding of philosophical problems. This article presents this subordination of linguistic reflections to factual problems, based on the issues of meaning and truth, which belong to the most critical areas of Austin’s linguistic philosophy.
The positive outcomes of Austin’s reflections on the meaning show a variety of reasons why we use the same word. In consequence of this discovery we should realise why there cannot be a single theory of universals. Moreover, some of the cases Austin takes into consideration with regard to this differentiation cast a particular light on the problems philosophers have with important words such as “good”, “happy”, “real”, and “true”. These problems result from considering them as proper names, while the reasons for using these terms change from case to case.
However, as is also the case with Wittgenstein’s investigation, Austin᾿s views on truth aim at a new validation of the classic concept of truth, which overcomes the problems of its structural interpretation. In this approach, truth is, as Wittgenstein said, the performance of grammar, and in Austin’s specification, it is possible thanks to the existence of the conven­tion of description and demonstration. Therefore, statements “correspond to the facts” to various degrees and in multiple dimensions, in different ways and in various situations, for different intentions and purposes. The correspondence between statements and facts occurs to the extent in which they are able to provide the rules for the language we use.

The widespread image of the “philosophy of ordinary language” shows its intention to replace the traditional philosophical inquiry with analyses of the ways the lan­guage is used. In fact, linguistic analyses were significant, above all, both in Wittgenstein’s research and Austin’s arguments, in so far as they removed the obstacles to appropriate un­derstanding of philosophical problems. This article presents this subordination of linguistic reflections to factual problems, based on the issues of meaning and truth, which belong to the most critical areas of Austin’s linguistic philosophy. The positive outcomes of Austin’s reflections on the meaning show a variety of reasons why we use the same word. In consequence of this discovery we should realise why there cannot be a single theory of universals. Moreover, some of the cases Austin takes into consideration with regard to this differentiation cast a particular light on the problems philosophers have with important words such as “good”, “happy”, “real”, and “true”. These problems result from considering them as proper names, while the reasons for using these terms change from case to case. However, as is also the case with Wittgenstein’s investigation, Austin᾿s views on truth aim at a new validation of the classic concept of truth, which overcomes the problems of its structural interpretation. In this approach, truth is, as Wittgenstein said, the performance of grammar, and in Austin’s specification, it is possible thanks to the existence of the conven­tion of description and demonstration. Therefore, statements “correspond to the facts” to various degrees and in multiple dimensions, in different ways and in various situations, for different intentions and purposes. The correspondence between statements and facts occurs to the extent in which they are able to provide the rules for the language we use.

66-soin

 

Keywords: Austin · Wittgenstein · philosophy of ordinary language · meaning · truth · grammar

Maciej Soin — Associate Professor, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology PAN (Warsaw), University of Information Technology and Management (Rzeszow). Main publications: “The Philosophy of S.I. Witkiewicz” (1995), “Grammar and Metaphysics. Wittgenstein’s Problem” (2001), “Th e Question of Truth. Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy” (2008). His current research focuses on applications of linguistic philosophy to sociology and ethics.   »  

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