Intuicja jako metoda poznania zasad u Arystotelesa

Dariusz Piętka

 

absolute; left: -10000px; top: 0px; width: 1px; height: 1px; overflow: hidden;„>The subject of the article is intuition and its role in philosophical cognition
absolute; left: -10000px; top: 0px; width: 1px; height: 1px; overflow: hidden;”>in Aristotle. The main problem concerns the rationality of intuitive knowledge. Intuition
absolute; left: -10000px; top: 0px; width: 1px; height: 1px; overflow: hidden;„>is the immediate perception of principles. There are two types of rational intuition – theoretical
absolute; left: -10000px; top: 0px; width: 1px; height: 1px; overflow: hidden;”>and practical. The first is perceiving principles in being and proving. The second one
absolute; left: -10000px; top: 0px; width: 1px; height: 1px; overflow: hidden;„>is cognition of purpose. Both are preceded by induction. The act of intuition is a kind of
absolute; left: -10000px; top: 0px; width: 1px; height: 1px; overflow: hidden;”>immediate rational perception. The aim of intuitive knowledge is to express the principles
absolute; left: -10000px; top: 0px; width: 1px; height: 1px; overflow: hidden;„>of being and cognition, the definition of essences, and advancing a thesis at the beginning of
absolute; left: -10000px; top: 0px; width: 1px; height: 1px; overflow: hidden;”>proof. In order to present inter-subjectivity of intuition, Aristotle introduced a confirmation
absolute; left: -10000px; top: 0px; width: 1px; height: 1px; overflow: hidden;„>procedure concerning some of the principles which are known intuitively. The idea of confirmation
absolute; left: -10000px; top: 0px; width: 1px; height: 1px; overflow: hidden;”>is forced by accusations against, for example, the principle of non–contradiction,
absolute; left: -10000px; top: 0px; width: 1px; height: 1px; overflow: hidden;„>which made Aristotle present a certain extra-intuitive way for it to be substantiated.

The subject of the article is intuition and its role in philosophical cognitionin Aristotle. The main problem concerns the rationality of intuitive knowledge. Intuitionis the immediate perception of principles. There are two types of rational intuition – theoreticaland practical. The first is perceiving principles in being and proving. The second oneis cognition of purpose. Both are preceded by induction. The act of intuition is a kind ofimmediate rational perception. The aim of intuitive knowledge is to express the principlesof being and cognition, the definition of essences, and advancing a thesis at the beginning ofproof. In order to present inter-subjectivity of intuition, Aristotle introduced a confirmationprocedure concerning some of the principles which are known intuitively. The idea of confirmationis forced by accusations against, for example, the principle of non–contradiction,which made Aristotle present a certain extra-intuitive way for it to be substantiated.

DOI: 10.37240/AHFiMS.2022.66.67.2

66-pietka

Słowa kluczowe: intuicja · Arystoteles · teoria poznania

Dariusz Piętka — dr, adiunkt w katedrze Metafizyki UKSW w Warszawie. Kierunki badań:  zastosowania logiki do metafizyki (w szczególności: zagadnienie przyczynowości, zagadnienie analogii), ontologia formalna, metodologia metafizyki, filozofia starożytna (szczególnie ontologia Parmenidesa, Platona, Arystotelesa).   »  

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